English
having shown the intention of the aforementioned Mahāaṭṭhakathā argument, to show the intention of the Kurundi argument which states "Pācittiya," "even in the latter method," etc., is said. By the measure of the word, even though the intention is the same regarding deception, etc., in the specific case of disparagement, etc., by the power of the word prescribing a Saṅghādisesa, etc., this is the meaning. But for a bhikkhu, a Dukkata for a bhikkhunī, a Dukkata for a bhikkhu who disparages a bhikkhunī. Thus, having clarified the intention in both Aṭṭhakathā statements, now, having shown the fault in the latter Pācittiya argument, to establish only the former Dukkata argument, "but there," etc., is said. There, distinct, a Pācittiya is stated distinct from the Pācittiya for intentional false speech (Pāci. 1), the intention is that it is not included therein. Therefore, since a distinct Pācittiya is prescribed for baseless disparagement, therefore, the former method, that is the Dukkata argument. Thus, having shown the Dukkata and Pācittiya argument that was inserted in between, now, to clarify the obvious meaning, "likewise a bhikkhunī," etc., is begun. There, likewise, just as for a bhikkhu who disparages a bhikkhu and a bhikkhunī, Saṅghādisesa and Dukkata offenses are stated, likewise, this is the meaning. By these, there is no destruction. It is said generally, but the meaning is that there is no destruction of this by a dukkaṭa offense. "Dussīlā" means those who have committed a pārājika offense. 386. "By the diversity of aspects" means by the diversity of the aspect that is corrupted and the aspect that corrupts. "Anabhiraddho" means not pleased. Therefore it is said, "not happy." "Na pasādito" means one in whom faith has not arisen. The word "khīla" means stiffness, and it is also a synonym for refuse, so it is said, "mind...etc....khīla." "Nappatīto" means not approached, not attained by joy, happiness, etc. Therefore it is said, "not associated." Where it is said, "by whom he is angry" and "by whom he is annoyed," here it should be connected as: "by whom he is angry" and "by whom he is annoyed" — both of these are stated in the mātikā and in the word analysis (Pārā. 386). "By two" means by the two terms "by that anger" and "by that ill-will," but in meaning, only ill-will is shown by both, so it is said, "it shows only the aggregate of mental formations." "Yāyā" means by displeasure. "Not on account of being admonished" means if "without foundation" were intended even on account of being admonished, the word analysis would say that "without foundation" means "not having committed an offense." That is the meaning. "Which is a pārājika" means any one of the nineteen pārājika offenses appropriate for a bhikkhu. However, in the word analysis (Pārā. 386), taking only those mentioned in the Bhikkhuvibhaṅga, it is said, "by any one of the four." "This is not important here" means this matter of having committed or not committed an offense is not a factor for the offense of slander here. The meaning is that the intention to remove a person, whether he has committed an offense or not, with the perception that "this person is innocent, pure," or with doubt, is the factor here. "Just so" means this refers to the meaning of the divine ear of faith, or the divine ear. Doubt that arises only according to what is seen is called "doubt based on what is seen." Thus in the remaining cases too. "Or without having seen" is stated in the highest sense; even if they have seen and departed, there is no fault. "Of these" means by these. "They will do" shows the manner of arising at that moment; later, however, he admonishes with the doubt, "Has it been done by this time?" There is no accusation that 'they will not do it'. This 'Ariṭṭha has been drunk' is the seeing of a sign, the smell of liquor wafting from the mouth. For Ariṭṭha is a permissible medicine, similar in color and smell to liquor. In 'seen, it has a root' and so on, it is the showing of the root or rootlessness of the offense, whether it occurred or not. But 'there is a root of perception' and so on, is the showing of the root or rootlessness of the perception of what was seen, whether it occurred or not. Here, in 'having seen, and having the perception of what was seen, he accuses,' even one who accuses, having seen another person transgressing, or coming out from a hidden place, and perceiving 'this is he,' is included. This method applies to what is heard and so on, too. Here, in 'with a root or with a root of perception,' one who accuses a person who has committed a pārājika, with a root of seeing and so on, and with an incorrect perception 'this one has committed,' is called accusing with a root. Because non-offense is possible only when there is a root of perception, if a person has committed or has not committed, one who perceives 'he has committed,' and has a perception of seeing or hearing and so on, based on roots of seeing and so on, or not seeing and so on, and accuses that person with that root of seeing and so on, is called accusing with a root of perception. For these, there is no offense; the meaning for the case of offense should be understood by the reverse of what has been said. 