English
also diminished by a quarter, and the bodies of living beings lost their vitality accordingly ; their length of life diminished, and diseases began to grow. So in the Dvapara age there was a further diminution of the quantities of earthly productions and a further weakening of human constitution and shortening of the length of life. It may be remembered that in Susruta, m1. 1, it is said that many persons of the medical school of thought had conceived this world to have come into being either through time (Ad@la), in the natural process by a blind destiny (nzyatz), or through a mere nature (svabhava), accidental concourse of things (yadrccha), or through evolution (parinama) by the will of God; and they called each of these alternatives the prakrti, or the origin of the world?. But the notion of the Samkhya prakrti holds within it all these concepts, and it is therefore more appropriate to admit one prakrti as the evolving cause of the world. Gayi, in interpreting this, holds that prakrti is to be regarded as the evolving material cause, whereas time, natural process, etc. are to be regarded as instrumental causes for the world-manifestation. According to Susruta the selves (ksetra-jfia) are not in the medical school regarded as all- pervasive (a-sarva-gata), as they are in the Samkhya system of thought. These selves, on account of their virtues or vices, trans- migrate from one life to another as men or as different animals; for, though not all-pervasive, they are eternal and are not destroyed by death. The selves are not to be regarded as self-revealing, as in Samkhya or the Vedanta; but they can be inferred, as the substance or entity to which the feelings of pleasure and pain belong, and they are always endowed with consciousness, though they may not themselves be regarded as of the nature of pure consciousness. They are cetanavantah (endowed with con- 1 The primary use of prakrti may have been due to the idea of an enquiry regarding the source and origin of the world. Prakrti literally mean’ “source” or “origin.” So the term was probably used in reference to other speculations regarding the origin of the world before it was technically applied as a Samkhya term. The ideas of svabhava, kala, etc. seem to have been combined to form the technical Samkhya concept of prakrti, and two schools of Samkhya, the Kapila and the Patafijali schools, arose in connection with the dispute as to the starting of the evolution of prakrti accidentally (yadrccha) or by the will of God. The idea of prakrti was reached by combining all the alternative sources of world-manifestation that were current before, and so they are all conserved in the notion of prakrti. X11] Springs of action in the Caraka-samhita 4Il sciousness) and not cit-svariipah (of the nature of consciousness). They are extremely subtle or fine (parama-siiksma), and this epithet is explained by Dalhana as meaning that the selves are as small as atoms. But, being always endowed with consciousness, they can also through self-perception (pratyaksa) be perceived as existing. The transmigration of these selves is regulated by the merit and demerit of their deeds. Dalhana says that through excessive sins they are born as animals, through an admixture of virtues and sins they are born as men, and through a preponderance of virtues they are born as gods. But according to Caraka not only is the nature of transmigration controlled by the good or bad deeds of a man, but even the productivity of nature, its purity or pollution; and the thousand and one things in which nature is helpful or harmful to men are determined by good and bad deeds (dharma and adharma). Dharma and adharma are therefore regarded as the most important factors in determining most of the human con- ditions of life and world-conditions of environment. Such a view is not opposed to the Samkhya theory of world-creation; for there also it is held that the evolution of prakrti is determined by the good or bad deeds of the selves; but, though implied, yet in no Samkhya work is such a clear and specific determination of world- conditions and world-evolution through the merit and demerit of human beings to be found. Freedom of human will is almost wholly admitted by Caraka, and, where the fruits of previous actions are not of a confirmed character, they can be averted or improved.by our efforts. Our efforts thus have on the one hand a cosmical or universal effect, as determining the conditions of the development of the material world, and on the other hand they determine the fate of the individual. The fruits of our actions determine our birth, our experiences and many intellectual gifts; but they do not determine the nature of our will or affect its strength of application in particular directions. Springs of action in the Caraka-samhita. The chief feature of