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impression in the mind of the sleeper as to his perception of happiness, accompanied with ignorance. Then again, in the Sruti, Self is said to be without attributes ; therefore to attribute desire, spite, virtue, etc., which properly belong to the internal organ, is simply a delusion. Moreover, as the said qualities ‘desire and the rest, belong to the internal organ which continues in waking and dreaming slumber—consequently present then; but in profound slumber, that organ is absent, hence there is an absence of the qualities which mark ‘it will thas be found, that ‘the natural inference of what has heen mentioned establishes the internal organ, and not self, to be possessed with the qualities, desire, ete, There is yet anozher consideration which precludes the applicability of the view held by Naiyayiks and Prabbakars: for say they, self is all-pervading and manifold ; in that case it will be difficult to connect a particular self with one body, for alt selves are related to all bodies, alt works, and all enjoyments and tonnected with all minds. oi 90 PANCHADASI. 96. Thus then, the recollection “I was sleeping in- tenaibly,” which arises in the mind of a person on bis first waking, can never follow without the perception of actual ignorance or insentiency in such profound slumber, hence for the presence of ignorance and experience or perception, the consciousness of Self is said to be covered with insentiency. 97. And since the Srzsi mentions “ Self is not deprived of his consciousness in that profound slumber,” and as memory establishes his insentiency, therefore he is both sentient and insentient and like the fire-fly, luminous and dark.* * But this is open,to objections, a few of which are here worth mentioning. As light and darkness are naturally opposed to each other, so are sentiency or consciousness, and its reverse. As for instance, it cannot be said, ‘* This man is a jar," so the above conditions cannot exist. For instance, if it be said, that the insentient part is perceivable, and the light of consciousness is not perceivable in self, so that for the same body or substance to be possessed of properties directly opposed to each other is clearly impossible. As from the sight of a stick, it cannot be said, “ here isa Dundi,” but there must be present an individual carrying the stick, to deserve the appellation of a Dundi; so from the know- ledge of one part, insentiency, Self cannot be determined to be both insentient and sentient. Moreover, if the part representing sentiency or consciousness be deemed amenable to perception, then insentiency must fall in the back ground of itlusion—a creation of fancy.—Likewise it may be asked of them who follow Bhatta, what is the relation of the two parts, insentiency and sentiency of self? Whether itis due to combination or to an identity ? Or is it only a condition of subject and owner. From the first stand-point, self will be reduced to impermanence, for objects derived from a combination of two or more substances are material, hence non-eternal; if the second view be maintained, insentiency will be identical with sentiency, and sentiency with insentiency, which is absurd; the third wil! reduce self to imper- manence, like a jar. We find, therefore, no proofs as to one half PANCHADASI. or 98. Alter thus exposing the error of the Bhats, the view held in Sankhya is now being set forth. A follower of Kapila (author of Santhya Philosophy) says, a body without. form cannot have both insentiency and sentiency ; therefore to say self is formless, would be meaningless. gg. But the attribution of a recollection of insentiency to self in spite of his intelligence, does not imply any contradio- tion. For the perception of insentiency is only due to: (Prakriti) Matter, which is possessed of the three attributes good, active, and painful or dark, and subject to change, only that self may be an agent or instrument of enjoyment, and be freed from the bondage of re-births. This fs its purpose. too. Though Self and Matter, for the possession of un. conditioned bliss and sentiency by the former, and insentiency by the Jatter are extremely different from each other, yet from an absence of perception of the difference between Matter and Spirit, matter is regarded as the cause which helps self to enjoyment and emancipation; and for allotting bondage and emancipation to Self, like the aforesaid dissenters Tartika etc., even the followers of the Sankhya School admit a distinct difference in self.