English
Therefore know the indication of @ wise man and look upon (ziveka) ‘discrimination’ as an antagonist of (avidya) nescience or Ignorance. 33- (8) ‘ Projection’ or ‘superimposition is now being set forth. It may likewise be termed misapprehension. It is determined by the illustration of silver in nacre. That is to say as eilver is mistaken in nacre from illusion, so from the force of creation or superimposition, the uniform Intel- ligence, enveloped in ignorance is apt to be mistaken for the physical and subtle bodies and individual intelligence. This PANCHADASI: 67; fs called the mistaken attribution of creation, superimposition. or projection. 34. When nacre is mistaken for silver, though the silver is entirely falee, yet the [preceeding portion} lying in front and designated by the term, ‘This nacre’ is not unreal; similarly though the attribution of individual intelligence to the uniform is not real, yet its practical resemblance to Self and Reality is a fact. 35. And as during the occurrence of that mistake, Its triangular shape and blue color cease to be present in the nacre, so the unassociated felicity, etc., of uniform Intelligence fire removed, when it is mistaken for individual intelligence. 36. Thus then as in its illusion, the mistaken perception of nacre is called silver, so the superimposition of falee perception on uniform Intelligence is Five. 37. Then again, as in nacre, illusion of silver occurs only when its preceeding part is visible, so the attribution of ¥1oa to uniform intelligence only follows on the parts represented by Self and Reality. 38. Though as a matter of fact, a mistake is the substitu-, tlon of one thing for another, yet without a close resemblance of the two, no mistake is apt to occur; now in the case of nacre there is ordinary and particular distinction in its fore- part, and a close resemblance® with silver, hence the mistake ; * Two very extreme views prevail in regard to this subject amongst Hindu metaphysicians, Some hold that between a predicate and subject their does not exist any difference in the meaning. Bhadri supports the view of difference along with non- difference, while our author seeks to maintain the existence of a difference. The arguments on which each rests his opinion are being given here to enable our readers to comprehend both the views. It is said, there is difference along with resemblance between a material cause and its product, just as there is between a quality and its receptacle, or between caste and person; between 68 PANCHADASI. similarly between the literal signification or predicate of the words ‘self’—uniform Intelligence—and ‘Ftve' there is both an instrumental cause and its resulting action, there does not exist such a relation both of difference and resemblance, but extreme difference only. For example, the instrumental cause of a jar,—a potter with his wheel and turning rod—is extremely different from that jar, which is a product of his manipulation, but between its material cause—a lump of clay—there exists both difference and resemblance, and if they were extremely different from eich other, then the cause clay would alike have the property of producing oil, another substance extremely different from it: but since it is otherwise, we may with equal propriety conclude no clay shalt produce a jar. Similarly if the material cause of a jar were ta bear the stcongest affinity, resemblance or similarity with it, no jar would result. Hence there is distinction along with resemblance between them, Now for this difference, the objections of extreme difference and of agreement or the faults of difference, do not apply to this view. Thus then it is an established fact. Te Tikewise derives proofs from our own perception, because externally we find a jar different from clay, but on reflection, we know that every part of the jar is composed of clay, hence the two are Wentical. Bhadri thus refutes his rivals who consider the predicate and subject of a word, bear only difference. He says :—If the predicate of the word ‘jar’ be extremely different from a jac then fas it fails to convey the import of a cloth which is extremely different from it, likewise it should fail to signify a pitcher which is also extremely different from it, moreover if you regard the predicate of the word ‘jar’ to be different from it and admit ite signification a ‘jar’ or a pitcher which is extremely different from it (both in shape and size) then it may with equal propriety imply uch another substance as does not bear any resemblance to it ; the same consideratian is applicable to that other doctrine which does not admit the presenee of 2 force, energy or desire in 2 term, hence it is faulty too. Because the predicate of ‘jar,'—a pitcher;— and a cloth,--which is not sa—both of them are equally different