English
cannot be said to be either different from or not different from its underlying reality; similarly, it cannot be said to exist or not exist in every way. For all these three are indeed existent; thus, there is no contradiction in the explanation of the matrix. "It is counted, it is spoken of" — thus "saṅkhā". This meaning is established in the sense of 'to be spoken of' as a verbal meaning, not in the word itself; thus, the straightforwardness of the verbal side is possible. Only the verbal aspect follows the Pāli, not the traditionally transmitted meaning as stated. How then can this be obtained? Indeed, a meaning not brought forth does not follow the Pāli. Nor are all Pāli meanings brought forth. The two kinds of designations as stated are indeed spoken of in the commentary by six designations, as appropriate. It should not be said that this is not established. If it is a denial of existence in ultimate reality, this is desirable. But if from conventional reality, then the very use of words like "being," "chariot," "pot," for "being," "chariot," etc., would not be possible. For indeed, there is no use of words without something to be designated. For the designation which is a non-existent phenomenon of ultimate realities, for the purpose of showing the distinction, the teaching of the pair beginning with "appellation" is given. Thus, ultimate realities like form do not become designations. And it is not appropriate to speak of no distinction between the path of designation, the designation, and the designated phenomenon. But if the sound itself is the designation, there might be some slight distinction among them. It is intended that only that which is to be designated, having a non-ultimate nature, is a designation. Therefore, not every path of designation is spoken of by the word "designation." And "designation" is spoken of as that which is to be designated. The term "path of designation" must indeed be spoken. And this should be desired. Otherwise, it could be said that the word "designation" should not be used, because sound itself is the path of designation by being that which is to be designated. And the designation, divided in the section on exposition, is also shown here in "the man Māgaṇḍiya," so it cannot be said that it cannot be spoken. Even so, indeed, because the nature exists of designations of dependence and name-designations as stated, the synonymity of words like "concept" is merely their opinion. Just as a communication, making known an intention, the name-designation itself, being known, makes known the object to be designated. Like a lamp, by its grasped form, it dispels the darkness of form. There is no purpose in conceiving another designation for designating the object to be designated. But in designating the name-designation, like the designation of dependence, which is differentiated by various kinds of appropriation, the name-designation, differentiated by various kinds of words and word-meanings... is just another designation, a desired designation. And there is no fault of endless regress, because each word, in its role as a contributing cause for clarifying its meaning, has a specific nature. By this, the absence of grasping a convention should also be understood as refuted, as well as the absence of purpose for name-designation. For its purpose has been shown before. In phrases like “the usage is obstructed in the worldly stream,” it should be understood that the usages and so on, which are the objects of the sound to be heard, are spoken of as being obstructed in the sense of being heard. Or the sound itself is spoken of thus due to its association with usage and so on. For it cannot be said that the teaching always proceeds in a uniform manner. Thus, in some places, pleasant and unpleasant, even pleasant feeling is called unpleasant, unpleasant is pleasant, even unpleasant is called pleasant. In this way, both types of designation as described, are indeed stated in the commentary as the meaning of the adhivacana and other passages. This is a determination for those who desire a specific knowable beyond the conditioned and unconditioned. 1316. Even if there is a naming by others for common nouns and so on, to show that the nature of naming here is exceedingly appropriate due to its independence from others, and that it means naming in the sense of excellence, he says, “without depending on another,” and so on. The meaning is that the nature of naming does not exist because it is unnatural, occurring only occasionally. By “inherently established,” he refers to the characteristic of feelings and so on being named feelings and so on. If feelings and so on are names in the sense of spontaneously arising names, because they proceed by taking their own names, not made by anyone, then in that case, earth and so on would also become names. Otherwise, the example of earth and so on would not be. Keeping this objection in mind, he says, “by the example