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But this is clearly impossible, for if a blending af the elements were to produce sentiency, knowledge or intelligence, we may as well expect a ‘jar’ which is derived from a blending of the same four elements to possess sentiency or knowledge, but that it has not; besides, in conditions of profound sleep, fainting 76 PANCHABASL. 61, And ta support it, cite the Srwf text which explaise the foodful sac. “ This foodful sac is the Supremo Self, etc.,”” and “I am the Supreme Seif.” and death, the body is as insentient as a jar consequently jnsen~ tiency is its normal condition and hence it is not self. Hthe physical body were identical with self we would never: have fixed our belief in the identity of the body of our manhood, with that of our youth, though they are different from each other j, and when a person who bad seen us in our boyhood come to see after an absence of several years, when we have attained man- haood, he for the sake of recognition recalls to our memory a few leading iacidents of the past, and we exclaim, ‘Indeed that am I.” As this is a common incident, therefore, the body is not self. Further, since the body is subject to birth and death, prior to its being born or subsequent to death, it is non-existent, consequent- Wy. self who is eternal cannot be same with it. Because that will imply the acknowledgment of two defects—of destruction of actions done, and the fruition of actions not done, after death; both of them are inapplicable. That isto say, if the actions performed in life, were to produce no result, in the absence of self who is no agent and instrument, a person would then cease to practise works enjoined in the Vedas, and we see the contrary to be fact. ‘Then again, for the existing difference of self of boyhood with that of prime, when a person has read the Vedas in his youth and Boyhood should enjoy no fruits subsequent to that period either in prime or old age; similarly all works done in the present life should yield him no results, thus the admission of destruction of works done already and their unproductiveness is injurious, and in a previous birth from an absence of a doer or agent ne actions could be done, so that in the present life whatever a person has to enjoy or suffer should be equally the case with all, and there shalt be no cause of the prevailing difference as to happiness or woe in es various shades, as we actually find to be the case,—one is happy, a second miserable, a third beset with difficulties,—so that, it is impossible to acknowledge the fruition of actions: not done, fond along with it, the assumption-of the bady being self. PANCHADAS?. Fe oR 62—63. Another Zokayate says since with the exit of the (fiva-Aima) or Life-soul the body dies, and since Egoism CV’) is plainly discernible in the organs, sensory and active— and by them words and actions are produced, they, (the organa) represent Seif. Thus doing away with the assertion last mentioned of the body being Self. 64. To admit this is nothing inconsistent; though in words and the rest of actions Intelligence is not clearly discer- nible, yet we cannot take them for insentient objects, conse~ quently (to a certain extent) it is allowable. {That is to say, Intelligence being the indication or sign of self, the organs as they shew signs of intelligence can justly be regarded as self. This is what another Charvake says, but it is fallacious, because self is that without which the body cannot last; in the case of the ergans of sense and action, we find a person may be blind or deaf yet living, he may be paralysed, his hands and feet are deprived of action, and progression, he may be dumb, yet living, consequently self is something distinct from the sensory and active organs. They cite in support, the expression ‘I hear,” “I see,” “I am blind,” etc. But it is to be remembered the first personal pronoun used in connection with that hearing, sight, etc... establishes the possession of the necessary organs with which the several functions are carried on, consequently when it is. aid “I hear,” etc, it means “I have ears to hear,” or “I see Now according to Charvakas the chief or ulterior aim of humanity consists in eating, dressing, etc.. but it is not so, because: & desire for a thing constitutes an ulterior aim or supreme purport, and as every one is desirous of acquiring happiness and removing, misery, necessarily that desire is the supreme purport of humarity, and the highest of that felicity and extreme destruction of misery. is called ‘emancipation’ jn the Sidhanta. But enjoyment cannot be ranked with this ulterior aim for it is apt to take an extreme turn, and there is no limit for it; neither can death be takee: in the light