f{eom ‘jar,’ then inasmuch as the word ar’ has in is the force of PANCHADASI. “6g distlaction and resemblance, for which the itlazory attribution of the former takes place in the iatter. Therefore the words conveying the signification of a pitcher, and not of another subs- tance, consequently beyond a pitcher the word ‘jar’ cannot mean any other thing. Hente the strength of a word to convey its proper signification can only render that sense perceptible, and not @ different sense, Thus then there is no defect in [admitting the strength of a word] regarding a predicate and subject ax alw: different from one another. Itcannot be alleged that along that difference there is a close resemblance, (tadatmys sambandha), Because ‘difference’ and ‘resemblance’ or ‘non- difference’ are naturally opposed to each other ; similarly between @ proximate cause and its product there is said to be only difference and nat difference along with non-difference (resem~ blance). According to the view of a Nyayika or supporter of the strength theory [of words], consideration of difference only és not at all faulty, though his opponents attribute faults wherever only difference is maintained. For say they, if there be extreme difference between a cause and its resulting action, then a3 a lump of clay produces a jar which is extremely different from it, it may as well produduce oil which also is extremely different, and if no oil can be produced from clay, similarly a jar should not be its product, But this fault does not apply to the view held by a Nyayika, for he looks upon (pragbhava) ‘prior condition’ as the efficient cause in the production of all things. That isto say, as for a ‘jar’ to be produced a potter, revolving wheel, and stick are, the instrumental cause, similarly the prior condition of a jar is its cause. In the same way, in reference to the production of att objects, their prior condition is a cause. Now this prior condition of a jar resides in its material cause (clay) and not elsewhere, and: that of oil, in the seed bearing it, (seesamum) and rot in any thing else, so on we find each and every object sesiding (potentially) in that prior condition in its respective material cause, and not in any thing else, hence clay produces a jar, etc., and not oi, simlashy ‘il seeds produce oil and not a jar and soon. Thus theaas ‘prior condition’ is a cause of production, hence to regard an extreme difference between a causo and its product implies neither 4a PANCHADASI, ‘self? and ‘I’ (expressive of ¥iva) do not literally bear the Bame meaning, 39. The difference of the two words ‘Self’ and 'l’ is now being explained. The common acceptance of ‘self’ and parti- cular indication of ‘I’ is being illustrated by reference to ordi. nary usage. In ordinary practice we find ‘Self’ (sayam) used in @ variety of expressions always attached to a word, ag Devadatta (him) self goes, you (your) self sce, I (my) self am incapable. But ‘I’ cannot be simitarly used. 40. Moreover as an expressive antecedent is ordinarily attached almost everywhere as “this silver,” ‘this cloth” contradiction not any other defect from the standpoint of a Nyayika, The same holds true with that other view of strength. For instance, moist earth can only produce a jar, because it has that strength only, and as it has not the strength of producing oil, no oil follows, similarly in an oil-seed there is the strength of producing oil and not a jar. Hence to regard a material cause and its product as extremely different from each other is not open to any objection. But to say that there is difference and resemblance, is objectionable, That istosay, if as Bhadri says that between material cause and its product there is difference along with non- differece, then the objections pointed out in connection with difference and non-difference will both apply to his view. A gambler and thief are two distinct persons, yet when a person is both a thief and gambler both the defects properly belong to him, similarly in admitting a difference and agreement between property and subject, the usual objections against difference and its reverse must equally apply. But that does not affect the strength theory inasmuch as difference only is admitred, Fora substance has the strength to hold qualities in it. Consequently the objection pointed out against difference donot apply. For instance if the form, capacity and its other qualities are different from a jar, so is a cloth different from a jar and it may as well be ‘expected to be present in a jar. PANCHADASI. : ot timilarly the word ‘self’ is always applicable by attaching it to another word. 41. If, therefore, ‘I’ (cham) expressive of Individual Intel. ligence is thus shewn to be different in its signification from (sayam) ‘Self,’ then uniform Intelligence is to be called Self. 42.