Caraka’s springs of action consists in the fact that he considers three primary desires as the motive causes of all our actions. These are, as has already been said, the desire . for life, the desire for riches and the desire for future life. In this Caraka seems to have a view uniquely different from that of most 412 Speculations in the Medical Schools [cH. of the systems of philosophy, which refer to a number of emotions as the root causes prompting us to action. Thus the Vaisesika regards attraction to pleasure and aversion to pain as the cause of all our actions. Pleasure is defined as being a sort of feeling which is approved and welcomed and towards which an attraction is naturally felt. Pleasures, therefore, when they arise, must always be felt, and there cannot be anything like unfelt pleasures. Apart from sensory pleasures, Sridhara in his Nydya-kandali discusses the existence of other kinds of pleasure, due to the remembering of past things, or to calmness and contentedness of mind or self-knowledge. Pleasures are, however, regarded as the fruits of meritorious deeds (dharma) performed before. Pain, the reverse of pleasure, may be defined as an experience from which we are repelled and which is the result of past misdeeds. Desire, as the wish to have what is unattained (aprapta-prarthana), may be either for the self (svartha) or for others (parartha). Such desires may be prompted by any of the following: longing for happiness in heaven or on earth (kama), appetites (abhilasa), longing for the continua- tion and recurrence of the enjoyment of pleasurable objects, com- passion for others (karunda), disinclination to worldly enjoyment (vairdgya), intention of deceiving others (upadha), subconscious motives (bhava). Prasastapada, however, distinguishes between desires for enjoyment and desires for work. But he does not include the positive Buddhist virtues of friendship (maitri) and a feeling of happiness in the happiness of others (mudita), and he is content with only the negative virtue of compassion (karuna). He also counts anger, malice, suppressed revengefulness (manyu), jealousy of the good qualities of others (aksama), and envy arising from a sense of one’s inferiority (amarsa). But, in spite of this elaborate classification, Prasastapada makes in reality two broad divisions, namely, desires arising from attachment to pleasures, and those from aversion to pain. Pain is as much a positive feeling as pleasure and cannot be regarded as mere negation of pleasure. Though Pragastapada knows that there is such a thing as desire for work, yet he does not give it any prominent consideration, and the net result of his classification of the springs of action is that he thinks that all desires are prompted by attachment to feelings of pleasure and antipathy to pain. Feelings, therefore, are to be regarded here as fundamentally determining all desires and through them all actions. The Naiyayikas think that attachment and antipathy can be XIII] Springs of action in the Caraka-samhita 413 traced to a more fundamental root, viz. ignorance or delusion (moha). Thus Vatsyayana, by tracing attachment or antipathy to ignorance, tends to intellectualize the psychological basis of Pragastapada. For moha would mean want of knowledge, and, if attachment and antipathy be due to want of knowledge, then one can no longer say that feelings ultimately determine our actions, as it is the absence of right knowledge that is found to be ultimately the determinant of the rise of all feelings and emotions. Jayanta, how- ever, in his Nya@ya-manjari, counts ignorance (moha), attachment (raga) and antipathy (dvesa) as being three parallel defects (dosa) which prompt our efforts!. Under attachment he counts sex- inclination (kama), disinclination to part with that which would not diminish by sharing with others (matsara), jealousy (sprha), inclination towards birth again and again (érsna@) and inclination towards taking forbidden things (Jobha). Under dvesa he counts emotional outbursts of anger with burning bodily conditions, envy (irsya), jealousy at the good qualities of others (asiya), injuring others (droha) and concealed malice (manyu). Under ignorance he counts false knowledge (mithya-jfiana), perplexity due to indecision (victkitsa), sense of false superiority (mada) and mistakes of judgment (pramada). But he adds that of the three defects, raga, dvesa and moha, moha is the worst, since the other two arise through it. For it is only the ignorant who are under the sway of attachment and antipathy. To the objection that in that case moha ought not to be counted as a defect in itself, but as the source of the other two defects, Jayanta replies that, though it is a source of the other two defects, it of itself also leads people to action and should therefore be counted as a defect in itself.