English
Mind is illumined by the reflection of intelligence from seli, not that self imparts something of his own consciousness, of his own will, for that he has none, as he is passive, and action= fess; but like 2 needle attracted by a magnet when placed in ‘apposition, the two—Mind and Self—from their close proximity to one another, are similarly influenced. Hence it is an agent and instrument. Here again there is difference, for as just said, Self is actionless, and, therefore, not an agent (doer) and instru+ ment, whereas Mind is so, and is the cause of bondage and emancipation. But it may be asked how? The reply is, in Proportion as you beget a desire for material prosperity, the more are yop enticed to search after it, and that subjects you to re-birth ¢ while on the other hand, after having ascertained the unreality of the objective world, when with due deliberation, you cease to have ‘any concern for it, and increase your spirituality by the ‘means’ of knowledge, your knowledge destroys the ‘accumulated’ and “ feurrent works’ leaving alone the ‘fructescent’ for your consum~ mation in life, so that when you part with the body, you enter into ‘ghat blissful state whose sole essence is joy, and which no eyes “‘ypve seen, nor ears heard, and Mind can form no adequate conception of, ‘PANCHADAS. © “Br “eitise of a peréoh’s bondage or that of his release.” “Situated internal to the vital sheath, self, distinct from it, fs full of mind.” Therefore Mind is self. 6. Some Buddhists affirm Intellect sitaated more inter- mally than the mind is self. They say, intellect which ts tran- ‘sient in daration is regarded by its supporters to be self, and ‘establish its internal position in this manner :—because the ‘cause of cognition by the mind is due to Intellect, and that is evident. 7o. If knowledge or cognition, and the predicate of the ‘word ‘mind,’ namely internal organ, were one, how can there be said to exist between them a relative condition of ‘cause and effect? Hence their difference is being described. ‘The internal organ has two sorts of functions—Egoiem and *This;’ of them, Egoism [I am I} is called cognition (Aoodhs), ‘and ‘This,’ Mind. 71. Since withont the internal perception of ‘Egoism’ ‘there can be no such knowledge as “This is,” therefore, Tatellect or cognition is called the internal and cause, while ‘Mind is the external and effect or action. 7%. Since that (Intellect) perception of Egoism {I am 1} fs apt to rise and disappear every moment, it is cailed tran- sitory, and self-illuminated ;* ® A Yogachara says Intellect or spiritual soal is his pelf — All objects whether external or internal are moulded after know- ledge. Now this knowledge resembles a flash of lightning, it appears and disappears in a moment, henceit is transient. But as it discovers itself and other objects, it is called self-illumined. It has been compared to the light of a lamp and a river current, where wave after wave keeps up the continuity; knowledge of a first ‘object is displaced by a second, and that by a third, and so ‘on; hence the current of intellect or knowledge is of two sorts, of ‘which, one is local, and the other continucos; the perception of Bgoism ‘Iam I’ is an instance of the first variety and is only ‘another form of Boodhi, ‘This is a jac’ and similar other percep> ca : 2 8 PANCHADASI. *. 73. And the life soul in the Veda; an agent subject to birth and death. tions connected with ‘this’ :—‘this body,’ ‘this river,’ ‘this house,” etc,, are all instances of the second; they relate to external objects. The second or continuous flow follows the first or local. Hence the local flow of Boodk? produces the continuous which is its action, Therefore that one is self. Now the continuous flow is no other than Mind, therefore ‘emancipation’ consists in dwell- ing upon or concentrating the mind on Bvodhi, and to be one with it, thereby fixing the transient flow of the intellect. But this view is objectionable. For, the action of knowledge in the perception of form, taste, smell, etc., like the sensory organs, eyes and the rest, being the means for ascertaining action, Intellect is not self; but what knows it, which ascertains or cognises ali objects to a certainty, is self,—and as he is naturally luminous, he is always self-illuminated. That is to say, like the sun who ig the discoverer or illuminator of all objects, which are, therefore, said to be discovered or illuminated by him, we have a similar conditional difference between Self and Intellect (Boodhi) ; Self is i!lumination and Intellect illuminated by Self. As the light of a lamp, covers or takes possession of a jar or another object and discovers it, the two are mixed, though naturally they are distinct ; similarly Self who is consciousness is blended with Intellect so as to become one, and this twin mediey is the means of perception