* tor. As proofs confirmatory of the insentiency of Matter and the unassociated bliss and intelligence of Self, Srufd texts are being cited in reference to the first. “For its being the cause, the indescribable (Ignorance or Prakriti ] is superior to Mahai (Mahataiwa).” And in support of the unconditioned or unrelated nature of Self [we find it said} ‘‘ This self is un- associated or unrelated. of Self being insentient and the other half sentient; for in the Sruti, Self is described as a mine of knowledge. It is true the Smyiti mentions about this insentiency, but that refers only to Ignorance in the condition of profound slumber. * Kapila regards Matter as the cause of the world, and says, it is likewise the cause of bondage and deliverance of the. PANCHADASE. yo2. Thus having exposed the fallacious views held by the aforesaid dissenters in regard to the nature of Self, theis opposite doctrines concerning Iswara are now being declared For this purpose, his nature is first determined. According to the followers of Voga, Iswara is the controller of matter, closely engaged [occupied] in intelligence. He is superior to all individuals. 5 103. As in the Srutf “He is the lord of Matter and Jiva, and qualities.” That is to say, Iswara is the Lord of the equilibrised state of matter, when its Safa, Raja and Tama are evenly blended, (likewise culled Pradhan or primary); the individual with his tenement of flesh which is called (Purusha) Atma or Spirit; but it is open to objection, For in periods of cyclic destruction, matter is said to be ina state of equipoise, that is to say, its three properties are evenly balanced, Evolution begins only with a disturbance of this equilibrium, The first mentioned condition is spoken of as the natural {Pradhona), chief or primary condition, so that with evolution. arises the insentient condition; now if insentiency be the primary state, the equilibrised condition will necessarily come to be secondary. ‘Then again, from a want of association with the intelligence (sclf) there is no relation with the primal condition ; and as without a rolativity of intelligence, the subsequent evolution cannot proceed from insentiency, consequently the primal cannot create; and that primal condition is Iswara’s intelligence endowed. with Maya, who is the internal ruler and creator of the world. Kapila advocates the theory of the Spirit being manifold and as. many in number, as there are individuals. But to say so is futile, because admission of the oneness of the all-pervading intelligence: and the attribution of enjoyment, etc., to the association of the internal organ, are enough to settle the point, and the necessity for such an infinite division of Atma is clearly removed ; other- wise to regard the eternity of matter and manifold diversity of Atma will land us in the region of (saj2tiya, vijatiya} defects marked by similarity and dissimilarity, or in the language of ‘Western physicists, isomorphism and disomorphism, PANCHADASL L's ground—for it is the scene of works already bearing fruit— and the three attributes just mentioned—for they are con- trolled by him. It is not to be imagined that this is the only men- tion of Iswara in the Veda. For the Brikadaranyakepanishad have texts explanatory of him, as an internal knower. 104. Resting their opinions on such Sru/f texts, as they* believe support them, and which they constrae according to their lights, a marked variety of opinion prevails in regard to Iswara among these controversialists. 105. With a view of ascertaining the view held by a Yogachara, the nature of Iswara after Patanjali is being declared. He is defined as “ A particular person unconnected with felicity or misery, merit or de-merit, good or bad action, their impression and composition. Like Jiva, He is un- associated (bliss) and intelligence.* 106. But it may be asked, if Iswara is thus unconditioned * {t remains to be observed that there is a marked similarity between Sankhya and Yoga in regard to Jiva; for as the former holds him to be unrelated, self-illuminated, uniform, and intelli- gence, so does the Jatter; and he is an enjoyer only, but no agent or instrument. Now such an experience of his enjoyment follows from want of discrimination, for happiness and misery are the attributes of the internal organ whose function is intellection, {Boodhi), in connection with which, he is apt to be attributed the power of enjoying, and that Boodhi (spiritual soul or intellection) is the agent ; frem similar want of discrimination, self is practically regarded as an agent, and so long as the intellect is not cleansed by the practice of the two varieties of meditation called samprac jnata and asamprajnata or better still, the conscious and uncons- cious varieties of the Vedantin, misery cannot be completely extirpated ; but when these medititations have thoroughly ripened, then Jiva is roused to his sense, he has now got discrimination wherewith to keep misery at bay, and thisextreme destruction of misery is called emancipation in Yoga. Sankhya does not admit Iswara, but Yoga does, and that Iswara is like Jiva unrelated ‘or unassociated [uncondioned] Intelligence. 94 PANCHADASI. or unassociated intelligence, how can then he be the controller ?