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A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics of the Fourth Century B.C - Caroline A. F. Rhys Davids, 1900 - Complete Book

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and Koth — prasa- dana), or that which gratifies or satisfies {Beruhigen), both meanings emphasizing psychological process, rather than ' product ' or ' seat.' ^ Attabhava-pariyapanno. * The body and the five skandhas are here termed nature of the self, after the usage of foolish folk who say, " This is myself " ' (Asl. 308). Thus the usage of attabhavO was a concession on the part of the Great Teacher to animistic phraseology. 2 * I.e., impact and reaction are set up in the eye ' (ihid.), ^ Paraphrased by ayam satto, any given individual (ibid.). * This and the following similes will be quotations of metaphors applied to the senses in the Sutta Pitaka. E.g., that of the ' empty village ' occurs in S. iv. 174 — Suniio gamo ti kho, bhikkhave, channam ajjhat- tikanam [? ayatananam] adhivacanam. That of a ' door,' which in the age of the Commentaries was the regular term for sense-organ, is, I believe, seldom used in the Sutta Pitaka, and then only as a poetical figure, not as a technical term. (7/*., ^.^., indriyesuguttadvaro (D I., 63, 250). Buddhaghosa simply paraphrases the various metaphors — * world,' by reason of wasting and decay; ' door,' by reason of customary resort ; ' ocean,' by reason of its insatiableness ; 'lucent,' by reason of its purity; ' field,' by reason of the springing up (growth) of contact, etc. ; ' base,' by reason of its fixed seat ; 'guide,' 'guidance,' by reason of its leading the nature-of-the-self showing agreements and differences; 'hither shore,' by reason of its being included in the ' body of this life ' (or individu- ality, sakkayam); * empty village,' because it is common to many, because there is no headman {i.e., Ego or soul. ' Many ' must mean the individual considered as an aggre- gate of constituents.) The metaphors, it will be seen, are applied equally, with the sole exception of ' guide ' and ' guidance,' to each remaining sense. By the explanation of these two figures given in the Cy., they should have been 176 basis,* * a guide,' * guidance,' the * hither shore,* an * empty village * — this is that form which constitutes the sphere of vision. [598] What is that form which is the sphere of vision ? The eye, that is to say the sentient organ, derived from the four Great Phenomena, forming part of the nature of the self, invisible and reacting, and against which eye, invisible and reacting, form that is visible and impingeing, has impinged,^ impinges, will, or may impinge — this that is sight, the sphere of sight, the constituent element of sight, etc. [continue as in § 597]. [599] What is that form which is the sphere of vision ? The eye, that is to say the sentient organ, derived from the four Great Phenomena, forming part of the nature of the self, invisible and reacting, which eye, invisible and reacting, has impinged, impinges, will, or may impinge on form 2 that is visible and impingeing — this that is sight, the sphere of sight, etc. [continue as in § 597]. [600] What is that form which is the sphere of vision ? The eye, that is to say the sentient organ, derived from the four Great Phenomena, forming part of the nature of the self, invisible and reacting, (i.) depending on which eye, in consequence of some visible form,^ there has arisen, arises, will, or may arise visual contact ;* . . . left to stand for each sense. Buddhaghosa, however, is of course not responsible for the expressions used in the Pitakas. Yet it is slightly disappointing that he makes no effort to account for an omission which is not without psychological justification. 1 In this answer, according to the Cy. (p. 309), in- voluntary visual sensation is described, as when lightning flashes on the sight of one not looking for it. 2 Here (Asl. 309) we have voluntary sense-impression described — the process in the case of one ' who, by his own desire, seeking to look at some object, concentrates his vision.