English
due to the non-existence of the object, says ‘‘of non-existent ones, etc.’’ Now, by showing the non-existence of the object of beings, etc., in any way whatsoever, he establishes that the conventional reality pertaining to that object is indeed a conventional reality that does not exist, saying ‘‘and this view.’’ Beings, etc., which exist, are called ‘‘non-existent’’ in the sense of the absence of the nature of form, etc., not because of their absolute non-existence. For thus, they are understood as being designated in various ways, and the view of the aforementioned kind, ‘‘Does form exist? Yes, it exists, and it does not exist. It exists in some ways, it does not exist in some ways. It should not be said thus. It exists in some ways, it does not exist in some ways. Yes. The meaning of existence, the meaning of non-existence’’ (Kathā. 306) thus p regarding the assertion of existence and non-existence. For there, phenomena such as form exist by their nature as form, but do not exist by their nature as feeling. Therefore, regarding those who hold the view that everything thus exists and thus does not exist, the question "Does form exist?" is for the proponent's side. The answer "It exists and it does not exist" is for the opponent's side. Then, if the proponent's side holds the view that form itself thus exists and thus does not exist, the proponent, asking "In that case, is it that same thing that exists and that same thing that does not exist?", says "It is that same thing that exists." The other side denies it, referring to its existence by that same nature and its non-existence by that same nature. When asked a second time, he affirms it, referring to its existence by its own nature and its non-existence by another nature. Then the proponent, by saying "the meaning of existence, the meaning of non-existence," and so on, shows that existence or non-existence, being mutually contradictory, cannot occur in a single phenomenon without a difference in time, and thus asks "Does it become one?" thereby refuting the opponent. And it is said that "refuted" means that by refuting the existence of form, feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness by their own nature, and their non-existence by another nature, as stated in "Form exists as 'form,' and form does not exist as 'feeling'" (Kathā. 306), the state of being a being and so on is also refuted. "Form and so on do not exist" means they do not exist by their nature as form and so on. "Thus, thus" means in the sense of a collection, a continuum, and so on. "Diverse perceptions arise by way of conceptualization." If the meaning of words based on the perception of a being, a chariot, and so on, does not exist, then surely the expressions of a being, a chariot, and so on, become ignoble speech, so it is said, "And those expressions..." Because something that does not exist in itself must be designated by the word that designates it, it obtains the designation of a conventional term. "By this very intention," and so on, refers to the meaning already stated by "not existing by itself," and so on. "That" refers to the apprehension of a being, and so on. "Because the four divine abidings operate by taking the designation of a being as their object, they are said to have an unutterable object," and so on, in the commentary (Dhs. A. 1421) there. that it is not said that they operate there. If it is not to be said that they operate in the sense of being a protection, how can there be a cause for non-existent beings, etc.? He says, "the continuum of the aggregate of aggregates," and so on. The continuum is the continuum of the aggregate of aggregates. That which is the basis for grasping is the person, the cause of the designation of grasping. If the arising of wholesome states, etc., occurs for one who practices with the perception of a person, how is the view of a person rejected as a wrong view? He says, "because," and so on. The earth element is found, he says, as an example in the sense of an opponent in the absence of a person. This is an inference here. A person is not found by separating form, etc., because in their absence, such a mind does not exist, just like practices, etc. The person who is found by ultimate reality, who is knowable by eye-consciousness, and who transmigrates and is liberated, is the person conceived by such a view who is rejected, not the conventional person, showing this, he says, "rejected... and so on... view." In the verse, among the five aggregates—form, feeling, perception, volitional formations, and consciousness—which of these phenomena do you know as a being? It shows that not even one of these should be taken as a being. Then, if you believe that there is another being apart from these, even so, is that your view, Mara? The word "nu" (or "indeed") emphasizes that it is indeed a view. Why? Because this is merely a heap of pure formations. He explains that very meaning: "No being is found here." The meaning is that since no being is found here, either directly or by inference, there is no such thing as a being. If there is no being, how is it said that a being enters transmigration, and so on? What is to be understood here is that a conventional being is intended, because the word "being" is used in convention. Showing the connection with the second verse, he says, "A being, however," and so on. "Components" means taking the components of a chariot, such as the axle, wheel, pole, and so on, as components. "Being" is a conventional term. Of the non-existent means of the absolutely non-existent, like a rabbit's horn, etc. If absolutely non-existent... unreal, how is it grasped? It is said: "conceptualized." A pot and so on are known by worldly convention. Here, just as Nibbāna, which is free from origination and so on, is called "that which brings relief" because it is a cause for peace, due to the absence of defilements and their torment in the states that arise concerning oneself and fall within one's continuum, so too, a concept is said to operate in terms of states that operate concerning oneself, even though it is free from origination and so on. Or, the meaning of "cause" is included, so "operates" means "is expressed." Similarly, a name-concept makes known the object to be made known, once it is grasped, just as an intimation makes known an intention. Thus, it is said to be "that which is spoken of through the door of the meaning being spoken of," because it is not to be grasped. But as for a concept to be made known, there is nothing to be said about its being spoken of. Similarly, its indeterminate nature is to be understood as rejected, because it is to be grasped by making it "that which makes known what is to be made known," in the sense of making known by way of characteristics. For the essential nature of real things, such as hardness or touch, does not become expressible by sound in its own form. Rather, a common aspect, which is distinct from other kinds and common to its own kind, established by prior convention and superimposed, is expressible for them, which are differentiated by time, place, and so on. Even there, a sound does not operate without some operating sign. Thus, the ancient teachers say that a specific common aspect, established by worldly convention as the operating sign of that sound, and fixed to the meaning of that particular word, is a name-concept. For it names the sound to that particular meaning, or it makes a name-designation for that particular meaning. And it is a concept because it makes known by characteristics. To whom does that specific aspect belong? It should be understood as belonging to the object to be made known. For objects have many aspects. And having done so, the statement that this concept is to be grasped becomes justified. And this must necessarily be accepted. Otherwise, there would be a confusion of the spoken and the speakable, and every meaning would be speakable by every sound, and every sound would be expressive of every meaning. Here, it can be said that their occurrence is by the mere taking of a convention, because the taking of a convention occurs only when they are well-established. But others explain: "Just as in inferring fire from smoke, fire is not known by the mere smoke alone; but when the connection of smoke with fire, called inseparability, is known, fire is known by the smoke. Similarly, in understanding meaning by sound, that meaning is not known by the mere sound alone. But when the connection of each particular sound with its particular meaning, called inseparability, is known, it should be understood that it makes the meaning known by that particular sound. Otherwise, even by merely hearing a sound, without grasping the connection, that meaning would be known. Whatever connection of the aforementioned kind is here, that, in its nature of making that meaning known, is called a name, because in ultimate reality it does not exist. Or, by way of worldly convention, it is a worldly convention, or it is established as known, thus established by worldly convention. And because it is the cause for understanding the kinds of meanings revealed by sound, and because it makes known by way of kind, it is called a designation (paññatti)." If there were no knowable distinction apart from the conditioned and unconditioned, then, like what is denoted by words like 'pot', what is expressed by words like 'earth element' or 'touch' would not be found either, and all conventional usage would cease. And since material and immaterial phenomena occur only by way of their specific modes, called continuity, and not in isolation, therefore, even if their specific modes of configuration, aggregation, and state are nothing in ultimate reality, yet, by taking on an existent nature through the underlying realities of existing material forms and so on, they become the basis for various expressions corresponding to various apprehensions. For a dependent designation