English
"The aggregates practice loving-kindness, the elements, the sense bases," or when it is said, "The aggregates recollect past lives, the elements, the sense bases," this is the same method. Therefore, the Blessed One speaks of a person to show individual effort, to show immediate retribution, to show the divine abodes, and to show recollection of past lives. Even when it is said, "The aggregates receive gifts, the elements, the sense bases," the general public does not understand, they become confused, or they become hostile, thinking, "What is this? Aggregates, elements, sense bases receiving gifts?" But when it is said, "A person receives," they understand, they are not confused, they are not hostile. Therefore, the Blessed One speaks of a person to show the purity of offerings. And the Buddhas, the Blessed Ones, do not abandon conventional worldly usage. They teach the Dhamma while abiding by worldly designations and worldly expressions. Therefore, the Blessed One also speaks of a person so as not to abandon conventional worldly usage. It should be understood that for these eight reasons the Blessed One speaks of a person, not because a person exists in the ultimate sense. "Only in the mode of the distinctions of phenomena" means since no other true entity apart from the distinctions of phenomena like form, etc., as stated, is established, the apprehension of a person must occur only in the mode of the distinctions of phenomena like form, etc. By this, it is shown, "Is a person, when apprehended, apprehended in the mode of being afflicted, or in one of the modes of experiencing, perceiving, volitionally forming, or cognizing?" because there is no intrinsic phenomenon in the world apart from these. The sides of affirmation and denial, of acceptance and rejection, regarding the apprehension of a person, are with or without distinction. Although these two sides are found in direct and reverse orders, the first method, which proceeds by setting aside the first, is the primary one, and the other is the second. This n Showing their distinction, he said "permission... etc. ...is to be understood." Here, the first method, being in agreement with the established doctrine, is the affirmative side, and the other, being contrary to it, is called the negative side, so it should be understood. Here, in "Tena vata re," "tena" is a word indicating cause. By which the apprehension of a person is established, by that reason. This reason has already been shown below, in terms of both the follower of the teaching and the outsider. And this designation of "reason" in the semblance of a reason is due to the ultimate meaning being intended. Below, "Understand the refutation" was merely an indication of refutation, but now, being clarified by "what you say there" and so on, in the form of a conclusion and by showing its falsity, it becomes "established" by being made clear, hence in the commentary it is said "due to being established." And here, the proposition component "a person is apprehended" is shown in its own form. By "tena" (by that), the reason component is shown in general. Since a reason, being a quality of the proposition, is truly characterized when it is present in the similar case and absent only in the dissimilar case, and not otherwise, therefore, where it is present and where it is not present, that is the two-fold example component, distinguished by similarity and dissimilarity. Just as form and so on are apprehended, so is a person. And just as a rabbit's horn is not apprehended, so a person is not apprehended (this is the application). This is explained by the Pāli text "Indeed, a person is apprehended in a true and ultimate sense," which in the commentary, along with the reason and examples, is called "pāpanā" (bringing forward). The conclusion appears in its own form in the Pāli text, which in the commentary is called "ropanā" (establishing). Thus, the components of proof should be determined and applied according to the ancient method of logic. Now, the application of proof should be arranged by determining the reasons and examples, which are characterized by the opponent's side, by showing their agreement and disagreement. What is to be said here by "reason" and "saying"? Indeed, it is by reasons and examples that the proof or refutation of one's own side and the opponent's side... Ah, not by a promise, because it is to be established. That pair, however, is explained by the Pāli text beginning with "tena vata re". In the commentary, it is shown by means of leading and imposing. But the establishment of a promise is to be understood as showing their scope in the discussion, as it is based on them. Therefore, it says, "whatever he will say," and so on. And for that very reason, in the commentary, it will say, "this is in order... one tetrad is to be understood." And so it says, "just as there," and so on. Only censure is stated separately, not counter-action, is the intention. Stated separately means stated as a separate component, not mixed with leading and imposing, not like one of the others, included within them, nor like establishment, not falling under enumeration. "Ye pana" refers to the word-makers. In the second... it falls into that, because the censure is unreal, and the counter-action is real, is the intention. 2. In ultimate reality, he does not acknowledge a person, but conventionally, he does acknowledge one. Even knowing this view of his own school, the opponent, without making a distinction by way of six types, when asked, "Is a person not found in the true ultimate sense?" the proponent, thinking, "This is a personalist, his doctrine must be rejected," referring to ultimate truth, says, "Yes." For it means, "is not found." Again, the other, referring to conventional truth, says, "What is true," and so on. Its meaning is: "That which is established by worldly convention as true, from that very fact, because it cannot be rejected by anyone, that person is not found in ultimate reality from that." Again, the proponent, having previously rejected the person in terms of ultimate truth, now, thinking, "This question is in terms of conventional truth," without rejecting it, says, "It should not be said thus." Therefore, it says, "The intention is that he refers to conventional truth as the ultimate truth he himself intended." When this is established, "If by the opponent... it should not be started," this should not be said, because in the first question, the ultimate truth is... because it is intended as truly existing. “Then by one’s own speaker… …falls into” this too should not be said, because in the second question, conventional truth is intended as truly existing. If both are intended, if this refers to the first question, then it is unsuitable, because that proceeds only by way of ultimate truth. If it refers to the second question, after stating the first meaning by way of conventional truth, to say again by way of a mixture, “or by combining conventional truth and ultimate truth, he says thus,” that too should not be said. Two truths: conventional and ultimate truths. Among these, only ultimate truth is truly existing in the ultimate sense, without qualification; the other is by way of metaphor. And thus it is said: “Illusion, mirage… …the highest meaning.” Therefore, even for one who desires apprehension by way of conventional truth, since they do not desire it by way of ultimate truth, the interrogation is appropriate, “Is a person apprehended as truly existing in the ultimate sense?” By this alone, “In the principal and non-principal, the task is accomplished in the principal,” “and there is no interrogation by a part of what is truly existing,” etc., is refuted, because the state of being a part of what is truly existing is not established. Its ultimate truth should not be interrogated: its truly existing ultimate truth should not be interrogated by the opponent, “A person is not apprehended as truly existing in the ultimate sense,” because it is desired by one’s own speaker as truly existing in the ultimate sense— this is the intention. The truly existing in common usage being the truly existing intended by oneself is also appropriate, because it is intended by him. This meaning has been shown below. The fault is as stated: this refers to what was just said with “two truths,” etc. But its faultlessness has been shown. Then not: then if it is not apprehended in the sense of a real nature— this is the connection. To be said: what is to be said here has already been said with “that which is established by worldly usage,” etc. Therefore, here, the intention is with “does not acknowledge a person in the ultimate sense,” etc. should be seen. This should be allowed, meaning that this non-perception should be allowed in the second question just as in the first question. Or nothing should be said, or rather, nothing should be said because the question is to be set aside. And showing its nature as something to be set aside, he says, "Just as..." and so on. And here, although the person is not perceived in terms of the two truths, the rejection is made in terms of the non-perception of his existence in terms of convention. This is the meaning to be understood here. Allowed and rejected: allowed in the first question, rejected in the second question. Relying on this sophistry: relying on this six-fold statement of allowing and rejecting with reference to one and the same thing. You are to be censured, this is the connection. Of what is possible in general: of allowing and rejecting in an affirmative way, which is possible in terms of being a ground for censure. Conceiving what is not possible: conceiving in a contrary way what is not possible in terms of being a ground for censure. This can be sophistry. "The destruction of a statement by the arising of a wrong conception of meaning is sophistry," this is the meaning stated. Therefore: because the aforementioned conception