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Jayanta enters into a long discussion in his Nydya-mafjari, trying to prove that it was through his omniscience that Caraka could write his work and that he neither discovered the science by inductive methods nor derived it from previous traditional sources. Evam vyavasyanty atitam bijat phalam anagatam drstua bijat phalam jatam thaiva sadrsam budhah. Caraka-samhitd, 1. 11. 22. Vatsyayana, in his commentary on the Nydya-siitra, illustrates purvavat (from cause to effect) as the inference of rain from the rise of clouds, sesavat (from effect to cause) as the inference of rain in the uplands from the flooding of the river * in the lower regions and sdmdanyato-drsta (from similar behaviour) as the inference of the motion of heavenly bodies from their changes of position in the sky at 400 Speculations in the Medical Schools [cH. siderations detailed in the preceding footnote it may well be assumed that Aksapada’s contribution to the definition of inference consists in his giving names to the types of floating inference described in Caraka-samhita. It is not improbable that the Nydya-siitra derived its theory of five propositions, and in fact most of the other logical doctrines, from Caraka, as there are no earlier works to which these can be traced!. Caraka’s definition of perception as the knowledge different times. But he also gives another meaning of these three terms pirvavat, Sesavat and samanyato-drsta. He interprets pirvavat here as the inference of fire from smoke ‘‘on the analogy of past behaviour of co-presence,”’ sesavat as the inference of the fact that sound is quality because it is neither substance nor action, by the method of residues (esa), and sdmdnyato-drsta as the inference of the existence of soul from the existence of desire, which is a quality and as such requires a substance in which it would inhere. This is not an inference from similarity of behaviour, but from the similarity of one thing to another (e.g. that of desire to other qualities), to extend the associations of the latter (inherence in a substance) to the former (desire), i.e. the inference that desire must also inhere in a substance. In the case of the terms pirvavat and sesavat, as these two terms could be grammatically interpreted in two different ways (with matup suffix in the sense of possession and vati suffix in the sense of similarity of behaviour), and as the words parva and sesa may also be used in two different ways, Vatsyayana inter- prets them in two different ways and tries to show that in both these senses they can be justified as modes of inference. It seems obvious that the names piurvavat, sesavat and samanyato-drsta were given for the first time to the threefold inference described by Caraka, as this explains the difficulty felt by Vatsyayana in giving a definite meaning to these terms, as they had no currency either in traditional or in the contemporaneous literature of Vatsyayana. Uddyotakara, in his commentary on Vatsyayana, contributes entirely original views on the subject. He takes Aksapada’s siitra, atha tat-pirvakam tri-vidham anumdnam piirvavac chesavat samanyato-drstam ca, and splits it up into atha tat-purvakam tri-vidham anumdnam and pirvavac chesavat samanyato-drstam ca; by the first tri-vidha he means inference from positive instances (anvayi), from negative instances (vyatireki) and from both together (anvaya-vyatireki). He gives two possible interpretations of the terms pirvavat, Sesavat and samdanyato-drsta, one of which is that piirvavat means argument from cause to effect, sesavat that from effect to cause and samdnyato-drsta is the inference on the basis of relations other than causal. The Sadmkhya-karika also mentions these kinds of inference. The Mathara-vrtti again interprets the threefold character of inferences (tri-vidha anumdana) in two ways; it says, firstly, that tri-vidha means that an inference has three propositions, and, secondly, that it is of three kinds, viz. purvavat (from the effect, e.g. flooding of the river, to the inference of the cause, e.g. showers in the upper region), sesavat (from part to whole, e.g. tasting a drop of sea-water to be saline, one infers that the whole sea is saline), and sama@nyato-drsta (inference from general association, e.g. by seeing flowering mangoes in one place one infers that mangoes may have flourished in other places as well). Curiously enough, the Mdthara-vrtti gives another example of sémdanyato-drsta which is very different from the examples of s@mdnyato-dysta hitherto considered. Thus it says that, when one says, “‘It is illuminated outside,” another replies, “‘ The moon must have risen.” 