English
Ah! At that time, within the space of a single atom, one can see the Buddha's pure lands, as numerous as atoms, together with their supports and supported. In a single instant of time, countless eons can appear and be seen, and so on. That is to say, all phenomena that appear are primordially true emptiness. The definitive understanding of illusion, which appears but is without inherent existence, is the inconceivable and profound realm of activity of the Buddhas, and one will be able to enter into it well. Third, explaining the inconceivable and summarizing the meaning: Therefore, it is explained by four verses and two lines, such as "self-appearance." Therefore, all dharmas are primordially appearance-emptiness, pure equality, and truth indivisible, or the meaning of abiding in union. To symbolize this meaning, self-appearance is without limitation, so it is called impartial, which means being free from all limitations and biases. The ground-essence is inconceivable, and the elaborations of suchness, emptiness and non-emptiness, etc., can all be established. Like fire and heat, appearance and emptiness are indivisible, or union, and so on. Even so, regarding the profound Dharma language of the tenets, even if one spends a hundred years striving to think about it again and again, because one does not have much prior habituation with the profound meaning in one's own mind-stream, or if there is no cause of prior habituation, then even if one now uses great wisdom to diligently practice, it is not bad, but very good, but still one cannot truly comprehend it, therefore one will not truly understand. As it is said, "Hearing is vast, but others cannot comprehend it." Therefore, no matter how many profound tenets of Sutra and Tantra, where do all these tenets' deepest intentions converge and flow? The great ocean into which all the essence of the rivers of hundreds of sacred and excellent Dharma teachings flow, that is, appearance-emptiness union, ultimate pure equality, and truth indivisible abiding, this is more wonderful than wonderful, it is truly amazing! In this way, the ultimate reality is in complete agreement with all appearances. Apart from that, the other pure and impure phenomena that appear are sometimes uncertain, impermanent, and appear with deception, etc. Having abandoned all obscurations, the wisdom of pure equality, truth indivisible union, which has fully manifested the ultimate reality as it is, is unchanging, so it is permanent.
Chinese
自生智慧，如实照见无欺之义，二者无别，安住之显现，一切皆极融洽，故无有变异。唉玛，除此以外，若有其他可考察之处，能否显现誓言之果？无论广狭，离边，双运任何一种，通达一法，即能解脱一切。如是说。第七个问题的回答是，对于离戏大中观，有无承诺，何者合理，分四部分：驳斥无承诺之观点；记录龙钦饶降巴分别有无承诺之观点；依此驳斥极力建立有承诺之他宗；追随龙钦饶降巴，广为阐释自宗。第一，以离戏中观等两段偈颂和三句来阐述：对于不住于双运之离戏大中观应成派而言，自宗是否有承诺？在考察有或无之时，藏地早期的大多数学者一致认为，对于不住于双运之中观自宗而言，因为没有任何关于此是彼非、有无等戏论，所以无论如何都不应持有任何承诺。然而，这种观点并不合理。例如，在圣者月称的自宗《入中论》根本和注释中，从作为基础的蕴、界、处之缘起，到作为道的十地，以及作为果的十力等，所有包含一切智智的显现，都是如幻无欺的缘起性。既然如此，所有关于宗派建立的观点都已明确承诺，如果公开否认一切承诺，并将关于基础、道和果等的术语概念全部推给他人，那么这就与圣者月称自宗的言语和所表达的意义相违背。第二，以龙钦饶降巴等四段偈颂来阐述：第二胜者，一切智法王龙钦饶降巴善逝曾如是说：对于圣者月称自宗的中观，即中观应成派而言，在考察是否有术语概念的承诺时，大多数藏地早期学者认为有
English
The self-originated wisdom that directly sees the meaning of infallibility without deception, the two being inseparable, the abiding appearance, all are extremely harmonious, so there is no change. Alas, besides this, if there is anything else to be examined, can the fruit of the vow be manifested? Whether broad or narrow, free from extremes, dual union, whichever it may be, understanding one thing liberates all. Thus it is said. The answer to the seventh question is, regarding the great non-elaboration Madhyamaka, whether there is a commitment or not, which is reasonable, divided into four parts: refuting the view of no commitment; recording the view of Longchen Rabjampa distinguishing between having and not having commitment; based on this, refuting the other's view of strongly establishing having commitment; following Longchen Rabjampa, extensively explaining one's own view. First, it is