English
the benefit of parents as seed and field, of kamma in causing distinctions such as inferiority, and beyond that, of seasons and food in growth and sustenance, and of the senses in accomplishing functions such as seeing, is seen; but not so for Isvara. Distinctions such as inferiority If it is said that it is because of a share-maker, that is not so, because it is unproven. It must be proven that the aforementioned special assistance is created by a lord, not by kamma. If it is said that it is the same in the other case too, no, because the determination of results from kamma is proven. When kamma, accumulated by action, exists, if it is unwholesome, there is degradation from it; if it is wholesome, there is excellence from it – this is proven. For even the proponent of a lord cannot reject kamma. Moreover, if this diverse world is created by a lord, many faults arise. How? If all this diverse world is created by a lord, it should arise simultaneously with the utterance, not gradually. For the gradual arising of results from proximate causes is not reasonable; if it depends on other causes, the lord's power is diminished. The causal nature of eyes and so on for eye-consciousness and so on is not reasonable. For it is said that a cause is that which makes. And if the lord alone is the maker, then the causal nature of all causes is lost. And the specific distinctions by which the lord might be pleased would become self-made, and similarly the causal nature of all conditions. And this creation of his might be for his own sake, or for the sake of others. If for his own sake, then his lordship is lost due to not having accomplished his purpose, as there is no state of being a sage or having completed his task. Why does he not do for himself what needs to be done by that which he created? If for the sake of others, then "others" here means the world itself; what is the purpose of his creation of hells and diseases and sorrows? And his lordship might be self-made, or made by another, or uncaused. If self-made, then there would be a state of not being a lord before that. If made by another, then there would be a state of not being a lord afterwards, and there would be a superior. If uncaused, then no one would be without lordship. Thus, the unproven nature of a lord should be understood. And just as a lord, so too Prajāpati and Puruṣa. Here, there is only a difference in name. What these proponents conceive as "Prajāpati, Puruṣa" – for those who desire the world's arising to be due to that, in the doctrine of Prajāpati and the doctrine of Puruṣa, the same faults apply as in the doctrine of a lord. Those faults and non-establishment should be removed. And just as these lords and so on, so too time is not established due to the absence of a characteristic mark. For in ultimate reality, a characteristic mark, which is the intrinsic nature of existing phenomena, is found. Just as hardness for earth, not so for time, therefore, ultimately, there is no time. But the proponent of time says, "Time has the characteristic of occurring." He should be asked, "What is this occurring?" He says, "The arising of moments, instants, and so on." That too is not so, because it is not determined as distinct from form and so on. For in ultimate reality, if something whose nature is not determined were to have the characteristic of occurring, then even the horns of a hare and so on would come to have that characteristic. As for what the Kaṇādas say, "Later in the later, simultaneous, long, quick— these are the signs of time, and since there are signs, time exists," that is not appropriate because the possessor of the sign is not found. For in the case of signs whose connection is established, the apprehension of the sign alone would lead to the understanding of the possessor of the sign. But the possessor of the sign, called time, has never been apprehended by anyone with an undistorted mind together with that sign. Therefore, it is not appropriate to say, "Since there are signs, time exists." If it is said that it is appropriate because "later in the later" and so on are the causes of specific distinctions? No, because it is the cause of distinctions like being born first. And there is no such phenomenon as being born first and so on, apart from a mere designation. Therefore, ultimately, there is no time. What's more, due to the many becoming one. For by way of common worldly designation, there are many divisions of time such as past and so on. And you say this is one, so due to the impossibility of the many becoming one, ultimately, there is no time. Similarly, due to the one becoming many. For this present time today, it was future yesterday, it will be past tomorrow. And what was present yesterday was past today, and similarly what will be present tomorrow will be the day after tomorrow. And it is not appropriate for a single nature to have many natures, thus, ultimately, time is not established. However, based on the