of earth and so on,” and so on. For a comparison is made by a partial commonality as intended, not by all commonality. Even so, if feelings and so on are names because their names are inherently established, then the naming of earth and so on is also unavoidable. So he says, “because it is established by usage,” and so on. Therefore, the reason why in feelings and so on, the name The sound's occurrence, even when others are linked to its sign, is shown to be a name-sound for feelings and so on. Just as a word, like 'cow', is established for a group of beings (such as chickens and others). Thus, in many Sutta passages, only their name-usage is seen. The non-occurrence of a name is stated from the non-occurrence of names like 'hair-pot'. This very meaning is explained by example, starting with 'not indeed'. Even though the grasping of feelings and other formless things occurs in a lumped form, due to no dense distinction like a collection, that, however, is mostly through over-conceptualizing meaning, only by way of a single thing, not by way of a collection, as stated in 'by another...pe...there is not'. The state of being illuminator and illuminated is simply the state of subject and object. Conceptual contact is mental contact. It is evident, because it cannot be grasped without a name. Thus it is stated as an example. To avert the doubt that by the phrase 'like conceptual contact' only mental contact and its kinds would be names, not contact with impingement and its kinds, it says 'contact with impingement also' and so on. There, contact accompanied by the five consciousnesses is contact with impingement. The word 'pi' (also) is for possibility. This is said: even gross contact with impingement, arising from the collision of subject and object, is not as manifest as material phenomena, unlike other contact. Therefore, the state of being graspable by name belongs to name itself. By 'due to being formless' and so on, it states the nominal nature of contact with impingement by way of commonality and specificity, by way of metaphor. 'Of the latter and former' is said with reference to the sequence 'name and form'. By 'even though there is form' and so on, it explains the unique causal condition for the usage of the name 'Nibbana' as a dominant condition. Because the minds of noble ones, freed from other objects, incline, lean, and slope only towards the unconditioned element. 1318. From concealing the danger in the cycle of existence, and from relishing and delighting in it, the root of the cycle, the primary cause, is thus 'root of the cycle'. 1320. In each of form and so on, as it is conceptualized... It is a special kind of grasping that arises having superimposed on the body, on the object, the basis for the sign of "I" conceit, and the basis for wholesome and unwholesome actions and their results in the world. Whatever view, when it settles, it is said that it settles by way of over-grasping the nature of phenomena. The meaning is: "they grasp." 1332. Having said that the aggregate of formations is predominated by volition, "by which volition" and so on was said. 1333. "Dunnāma" means a blameworthy name. By "for one not approaching" and so on, he states the distinction of association and frequenting. 1336. Showing this meaning, the statement of the means to know the distinction of offenses and rising from offenses, together with the object, together with the formal act, and so on, he said "from the transgression of the object" and so on. For it is said: "skill in offenses, skill in rising from offenses" (Dhammasaṅgaṇī, Duka-mātikā 119). By knowing the cause, the result is well known. To show that, he said "or of the offense" and so on. 1342. "Of that" means skill in attention. 1344. "Not arising" means not arising. 1348. "By not doing" means by way of disrespect. 1350. "Of a weak tree" means like a moringa tree and so on. 1352. "Of the non-restraint of the eye faculty" means of the non-restraint of the eye faculty. "The cause is the unrestrained eye faculty itself" means the eye faculty is the primary cause for covetousness and other defilements that flow in through the eye-door, just like the consciousness that arises through that door. For when the eye faculty is unrestrained, those defilements flow in. Thus, the commentary shows the meaning that this non-restraint is said to be caused by the unrestrained eye faculty. Now, standing on the meaning thus stated, he shows the application of the Pāli by "where the basis is" and so on. "Of what?" asks about the kind, meaning "of what sort, of what nature?" For when the form is stated, there is no purpose in asking about the form again. Covetousness and so on flow in. "That which is characterized" means the eye faculty characterized by the inflow (of defilements) is unrestrained – this is the application. "As far as possible" means the non-restraint of immorality is to be applied by way of the mind-door, and the remaining non-restraint