explained with two verses and three lines such as non-elaboration Madhyamaka: For the non-abiding dual union, non-elaboration great Madhyamaka Prasangika, does the self-view have commitment? When examining whether there is or not, most of the early Tibetan scholars unanimously believe that for the non-abiding dual union Madhyamaka self-view, because there is no elaboration about this is not that, having or not having, etc., so in any case, one should not hold any commitment. However, this view is not reasonable. For example, in the self-view of the glorious Chandrakirti's "Entering the Middle Way" root text and commentary, from the dependent origination of the aggregates, elements, and sources as the basis, to the ten grounds as the path, and the ten powers as the result, all the appearances including omniscience are the dependent origination of illusion-like infallibility. Since this is the case, all views on the establishment of tenets have been clearly committed. If one openly denies all commitments and pushes all the terminology concepts about the basis, path, and result to others, then this contradicts the words and expressed meaning of the glorious Chandrakirti's self-view. Second, it is explained with four verses such as Longchen Rabjampa: The second Victor, the all-knowing Dharma King Longchen Rabjampa the Excellent One, once said: Regarding the Madhyamaka of the glorious Chandrakirti's self-view, that is, the Madhyamaka Prasangika, when examining whether there is a commitment to terminology concepts, most of the early Tibetan scholars believe there is
Chinese
现在执着于无的方面，像这样作为四种替代中的一种，在句义和意义上都很精通的玛嘉蒋尊认为有承诺，而大学者藏巴则认为没有承诺，如果对此进行研究，这两种观点各自都有缺点和优点，因此没有很好地区分。因此，对于远离一切缺点的自己的观点来说，与圣者的等持智慧相符，如实衡量胜义的实相，在等持中念诵时，自性法界中，无论是有无等戏论都无法成立。既然如此，又有什么可取舍的有无等呢？因此，什么都不承诺才是优点。因此，所谓的自己的宗派，就是各自不观察衡量究竟实相的意义，因此无论承诺什么有无等，因为是实相的承诺，所以在等持智慧作为对境时，以及与他人辩论等时，自性或实相有无等戏论的极细微的相状也没有的法界，如其所有，对于有和无、空和不空等，什么承诺都没有。在后得位以名言为对境时，对于包括基地、道路、果在内的宗派，所有如是如是的安立，也必须毫不紊乱和混淆地各自承诺，我是这样认为的。今后如果能像这样立誓并能说话，那么我认为这是我很好地讲述的如意宝藏的伟大注释白莲的力量。第三，依靠它，以雪域等十二个偈颂来表示，像这样依靠有承诺的方面，雪域的一些学者在研究应成派中观的自宗时，虽然没有真实成立的承诺，但没有研究考察世间共称的名言，仅仅是有承诺的方面，反复运用教证和理证来大大地论证，也没有很好地区分，因为如果那样，也没有很好地区分等持和后得的中观细微和粗大等情况，如果全部论证为有承诺，那么自性意义实相法界
English
Now, clinging to the aspect of non-existence, like this, as one of the four alternatives, Machik Jangtson, who is skilled in both sentence meaning and significance, believes there is commitment, while the great scholar Tsangba believes there is no commitment. If this is examined, both of these views each have their own flaws and merits, so they have not been well distinguished. Therefore, for one's own view, which is free from all faults, it is in accordance with the wisdom of the noble equipoise, measuring the ultimate reality as it is. When reciting in equipoise, in the nature of the dharmadhatu, no elaborations such as existence or non-existence can be established. Since that is the case, what is there to take or reject, such as existence or non-existence? Therefore, not committing to anything is the advantage. Therefore, the so-called own tenet is the meaning of the ultimate reality that each individual does not observe and measure. Therefore, no matter what is committed to, such as existence or non-existence, because it is a commitment to reality, when the wisdom of equipoise is the object, and when debating with others, etc., the dharmadhatu, in which there is not even the slightest trace of elaborations such as existence or non-existence of nature or reality, as it is, has no commitment to existence or non-existence, emptiness or non-emptiness, etc. When the subsequent attainment makes conventional truth its object, all the establishments of the tenets including the base, path, and result, as they are, must be committed to separately without confusion or mixing. I think so. From now on, if one can vow and speak in this way about whether to commit or not, then I think it is the power of the great commentary White Lotus, the Wish-Fulfilling Treasury, which I have