from which cognition follows, though naturally they are distinct from each other. And as from a difference in occupation, the same Brahmana may be designated separately a reader amd cook, similarly the internal organ which is a product of the good quality of the non-quintuplicated elements, ether and the rest, for its certitude is called Intellect, and for its action of doubt and resolution is designated (Mana) Mind ; consequently the division of that internal organ into Intellect and Mind for their separete functions of internal and external objects of ‘I’ and ‘this’ is not feasible. In reference to the transient nature of knowledge the argu- ~ments adduced by its supporters do not stand a searching “gerutiny. For, 4 Self be liable to destruction every moment, im PANCHADASI. 83 74. A Madbyamika Buddhist says this transient cognition fa not Self, for it is very short-lived, like a flash of lightning ; the absence of that Self in a prior period, there can be no acquisi tion of wealth; or a person advancing money to another wih a promise of re-payment a year hence, must naturally forget thing about it and will cease to demand or receive payment from his debtor. Then again, a person on rising from his dinner table will never express satisfaction the next moment that he has been well satiated, as he does; a dead man may turn into a beast, a can of milk may likewise be turned into on a moment after~ wards; it cannot be aserted with any plausi ty, that a second Self is produced after the first one is destroyed retaining all his conceptions, consequently the subsequent Self is capable of tetaining the knowledge previously acquired by his predecessor, and this prior knowledge is said to be due to mistake. But since the transient Self is subject to destruction in a subsequent moment, necessarily in the absence of an observer and site, there can be no mistake [as in the instance of a snake in a rope, a ‘spectator and rope are needed to create that illusion.) Moreover, as knowledge is non-particular, its conception cannot be ar- knowledged. Even admitting conception to be a fact, then it must have a receptacle, vehicle, or asylum ; and if it be said, knowledge is the asylum, that will do away with the non-parti- cularity of knowledge. IE Self were short-lived, a person will have not the slightest inclination for doing meritorious deeds, but will lead a life of pleasure and run headlong into sin ; for his self is changing every moment, the first one gives place to a second, and that toa third, so that the doer of sin (they regard Self so) will be re-placed by a new self the next moment, and there will be no bad consequences for him, and there will be a total absence of desire of happiness. Further, on appealing to experience, we find a person say, ‘' My intellect is dull ;” another says, “‘My intellect ia sharp ;”” here also the same difference is established between self and intellect ; for the intelligence of self knows no fluctuation, it is permanent, and *~ self-illuminated while’ Intellect is illuminated by self, consequently dependent on him, therefore not self, 7 PANCHADASL but ‘Nothing’ is elf, as without it not another thing can. be perceived. 75. And. cite in support the Sruff text. “Before the evolution of the world there was present nothing ;” and ledge, and its subject, #. ¢, phenomena, are only illusions. created on nothing.* 76. But this assertion is inadmissible. For the asserters; of ‘nothing’ maintain the unreality of the world which they say to be a simple illusion ; but illusion must abide on some- thing real, and in the absence of that site in ‘Nothing’ for an illusion to arise, consequently ‘nothing’ cannot be admit- ted to be the source ; moreover, ‘nothing’ also stands in need of Intelligence as a witness, otherwise it cannot possibly have any power or force. [To cite an apt illustration so. frequently made use of in Vedantic writings, let us take the. instance of ‘snake ina rope.’ Here the site of the snake * A Madhyamika Buddhist calls ‘ Nothing ;’ his self, because. self and things distinct from self, are like nothing, consequently for the resemblance of all objects with ‘nothing,’ it is the principal ‘entity. In profound slumber, a person loses al! consciousness of external objects and he experiences nothing ; for, on rising from aleep.he says ‘’ | knew nothing then.” Moreover, to a wise person, the remnant of ignorance in the form of the Blissful sheath, is. self—a semblance of nothing. But it may be asked of him whether his nothing is with or without witness? Or whether it is. self-illuminated? If the first, then that witness is something different from nothing and no other than self; the second consi- deration-—without a witness—will be a contradiction, and the third view of self-manifestability only establishes Brahma by another name and remove ‘nothing’ altogether.