1 For more or less fanciful reasons Mr Dhruva suggests that the terms pirvavat and sesavat were borrowed in the Nydya-siitra from the Mimamsda-sitra and that this siitra must therefore be very old (Proceedings and Transactions of the First Oriental Conference, Poona, 1922). This argument is invalid for more xT] Nature of Ayur-veda Discussions 401 that arises through the contact of the self, the senses, the mind and the objects seems very much like an earlier model for Aksa- pada’s definition of perception, which adds three more qualifi- cations to make the meaning more complex and precise!. The idea that in the first instance perception is indeterminate (nir-vikalpa or a-vyapadesya) is a later development and can hardly be traced in Hindu philosophy earlier than the Nydya-sitra®. The similarity of the various categories of vada, jalpa, vitanda, chala, jati, nigraha- sthana, etc., as enumerated in Caraka, to those of the Nydya- sitra has been duly pointed out in a preceding section. The only difference between the two sets of enumeration and their elabora- tion is that Caraka’s treatment, being the earlier one, is less full and less complex than that of Aksapada. . The fact that physicians in counsel earnestly discussed to- gether, in order to arrive at right conclusions regarding both the theoretical causes of diseases and their cures and their actual practical discernment in individual cases, is abundantly clear from even a very superficial study of the Caraka-samhita. 'The entire work seems to be a collection of discussions of learned physi- cians with Atri as their chairman. Where differences of opinion are great, they are all noted, and Atri’s own opinion on them is given, and, where there was more or less unanimity, or where Atri himself lectured on specific problems, his own opinion alone is given. It is also related how a good and clever physician is to defeat his opponents in dispute, not only in a legitimate and scientific way, but also by sophistic wrangling and unfair logical tricks. It was a practical necessity for these physicians to earn their bread in the face of strong competition, and it is easy to see how the logical tricks of chala, jati and migraha-sthana developed into a regular art of debate, not always for the discovery of truth, but also for gaining the victory over opponents. We hear of debates, discussions or logical disputes in literature much earlier than the than one reason. Firstly, granting that the Mimdmsd-sitra is very old (which is doubtful), the fact that these two logical terms were borrowed from it does not show that it must be a very old work; for even a modern work may borrow its terminology from an older treatise. Secondly, the fact that these three terms were borrowed from early sources does not show that the theory of tri-vidha anumana in the Nydya-sitra is either its own contribution or very old. Mr Dhruva’s arguments as to the Mathara-vrtti being subsequent to Vatsyayana’s commentary are also very weak and do not stand criticism. 1 indriyartha-sannikarsotparmam jnanam avyapadesyam avyabhicari vyavasa- * yatmakam pratyaksam. NydGya-siitra, 1. 1. 4. ° 2 Caraka uses the word vikalpa in 11. 1. 10. 4 in the sense of distinction (bheda) of superiority and inferiority (utkarsa-prakarsa-riipa). DI 26 402 Speculations in the Medical Schools [cH. Caraka-samhita; but nowhere was the acquirement of this art deemed so much a practical necessity for earning a living as among the medical men. And, since there is no mention of the develop- ment of this in any other earlier literature, it is reasonable to suppose that the art of debate and its other accessories developed from early times in the traditional medical schools, whence they are found collected in Caraka’s work. The origin of the logical art of debate in the schools of Ayur-veda is so natural, and the illus- trations of the modes of dispute and the categories of the art of debate are so often taken from the medical field, that one has little reason to suspect that the logical portions of the Caraka-samhita were collected by Caraka from non-medical literature and grafted into his work. Ayur-veda Ethics. The length of the period of a man’s lifetime in this iron age (kal1- yyuga) of ours is normally fixed at one hundred years. But sinful actions of great enormity may definitely reduce the normal length to any extent. Ordinary vicious actions, however, can reduce the length of life only if the proper physical causes of death, such as poisoning, diseases and the like, afe present. If these physical causes can be warded off, then a man may continue to live until the normal length of his life, one hundred years, is reached, when the body-machine, being worn out by long work, gradually breaks down. Medicines may, however, in the case of those who are not cursed by the commission of sins of great enormity, prolong the normal length of life. It is here that Caraka and his followers differ from all other theories of karma that flourished on the soil of India. The theory is not accepted in any Indian system of thought except that of Caraka.