English
Therefore, this can be understood through the discussions in all aspects, above and below. The third view is that the 'ground' (gzhi) is considered to be indeterminate: it is believed that the nature of the 'ground' mind can be transformed into either samsara or nirvana, so it is not absolutely certain in any case. That is, it is reasonable to consider it indeterminate from the perspective that the 'ground' is free from elaboration and samsara and nirvana have not yet been established. However, if the nature of the mind is the 'ground', and the 'ground' itself is not determined in reality, then it would lead to the reversal from a pure state to an impure state, or from an impure state to a pure nature, because there is no definite basis, so it will transform into any state. If this is admitted, then sentient beings will also be liberated effortlessly, and Buddhas will also transform into samsara, thus leading to the confusion of samsara and nirvana. The fourth view is that the 'ground' is considered to be definite, the ultimate reality: it is believed that the nature of the 'ground' is uncreated, immutable. That is, clinging to something unchanging and real, believing that it is the nature of the mind that is different from innate feelings and thoughts. That is, from the perspective that the 'ground' is a temporary, stainless manifestation, it is reasonable to consider the 'ground' to be the definite reality. However, if it is considered to be the definite reality in all cases, then samsara will not appear. If it is believed that nirvana is determined through realization, then before realization, the nirvana that is the basis of realization must exist, which is the same as the eternal view of the heretics, and also contradicts the view that liberation from causes and conditions is desired. If it is not realized, how can it be known as the 'ground'? If it is said that the essence of samsara is known to be nirvana, then if the essence is nirvana, there is no need for original liberation, just as the nature of water is moist and does not require acquired modification. The fifth view is that the 'ground' can be transformed into anything: it is believed that the nature of the 'ground' can be transformed into either samsara or nirvana through conditions. That is, clinging to the idea that the nature of the mind can be influenced by conditions. That is, in general, because it is emptiness, the appearance of dependent origination can arise, which is consistent with the view that 'the appearance of the ground arises from the ground'. Therefore, if the appearance of the ground arises, it is acceptable to use the term 'transformation' to describe the state of liberation or delusion from knowing and not knowing. However, if it is believed that the essence of the ground or mind can be transformed, then there must be a substance that can be transformed, so it must be either permanent or impermanent. If it is permanent, it cannot be transformed, just as the sky cannot be cut. If it is not impermanent, there is no need to transform it, because it does not transform.
Chinese
又，因为变化是法性之故。此外，识蕴成为顽固之物，以及获得涅槃果位后也可能被转回轮回，这些都是不可能的。第六，认为基可以被承认为任何事物，即认为基心之自性，无论是轮回、涅槃、有、无等等，都可以是任何事物，因此可以被承认为任何事物，这是因为没有真正契合离戏之本性，是没有把握住要点的观点。也就是说，从基心之法性显现为轮回和涅槃两者的角度来说，既是轮回之基，也是涅槃之基。从本来清净的角度来说是无，从任运自成的角度来说是有，从和合的角度来说是二者都是，仅仅是名言上可以承认。如果无论如何都可以承认为任何事物，那么，以六种特征解脱的基就是迷惑之基，并且必须承认与无明具有相同性质的迷惑之基是解脱之基。如果这样，那么承认兔角和石女之子能造作轮回和涅槃也可以，因为理由相同。第七，认为基是多种多样的，即认为从基中显现出轮回和涅槃的各种法，那些法就是基的法性。实际上，无论显现出轮回、涅槃、内外的各种法，都不是在心之外成立的，因此执着于一切都是心性。任运自成和这二者的区别是，一个是说基上成立轮回和涅槃，一个是说基本身就是轮回和涅槃。也就是说，从大悲的自力无碍显现为各种游舞的角度来说，并非心性之外，这是合理的，但如果无论如何都这样认为基，那么就会导致唯一的心性既是清净的也是不清净的，如果认为是外在显现，那么就会导致基是顽固之物，如果认为是内在觉知，那么就会导致基是能思之物，如果认为是二者的集合，那么就会导致基是能取所取之物，并且不能成为一味法界之自性，因此是不合理的。像这样，所有执着于已成立的宗派观点的七种基，它们所要确定的体性，实际上是本来清净和任运自成双运之基的唯一自性中的各个方面，各自认为这才是基的实相。
