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In spite of the many differences that pre- vail amongst these theories, they may still be roughly divided into four classes. Thus there are, first, the paurusa-vadins, such as those who follow the Yoga-vasistha school of thought and are idealists of the extreme type, thinking that all our experiences can be controlled by a determined effort of the will and that there is no bond of previous karma, destiny, or fatality which cannot be controlled or overcome by it. Human will is all-powerful, and by it we can produce any change of any kind in the development of our future well-being. There is, again, the view that God alone is responsible for all our actions,*and that He makes those whom He wants to xT] Ayur-veda Ethics 403 raise perform good actions and those whom He wants to take the downward path commit sinful deeds. There is also the view that God rewards or praises us:in accordance with our good or bad deeds, and that we alone are responsible for our actions and free to act as we choose. There is a further view, elaborately dealt with in Patanjali’s Yoga-siitra, that our deeds determine the particular nature of our birth, the period of our lifetime and the nature of our enjoyments or sufferings. Ordinarily the fruits of the actions of a previous birth are reaped in the present birth, and the ripened fruits of the actions of the present birth determine the nature of the future birth, period of life and pleasurable or painful experiences, while the fruits of extremely good or bad actions are reaped in this life. In none of these theories do we find the sort of common-sense eclecticism that we find in Caraka. For here it is only the fruits of extremely bad actions that cannot be arrested by the normal efforts of good conduct. The fruits of all ordinary actions can be arrested by normal physical ways of well-balanced conduct, the administration of proper medicines and the like. This implies that our ordinary non-moral actions in the proper care of health, taking proper tonics, medicines and the like, can modify or arrest the ordinary course of the fruition of our karma. Thus, according to the effects of my ordinary karma I may have fallen ill; but, if I take due care, I may avoid such effects and may still be in good health. According to other theories the laws of karma are im- mutable. Only the fruits of unripe karma can be destroyed by true knowledge. The fruits of ripe karma have to be experienced in any case, even if true knowledge is attained. The peculiar features of Caraka’s theory consist in this, that he does not intro- duce this immutability of ripe karmas. The effects of all karmas, excepting those which are extremely strong, can be modified by an apparently non-moral course of conduct, involving the ob- servance of the ordinary daily duties of life. Ordinarily the law of karma implies the theory of a moral government of the universe in accordance with the good or bad fruits of one’s own karma. We may be free to act as we choose; but our actions in this life, excepting those of great enormity, determine the experiences of our future lives, and so an action in this life cannot ordinarily be expected to ward off any of the evils of this life which one is predestined to undergo in accordance with the karma of a previous birth. Moreover, it is the moral or immoral aspects of an action that 26-2 404 Speculations in the Medical Schools [cH. determine the actual nature of their good or bad effects, success or failure. This implies a disbelief in our power of directly controlling our fortunes by our efforts. The theory of karma thus involves a belief in the mysterious existence and ripening of the sinful and virtuous elements of our actions, which alone in their course of maturity produce effects. If the theory that sins bring their punish- ment, and virtues produce their beneficial effects, of themselves, is accepted, its logical consequences would lead us to deny the possibility of mere physical actions modifying the fruition of these karmas. So the acceptance of the moral properties of actions leads to the denial of their direct physical consequences. If through my honest efforts I succeed in attaining a happy state, it is contended that my success is not due to my present efforts, but it was pre- destined, as a consequence of the good deeds of my previous birth, that I should be happy. For, if the fruition was due to my ordinary efforts, then the theory that all happy or unhappy experiences are due to the ripening of the armas of the previous births falls to the ground. If, on the other hand, all success or failure is due to our proper or improper efforts, then the capacity of sins or virtues to produce misery or happiness may naturally be doubted, and the cases where even our best efforts are attended with failure are not explained. But, if our ordinary efforts cannot effect any- thing, and if the modes of our experiences, pleasures and sufferings, and the term of our life are already predestined, then none of our efforts are of any use in warding off the calamities of this life, and the purpose of the science of medicine is baffled. In common-sense ways of belief one refers to ‘‘fate” or ‘‘destiny”’ only when the best efforts fail, and one thinks that, unless there is an absolute fatality, properly directed efforts are bound to succeed. Caraka’s theory seems to embody such a common-sense view. But the question arises how, if this is so, can the immutability of the law of karma be preserved? Caraka thinks that it is only the extremely good or bad deeds that have this immutable character. All other effects of ordinary actions can be modified or combated by our efforts. Virtue and vice are not vague and mysterious principles in Caraka, and the separation that appears elsewhere between the moral and the physical sides of an action is not found in his teaching?. He seems to regard the “good,” or the all-round manifold 1 Caraka-samhitd, 111. 3. 28-38. XII] Ayur-veda Ethics 405 utility (Aita) of an action, as its ultimate test. What a man has to do before acting is carefully to judge and anticipate the utility of his action, i.e. to judge whether it will be good for him or not; if the effects are beneficial for him, he ought to do it, and, if they ‘are harmful, he ought not to do it1. Our ultimate standard of good actions lies in seeking our own good, and to this end the proper direction and guidance of our mind and senses are absolutely necessary. Caraka applies here also his old principle of the golden mean, and says that the proper means of keeping the mind in the right path consists in avoiding too much thinking, in not thinking of revolting subjects, and in keeping the mind active. Thoughts and ideas are the objects of the mind, and one has to avoid the atiyoga, mithya-yoga and a-yoga of all thoughts, as just described. “‘Self-good,” or atma-hita, which is the end of all our actions, is described as not only that which gives us pleasure and supplies the material for our comfort, ease of mind and long life, but also that which will be beneficial to us in our future life. Right conduct (sad-vrtia) leads to the health and well-being of body and mind and secures sense-control (indriya-vijaya). The three springs of action are our desire for self-preservation (pranaisana), our desire for the materials of comfort (dhanaisana), and our desire for a happy state of existence in the future life (paralokaisana). We seek our good not only in this life, but also in the after-life, and these two kinds of self-good are summed up in our threefold desire—for self-preservation, for the objects that lead to happiness, and for a blessed after-life. Right con- duct is not conduct in accordance with the injunctions of the Vedas, or conduct which leads ultimately to the cessation of all sorrows through cessation of all desires or through right know- ledge and the extinction of false knowledge, but is that which leads to the fulfilment of the three ultimate desires. The cause of sins is not transgression of the injunctions of the scriptures, but errors of right judgment or of right thinking (prajiaparadha). First and foremost is our desire for life, ie. for health and pro- longation of life; for life is the precondition of all other good things. Next to our desire for life is our desire for wealth and the pursuit of such vocations of life as lead to it. The third is 1 buddhya samyag idam mama hitam idam mamahitam ity aveksyaveksya Rar- manam pravrttinam samyak pratipadanena ity ahita-karma-parityagena hita- karmacaranena ca. Cakrapani on Caraka, 1. 8. 17. 406 Speculations in the Medical Schools [cH. the desire for a blessed after-life. In this connection Caraka intro- duces a discussion to prove the existence of a future state of existence. He says that a wise man should not entertain doubts regarding the existence of a future life, since such doubts might hinder the performance of right conduct. The mere fact that we cannot experience its existence with our senses is not a sufficient negative proof. For there are few things which can be directly experienced by the senses, and there are many which exist, but are never experienced by the senses. The very senses with which we experience other things cannot themselves be subject to sense- experience!. Even sensible things cannot be perceived if they are too near or too distant, if they are covered, if the senses are weak or diseased, if the mind is otherwise engaged, if they are mixed up with similar things, if their light is overcome by stronger light, or if they are too small?. It is therefore wrong to say that what is not perceived by the senses does not exist.