English
neglect of what should be questioned, questioning of what should not be questioned, different established doctrine, and fallacies of reason. Among these: Acknowledging dissimilar examples is loss of proposition in the first example. Stating a different meaning when the proposed meaning is denied is different proposition. Stating a reason contradictory to the proposition is contradiction of proposition. Removing the proposed meaning is abandonment of proposition. Stating a specific reason when a general reason is denied is different reason. Stating a meaning that is useless for the additional meaning is different meaning. Meaningless is like a recitation of a list, devoid of meaning. Even if stated three times by the witness and opponent, Unknown, unintelligible meaning. Meaning disconnected, without connection in terms of prior and subsequent. A statement with inverted parts, untimely. Defective in parts, incomplete. Excessive reason or example, redundant. Repetition, except for recitation, is saying the same thing again and again, or a meaningless statement. Not speaking up when something known to the assembly is said three times without objection. What the speaker said, understood by the assembly, but misunderstood by the opponent, that is unintelligible. When the speaker says what should be said, the opponent's inability to respond is lack of readiness. Interrupting the discussion due to involvement in another matter is distraction. Acknowledging one's own fault to imply fault in the opponent's side, or agreeing with the opponent's view, is concession of opinion. Reprimanding one who deserves it, neglecting one who should be questioned. Reprimanding one who deserves it in a non-reprimandable place, and questioning one who should be questioned. Having accepted one doctrine, then inconsistently introducing talk of another doctrine is a different doctrine. Unestablished, inconclusive, and contradictory are fallacious reasons, meaning pseudo-reasons. And speaking of these is a point of defeat. Among these twenty-two points of defeat, this one, by retracting one's own assertion, by denying it oneself, is called "retraction of assertion," a point of defeat. Therefore it is said: "He shows defeat by his very ignorance." By "unestablished," it means the person is not found by direct perception or by inference. Indeed, he is not found by direct perception. If he were found, there would be no dispute. Nor is there such an inference by which one could infer the person. Thus, a follower of the doctrine, a personalist, might say: "The person is found, there is a person," because it was said by the Blessed One, like form, feeling, etc. For if something was said by the Blessed One as "exists," that exists in the ultimate sense, like form, feeling, perception, mental formations, consciousness. But what does not exist in the ultimate sense, that was not said by the Blessed One as "exists," like the primary matter of the materialists, etc. Regarding the statement, "It does not exist," that is wrong. For here, if the existence of a person is intended conventionally, the conclusion is established. But if it is in the ultimate sense, the reason is unproven, as it is not stated as such. And it is contradictory, since its nature as impermanent, conditioned, dependently arisen, and so on, is not established, and because its uncaused nature is evident in form, feeling, and so on, as seen in "thus seen." As for what other external sectarians say: "Indeed, ultimately, there is a self, because it is the basis for the occurrence of the term 'knowledge,' like form and so on. Or else, the form aggregate is a substance distinct from the self, because it is an aggregate, just like the other aggregates." The intention here is that whatever is a distinct substance, that is the person. Here, for the first reason, there is an inconstant connection and unprovenness in its designation. For it is not established for our own proponents that a non-existent thing is ultimately the basis for the occurrence of the term 'knowledge.' If it is conventionally, that is proving what is already proven. And it is contradictory, as in "a person is not a form distinct from the nature of form and so on." For the latter reason, however, if the general meaning to be proven is taken, it is proving what is already proven, and because the arising of feeling and so on, which are ultimately distinct from the form aggregate and are distinct substances, is desired. And if a specific meaning is taken, there is no example for our own proponents, due to the absence of the substance 'life' conceived by others. And it is contradictory, as in "the form aggregate, even if accompanied by the substance 'life' which is mutually accepted as distinct from feeling and so on, is not like the other aggregates." As for what the Kaṇādas say, "because it is the basis of pleasures and so on," as an inference, they should be told this: What is connected to the self in the case of pleasures and so on, from which the self is inferred as the basis of pleasures and so on? If it is production, then all pleasures and so on would arise from one source, due to the presence of the cause and its independence from others. But if something else, some other cause like the senses, must be depended upon, let that itself be the cause. What is the use of another conceived thing whose power is unseen? Or else, They would say, their livelihood is not self-dependent, even so, it does not succeed, due to the absence of examples. For there is no such intrinsic nature, apart from form and so on, which is a basis for pleasure and so on, from which they could cite an example for the accomplishment of their own purpose. In this way, the unsuitability of terms like "not expressible by compound words" and so on should be refuted. Similarly, it should be understood that by "the non-existence of another real entity," the non-existence of primordial matter, atoms, and so on, conceived externally, is stated. But how is their non-existence? Because they are not apprehended by valid cognition. For primordial matter is not established by direct perception, even for the sage Kapila, since its non-perceptibility is admitted by the Kapilans. But what they say is an inference: "There is a primary cause (padhāna), because of the observed connection of its differentiations, like a whole bundle." By this, the existence of a primary cause for the differentiations, such as sattva and so on, is affirmed. And here it is said: Is the primary cause of the whole and so on different from its divisions, or not different? And what if it is different? Then there would be a contradiction of their doctrine, that the whole world is made of the primary cause. If they say there is no fault, because they admit difference based on distinct configurations? That is not so, for even with distinct configurations like a bracelet and an armlet, the non-difference of gold is observed. For configuration is not the cause of a difference in substance, as it is not the material cause. That which is the cause of its difference is not its non-material cause, just as gold and clay are for pots, and a gold pot, a clay pot, a silk cloth, a cotton cloth. And the example lacks the property to be proven. For the Kapilans do not accept that the whole and so on are preceded by a single cause, the primary cause, nor do they admit any difference whatsoever. But if there is no difference, there is an absence of example. For it is not proper that the very thing to be proven is also the example. And the observation of connection is also unproven. For it is not proper that the same thing is connected with itself. The observation of connection with the primary cause is also unproven for the opponent, because they do not admit the primary cause of the qualities. Now, whatever cause is the primary cause, "it is placed in it..." O fruit!” Even so, it is unproven, since the existence of the fruit is not admitted in the cause, and since the non-admittance of the difference of the unproven dependence on the cause is not admitted by others. But if the dependence of the fruit on the cause is specifically established, there is nothing contradictory, since the dependent origination of phenomena by their respective conditions is desired. Furthermore, the naturalists declare: “Nature is the equilibrium of the three qualities called sattva, rajas, and tamas; and it is eternal, not different from the impermanent modifications such as mahat, due to its uneven and even nature.” This nature, as described by them, is not established, because it is not different from modifications due to its contradictory nature. Indeed, it is not established to say that a horse’s horn is long, and that it is not different from a short cow’s horn. What is more? Because there is no oneness of the three. For those who desire the non-difference of nature from the triad of qualities like sattva, the non-difference of sattva and the others from nature also follows, and it is not proper for the three to be one. Even so, nature is not established. How? Because many faults arise. For if nature, which is unmanifest, is not different from manifest modifications, then many faults such as being caused, impermanent, non-pervasive, active, manifold, dependent, indicative, composite, and heteronomous, would arise for nature, and it should not be declared as not different from genus and modification. And in that case, there is a contradiction in their system, so nature is merely a supposition, and thus it is unproven—this conclusion should be reached here. And with nature being unproven, mahat and the others, which are said to arise from it, are also unproven. And just as nature and mahat and the others, so too are Isvara, Prajapati, Purusha, time, inherent nature, destiny, and desire, etc. Among these, Isvara is not established, because no benefit is seen. For in the birth of beings,