English
Furthermore, because change is the nature of phenomena. Moreover, it is not reasonable because it is possible for awareness to become inert, and even after attaining the fruit of nirvana, it can be transformed back into samsara. Sixth, the assertion that the ground can be affirmed as anything at all: This is the view that the nature of the ground-mind, whether it is samsara, nirvana, existence, non-existence, etc., can be anything at all, and therefore can be affirmed as anything. This is because it has not truly met the nature of freedom from elaboration, and it is a view that has not grasped the essential point. That is to say, from the perspective of the ground-mind's nature manifesting as both samsara and nirvana, it is both the ground of samsara and the ground of nirvana. From the perspective of primordial purity, it is non-existence; from the perspective of spontaneous presence, it is existence; and from the perspective of union, it is both. It is permissible to affirm this merely in terms of terminology. However, if it is possible to affirm it as anything at all in every way, then the ground that is liberated by the six characteristics is the ground of delusion, and it must be possible to affirm that the ground of delusion, which possesses the same nature as ignorance, is the ground of liberation. If this is the case, then it would also be permissible to affirm that a rabbit's horn and the child of a barren woman can create samsara and nirvana, because the reasoning is the same. Seventh, the assertion that the ground is manifold: This is the view that the various phenomena of samsara and nirvana that arise from the ground are the nature of the ground. In reality, whatever manifold phenomena of samsara, nirvana, inner, and outer appear, they are not established apart from the mind, and therefore they are all mind-itself. The difference between spontaneous presence and this is that one says that samsara and nirvana are established on the ground, while the other says that the ground itself is both samsara and nirvana. That is to say, from the perspective that the unobstructed self-display of compassion manifests as various displays, it is not other than mind-itself, which is reasonable. However, if one asserts the ground in this way in every respect, then it would follow that the single mind-itself is both pure and impure. If one asserts it as external appearance, then it would follow that the ground is inert. If one asserts it as internal awareness, then it would follow that the ground is a thinker. If one asserts it as a collection of the two, then it would follow that the ground possesses a subject and object. And it would not be possible for it to be the nature of the single expanse, therefore it is not reasonable. Like this, all seven grounds that hold onto established philosophical views, the nature to be definitively ascertained by all of them is actually each aspect of the single nature of the ground of the union of primordial purity and spontaneous presence, each separately thinking that this alone is the reality of the ground.
Chinese