arising of phenomena, for the sake of a mere conceptual designation, a worldly designation, divided into past and so on, is used. is to be understood as merely a conventional term. Nature, destiny, and chance are also unproven. For what reason? Because of the absence of characteristics. For, nature, destiny, and chance do not arise from their own essence. Otherwise, if such a state exists, it should have a characteristic called its own nature, and there is no establishing cause for it. But these views, when examined, stand only as theories of causelessness. And the varied world is not causeless, due to the implication of the absence of distinction. For, if there were causeless existence, the distinction of faculties and so on, in humans, devas, hell-beings, animals, and so on, which is this existence, would be absent. And this is not desired by the wise. Furthermore, because it is observed. For, the arising of eye-consciousness and so on from the eye and so on, and of sprouts and so on from seeds and so on, is observed. Therefore, this arising is also from a cause. Similarly, because of its absence before and after. For, from whatever combination of conditions, whatever result arises, its arising is not possible before and after that. And what more is there to say? If existence were causeless, then these very words, "causeless existence," would arise before and after, according to their respective combinations of conditions. But they do not arise, because they have not obtained conditions. They arise only in the middle, because they have obtained conditions. Thus, all conditioned phenomena are such, and the theory of causelessness is not established. And when that is unproven, nature, destiny, and chance, which are specific aspects of causelessness, are also unproven, just like the causelessness of existence; this should be understood. What the Kaṇādas say, "atoms are permanent, from them arise the results of dyads and so on, and that is impermanent, and by means of that, this world is varied," that too is merely a wrong conception. For, there are no such things as atoms, apart from aggregates of elements. And that is impermanent. And the arising of the impermanent from the permanent is not appropriate, because of the impossibility of its being a cause, and also because it is not observed. And if it were to become a cause for anything, it would itself be impermanent, due to undergoing change. And there is no such possibility, that a cause, without undergoing change, is sufficient for it to arise. If it undergoes change, how can it have a chance for permanence? Therefore, the atoms of the aforementioned type, beings, are impermanent. And others, conceived by externalists as permanent and so forth, are likewise to be understood as unestablished. Thus it is said: “because, apart from the analysis of phenomena, no other true state is established.” Here it is asked: “If, in ultimate reality, a person is not found, then, with no person being found, why did the Blessed One ‘A person exists who is devoted to his own welfare’ (A. IV, 95; Kv. 22), ‘There are, monks, these four persons, existing, found in the world’ (A. IV, 95; Kv. 22), and in various places declare the existence of a person?” It is in accordance with the disposition of those to be trained. For the Teacher, skillful in taming those to be trained, preaching the Dhamma in accordance with the dispositions of those persons who are to be trained in such and such a way, makes mention of a person in various places in conformity with worldly conventions, not because a person exists in ultimate reality. Moreover, the Blessed One speaks of a person for eight reasons: to illuminate shame and moral dread, to illuminate ownership of kamma, to illuminate individual human effort, to illuminate immediate retribution, to illuminate the divine abidings, to illuminate past lives, to illuminate the purity of offerings, and so that worldly convention is not abandoned. For if it were said: “Aggregates, elements, sense-bases feel shame and moral dread,” the great mass of people would not understand, they would fall into confusion, or they would become hostile: “What is this, aggregates, elements, sense-bases feeling shame and moral dread?” But when it is said: “A woman feels shame and moral dread, a man, a khattiya, a brahmin,” they understand, they do not fall into confusion, they do not become hostile. Therefore, the Blessed One speaks of a person to illuminate shame and moral dread. If it were said: “Aggregates are owners of kamma, elements, sense-bases,” the same principle applies. Therefore, he also speaks of a person to illuminate ownership of kamma. If it were said: “The great monasteries like Veḷuvana were built by aggregates, by elements, by sense-bases,” This is the same method. Similarly, when it is said, "The aggregates kill the mother, the father, the Arahant, cause blood to flow, cause schism in the Sangha, the elements, the sense bases," or when it is said,