'Standing nearby' means standing within the range of sight and hearing of gestures, words, and sounds that are being made as an accusation. But some say 'standing within twelve cubits,' (Sārattha. ṭī. 2.385-386) that is not appropriate. Further, by way of exception, in showing non-offense, it is only said 'having sent a messenger, or a letter, or a message,' but it is not said 'the head of one who accuses beyond twelve cubits does not come'. 'By word, by word' means that the offense belongs only to the one who instigates the accusation, even if the one commanded speaks throughout the entire day, word by word. 'He too' means the one commanded too. And for him, even without saying 'I too have seen' and so on, but with the intention of causing removal by the perception 'it is rootless,' saying 'you have committed a pārājika offense' – this very speech, not as if it were another's statement, but simply... Even for restrained speech, it is a Saṅghādisesa. But even if there is no intention to disparage, if one says "so-and-so said this" merely repeating what another said, there is no Saṅghādisesa. But if one says that what was not said by another was said, then it is an offense. In "many (accusers), many (accused), with many (grounds)," here "many" (sambahula), by indicating the plurality of the accused, makes known the existence of different cases even in the previous three instances due to the plurality of the accused. Indeed, for one accused, this set of four is stated based on the distinctions of the object and the accuser; and by the plurality of the accused, another set of four is obtained, so it becomes eight. In connection with groundless accusation, to show the characteristics of accusation with grounds, etc., the passage beginning "Who, then, is able to accuse?" is commenced. The Sutta beginning "Having heard from a bhikkhu, he accuses..." (is stated) because those who reveal the transgression of others to the accuser, they too, at that moment, stand in the position of an accuser and reveal it. And taking their words, the other (accuser) is able to accuse, and is able to make the unwilling (accused) accept (the accusation) by means of those first accusers, who are ultimately disciples of other sects. Therefore, it should be understood that here they are referred to as disciples. In phrases like "or a messenger," etc., (it means) whoever is able to accuse by sending a messenger saying "you go thus and accuse," or by sending a letter or an original message for him. "By the proper time" means at the moment of naturally knowing. "Of the two grave ones" means the Pārājika and Saṅghādisesa offenses. "Wrong view" (micchādiṭṭhi) is the view with ten grounds that proceeds in the manner of "there is no giving," etc. (MN 1.445; 2.94, 95, 225; 3.91, 116, 136; SN 3.210). The view that grasps at an extreme, called "antaggāhikā," is that which causes one to grasp at the extreme called eternalism or annihilationism. "Of the six (offenses) laid down for the sake of livelihood" means those that can be incurred even for the sake of livelihood: the Pārājika of superhuman states (Pārā. 195), the Saṅghādisesa of acting as a go-between (Pārā. 301, 302), the Thullaccaya by implication for "whoever lives in your monastery is an Arahant" (Pārā. 220), the Pācittiya for a bhikkhu requesting choice food (Pāci. 257), (and the Pācittiya for) a bhikkhunī requesting choice food... Pāṭidesanīya by announcement (Pāci. 1236), Dukkaṭa by requesting soup and rice (Pāci. 612-613) — These six mentioned in the Parivāra (Pari. 287). These offenses are not only laid down for livelihood, for acting as a go-between and others can be incurred otherwise too. It is said thus with reference to incurring them even for livelihood, meaning, "also laid down for livelihood." And not only these, there are other offenses that can be incurred for livelihood, such as taking what is not given, corrupting families, killing living beings, practicing medicine, and so on. But it should be understood that these are included in the six categories of offenses like Pārājika, due to their nature as offenses, and are therefore not mentioned separately. "By this much, the head does not come" — this is said with reference to a Saṅghādisesa. But the accusation has indeed been made. "Thirty" (tiṃsāni) means "they have thirty," meaning "more than thirty." The same method applies to "ninety" (navutāni) here. Here, "wishing to take the self-taking" — because it is to be taken by oneself, because it is to be grasped by views and so on as its root, because it is seized without allowing another to struggle, the accusation is called "self-taking." "Wishing to take that" means "wishing to make an accusation."