那些认为自己通过分别念所设定的各自宗义，在宣说地基时没有过失的人，即使对地基的某一方面没有迷惑而有所了解，但因为没有完全了解其本性，所以是有过失的。现在我们这些初学者在进入心的实相时，无论执着于有无等七个方面中的哪一个，都是束缚，所以必须理解为不要执着于任何一边。像这样只了解某一方面的情况，比如七个天生失明的盲人触摸大象的身体并进行观察，虽然了解某一方面，但无法完全了解整体。这种情形就像《心髓经》中所说的那样：国王召集许多盲人，让他们看大象，并命令他们各自描述大象的特征。触摸到大象鼻子的人说："像铁钩一样。"触摸到眼睛的人说："像碗一样。"触摸到耳朵的人说："像簸箕一样。"触摸到背部的人说："像床一样。"触摸到尾巴的人说："像绳子一样。"盲人们所说的都不是大象以外的东西，但他们并没有完全理解大象。同样，佛的自性也被说成是空性、如幻、光明等等不同的说法，但也没有完全理解。又如，无论用语言概念的思维如何衡量胜义谛，即地基的实相，也无法如实了解，就像对盲人描述天鹅的颜色一样。同样，在那部经中也说：无论是凡夫、声闻、缘觉还是菩萨，都无法如实见到佛的真如，比如一个盲人问另一个人酥油的颜色，那人说像雪一样。那人触摸雪，认为酥油的颜色是冷的。问：雪的颜色是什么样的？答：像天鹅的翅膀一样。听到天鹅翅膀的声音，认为颜色是喧闹的。问：翅膀的颜色是什么样的？
English
Those who claim that their own established tenets, conceived through conceptual thought, are without fault when explaining the ground, even if they understand a certain aspect of the ground without being deluded, are still flawed because they do not fully understand its nature as it is. Now, when we beginners engage in experiencing the nature of mind, clinging to any of the seven aspects such as existence or non-existence is a binding factor. Therefore, it is necessary to understand that we should not cling to any extreme. Such incomplete understanding is like the example of seven blind men, blind from birth, who touch the body of an elephant and examine it. Although they understand a part, they do not understand the whole. This is similar to what is said in the Essence Sutra: The king gathered many blind men and showed them an elephant, instructing them to describe the characteristics of the elephant individually. Those who touched the elephant's trunk said, "It is like a hook." Those who touched the eyes said, "It is like a bowl." Those who touched the ears said, "It is like a winnowing basket." Those who touched the back said, "It is like a bed." Those who touched the tail said, "It is like a rope." The blind men did not speak of anything other than the elephant, but they did not fully understand it. Similarly, the nature of the Buddha is spoken of as emptiness, illusion-like, luminosity, and so on, in different ways, but it is not fully understood. Furthermore, no matter how the ultimate truth, the reality of the ground, is measured by the mind of linguistic concepts, it cannot be known as it is, just as describing the color of a swan to a blind man. Likewise, it is said in that very text: Neither ordinary individuals, nor Shravakas, nor Pratyekabuddhas, nor Bodhisattvas see the essence of the Buddha as it is. For example, a blind man asked another what the color of butter was, and the other replied that it was like snow. When he touched the snow, he perceived the color of butter to be cold. He asked, "What is the color of snow like?" He replied, "It is like the wing of a swan." Hearing the sound of the swan's wing, he perceived the color to be noisy. He asked, "What is the color of the wing like?"
Chinese
扎。如同海螺一般。触摸海螺时感到光滑，因此也认为它是光滑的。无论怎么说，就像盲人无法知道颜色一样，佛的自性也极难见到。第三，详细阐述无过失自宗的基础：在此确立无矛盾集合的无过失基础之实相时，觉性之本体从一开始就是清净的，虽然自性功德之分本来就是任运成就的，但由于显空之反体各异，因此不是一体的，并且由于本体只有一个，因此不是不同实体，例如水和湿性一样。像这样，从空性的角度来看，由于远离了形状和颜色等，以及所有可以被认为是“这种本体”之物的相状之戏论，因此被称为本来清净。然而，它不像虚空一样什么都没有，而是从显现的角度来看，由于深邃明澈之分自发显现而不间断，因此可以显现任何慈悲之力量，所以被称为任运成就。如《珍珠鬘》中所说：“本体本来清净，离言诠，自性任运成，显现皆圆满。”以及《秘密藏续》中所说：“非男非女亦非双性，无相无种亦无族，非色非形亦非处，亦非任何物。如是法界即智慧，乃是方便手印之根本。”如是，常断二边亦随之而舍弃。那么，如果你们将本来清净和任运成就各自的状态视为有过失，那么这里也说是二者兼具，难道没有那个过失吗？答：这里，基础心之法性不是一个存在或不存在，也不是显空之不同实体二者存在，而是本体相同，只是反体有所区别而已，因此不存在那样的矛盾集合。例如，从入睡开始，粗细念头逐渐停止，进入深度睡眠状态时，八十自性念头停止的觉知中没有梦境，以及携带着蔓延光芒之风的觉知中显现梦境的睡眠时期的两种觉知，就像没有脱离一个睡眠的本体一样。由于本来清净之分上没有建立起根本的错乱，因此从未流转轮回，未来也不会流转。