of emancipation. “38 PANCHADASI. with my eyes,” and not “I am the eye,” “Tam the ear’ Thus then the perception of (subject of Egoism) ‘I’ in con- nection with the organs of sense is quite distinct from them; then again, if their identity be sought to be proved by similar other expressions as “ My sight is indifferent,” “My hearing is actute,” by shewing an attachment of sight, etc., with own self, it is simply a misapplication, for the cogniser is differ- ent from cognition, and self being the cogniser is different from sight, hearing, etc. Moreover, in mental abstraction, or absence of mind, a person sees not, neither does he hear, though his sight and hearing are perfect, therefore, we may lay down the insentiency of sensory organs, and what is {nsentient cannot be similar to self. In connection with it, in a dead body the organs of sense and action are all present, yet they are insentient. Further, it may be enquired whether one organ is self, or whether their collective totality is so, or they are so many different selves. The first is quite untenable, for if it be said that a’single organ is self, a person should die or be insenti- ent when that is wanting ; yet the fact is otherwise, similarly if the collective aggregate of organs be regarded in that light, then in the destruction of one single organ, all the rest should equally be destroyed and their should be neither life nor in- telligence ; moreover, if each of them were so many different eelves then like ten elephants tied to one tree breaking it asunder, the body will be similarly affected by desires origin- ating with each of these selves.} 65. A worshipper of Ziranyagarbha says as life continues with respiration, though the eyes and the rest of the organs tay be destroyed,* 66. And as after all the organs, etc., are engrossed in éleep, respiration (vital airs) alone continue, and as its supe- . "© Hiranyogarbha is collective aggregate of Prans. PANCHADAS! 9 tlority over the rest, has been mentioned distinctly in several places, it is therefore his Self. [But Prana is not self. Because like the absence of motion in the external air, when there is no respiratien going on, death does not follow, we find plants do not respire® like our- selves yet they continue to grow, and preserve their vitality; in regard to animated beings it cannot be said that respiration goes on during or after death, yet there are instances when it is suspended’, and vitality is. seen to continue; moreover, in sleep Prana is awake, yet if it were intelligence or self, it should show the usual civilities to a new comer related to a person when he arrives at his house while sleeping, that it does not, nor does it prevent a thief when he robs him in sleep; hence it is not self, but insentient and unconscious. It is contended by the supporters of Prana, that with its exit, death follows, thercfore it is self. But this does not hold true, Because with the departure [cessation of the secretion] of gastric juice, a man toses his appetite, wastes and dies, and we may as well call it self. Moreover, the superiority of Prana mentioned in the Veda is only with a view of producing an inclination to one engaged in devotional exercises. If it be said there are Srufi texts which clearly denote Prana to be self, but inasmuch as similar texts are also found in connec. tion with the mental sac consequently one is contradicted by the other, hence it is not meant 80; but it serves to establish the non-difference of the abiding intelligence seated in them with Brahma.] 67. Mind which is more internal than Prana is said by its supporters to be self, after the manner of Narad’s Pancheratra, They say, “ Persons given to the exercise of * We know too well that trees and plants have inspiration and expiration, i) . PANCHADAS, devotion regard mind in that light mot an agent or instrument, but mind 68. The Sruf texts corroborating the view of mind as self are pointed ont to support them:—‘ Mind is either s ® Mind is not self. Because in conditions of trance and sleep, an absence of Mind is plainly discernible. Now, the Afms ‘can never leave a body without causing death to it, but in the absent conditions, when a person recovers consciousness, the Mind is again restored to its original condition, Hence Mind is said to be insentient naturally, and is not self. In proof, we may ‘cite the expression when from some cause or other, a person is ‘under mental abstraction, on recovering from it, he says, “I was wandering in my Mind, and hence did not hear you.” Though ‘all the time, he was apparently listening to what was being said tohim, Thus then, as Mind is apt to be disturbed, sometimes fixed, at others, unsettled, it is something different from self, who is always fixed.