* ' Cakkhum nissaya, rupam arabbha. * Here there should be in the text ... pe ... as in 177 (ii.) and depending on which eye, in consequence of some visible form, there has arisen, arises, will, or may arise — born of that visual contact — a feeling . . . [or iii.] a perception . . . [or iv.] thinking ... [or v.] a visual cognition i . . . [further, vi.] depending on^ which eye, and having a visible form as its object, there has arisen, arises, will, or may arise visual contact, (vii.) and depending on which eye, and having a visible form as its object, there has arisen, arises, will, or may arise, born of that visual contact, a feeling . . . [or viii.] a perception ... the corresponding passage for the other four senses. Cf. note 4. In K. it is also inadvertently omitted here. ^ Cakkhuvinfianani here replaces the fourth mode of consciousness, c it tarn, or thought, in the series invariably stated as aroused by ' contact ' in connexion with the Eight Types of Thought given in Book I, chap. i. Thinking (cetana) may stand for a train of ideas set going by the sensation having no special reference to the visible object as such. Visual cognition, on the other hand, would take special account of the thing seen. Or possibly the two are to be considered as corresponding approximately to process and product. Cf. what has been said above on both terms, p. 8, n. 1. ^ Judging by the corresponding passages in § § 604, 608, 612, 616, by K. and by the comments of Buddhaghosa, I find that the following passage has been erroneously omitted in the text before the words cakkhum p'etam: — . . . pe . . .yam cakkhum niss ay a ruparammano cakkhu- samphasso uppajji va uppajjati va uppajjissati va uppajje va, yam cakkhum nissaya ruparam- mana cakkhusamphassaja vedana . . . pe . . . sanna . . . pe . . . cetana . . . pe . . . cakkhuvin- nanam uppajji va uppajjati va uppajji va uppajje va. Cf. also § 620. , 12 178 [o?- ix.] thinking ... [o7' X.] visual cognition — this that is sight, the sphere of sight, etc. [continue as in § 597].^ [601-604] What is that form which is the sphere of hearing ? The ear, that is to say the sentient organ,- derived from the four Great Phenomena, forming part of the nature of the self, invisible and reacting, — (a) by which ear, invisible and reacting, one has heard, hears, will, or may hear sound that is invisible and im- pingeing ;— (b) against which ear, invisible and reacting, sound that is invisible and impingeing, has impinged, impinges, will, or may impinge ; — (c) which ear, invisible and reacting, has impinged, impinges, will, or may impinge on sound that is invisible and impingeing ; — (d) depending on which ear, in consequence of a sound, there has arisen, arises, will, or may arise auditory contact ; . . . and, depending on which ear, in consequence of a ^ According to the Cy. (310), this reply, when rehearsed in full, reveals ten distinct answers, each commencing with the refrain : ' The eye, that is to say,' etc., to * self, in- visible and reacting.' They may be summarized and generalized thus: (i.) Sense - impression or contact, as conditioned by sense-organ and sense-stiimdus. (ii.) Ee- sultant feeling. (iii. -v.) Kesultant intellectual states, (vi.) Sense-impression or contact, as conditioned by sense- organ and idea of sense-object, (vii.-x.) Eesultant states as in (ii.-v). What was precisely the difference between the processies named as (i.) and (vi.) it is not yet easy to deter- mine with certainty. 2 This, situated within the cavity of the aggregate organism of the ear, and w^ell furnished with fine reddish hairs, is in shape like a little finger-stall (anguli-ve- thanaka). (Asl. 310.) (7/. Hardy, Zoc. c?7. 179 sound, there has arisen, arises, will, or may arise, born of that auditory contact, a feeling . . . [or] a perception ... [o7'] thinking ... [or] auditory cognition ; — [further] depending on which ear, and having a sound as its object, there has arisen, arises, will, or may arise auditory contact, and, depending on which ear, and having a sound as its object, there has arisen, arises, will, or may arise, born of that auditory contact, a feeling ... [or] a perception . . . [or] thinking . . . [or] auditory cognition ; — this that is hearing, the sphere of hearing, the constituent element of hearing, the faculty of hearing, this that is * a world,' * a door,' ' an ocean,' ' lucent,' * a field,' * a basis,'^ ' the hither shore,' ' an empty village ' — this is that form which is the sphere of hearing.