explained well. Third, relying on it, it is shown by twelve verses such as "Snow Land" etc. Like this, relying on the side of having commitment, some scholars of the snowy land, when examining the self-view of the Prasangika Madhyamaka, although there is no commitment to true establishment, without examining or investigating the worldly conventions, only the side of having commitment is greatly proven by repeatedly using scripture and reasoning, which is also not well distinguished, because if that is the case, the subtle and coarse aspects of Madhyamaka in equipoise and subsequent attainment are not well distinguished, and if everything is proven to have commitment, then the nature, meaning, reality, and dharmadhatu
Chinese
由于在法界中，有和没有等戏论都未成立，因此对于应成中观派来说，不依赖于自己的宗派，而完全承认世间共称的一切名言，也是非常困难的。像这样，所谓的应成中观派自己的宗派，必须是中观的宗义以理性能衡量究竟实相而无有妨害。如果不是这样，其他的名言承认都是有理性妨害的，因此不是自己的宗派。那是因为什么呢？因为应成中观派自己如果以胜义谛的理智来衡量，那么其他宗派所承认的名言都不会那样成立。因此，如果应成派承认自己的宗派的名言，那么它本身也必须能够以胜义谛的理智来衡量而成立，因为胜义谛的理智在经过衡量之后，能够以正确的理智来推动它所承认的。因此，它所承认的未经考察的共称名言，也将在胜义谛上真实成立，并且能够经受胜义谛理智的考察。像这样，应成派自己对中观自续派所说的，名言谛是能够经受理智考察的，并且不能遮破胜义谛的生，以及圣者的等持会成为事物坏灭之因这三个过失，也会同样降临到自己身上。如果说未经考察的共称承认不是应成派自己的宗派承认，那么这难道不是与“自己的宗派像世间老人的承认一样存在承认”的自语相矛盾吗？此外，在自己这里，如果以胜义谛的理智来考察，就没有真实成立，以及未经考察，世间老人所共称的一切名言都无害存在这两个承认已经存在，如果这两个承认都必定是真实的或正确的，那么所谓的中观宗派是这两个中的每一个，还是两个都是？如果说是其中任何一个都是自己的宗派，那么另一个就不可能是自己的宗派，因为它们是直接相违的。如果说“有”的承认不是自己的宗派承认，而“没有”的承认是自己所承认的，那么这就是自己的宗派。
English
Since in the realm of reality, elaborations such as existence and non-existence are not established in any way, it is very difficult for the Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka to accept all worldly conventions without relying on its own system. Thus, what is called the Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka's own system must be such that the ultimate meaning of the Madhyamaka's established conclusion is measured by reason without any harm. Otherwise, the acceptance of terms by others is not their own system because it is harmed by reason. Why is that? Because when the Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka itself measures with the reasoning that examines ultimate truth, those terms of other systems that have been accepted are not established as such. Therefore, if the Prāsaṅgika accepts the terms of its own system, then it itself must be able to be measured by the reasoning that examines ultimate truth and be established, because the reasoning that examines ultimate truth, after examining, can be propelled by correct reasoning to what it has accepted. Therefore, the unexamined, commonly known terms that it has accepted are also truly established in ultimate truth and become amenable to examination by the reasoning that examines ultimate truth. Thus, the three faults that the Prāsaṅgika itself says to the Svātantrika Madhyamaka—that conventional truth is amenable to examination by reason, that the arising of ultimate truth cannot be refuted, and that the samadhi of the noble ones becomes the cause of the destruction of things—also fall equally on itself. If it is said that the unexamined, commonly known acceptance is not the Prāsaṅgika's own system of acceptance, then is this not contradictory to the statement that "one's own system has acceptance just as the acceptance of worldly old people exists"? Furthermore, in oneself, the two acceptances—that there is no true establishment when examined by the reasoning that examines ultimate truth, and that all the terms commonly known to worldly old people exist without harm without examination—exist, and if both of these acceptances are necessarily true or correct, then is what is called the Madhyamaka system each one of these two, or are both? If it is said that any one of them is one's own system, then the other cannot be one's own system, because they are directly contradictory. If it is said that the acceptance of "exists" is not the acceptance of one's own system, but the acceptance of "does not exist" is what is accepted, then that is one's own system.