Back to the library

B020303puggalapaññatti aṭṭhakathā(designation of persons commentary)

English

His intention here is this: in the truths of suffering, origin, and path, the objective truth is conditioned, the characteristic truth is unconditioned. In cessation, there is no objective truth; it is only unconditioned. Therefore, he says "Yes." But that is merely his doctrine. For he considers suffering, origin, and the path to be objective truths. However, those characteristics of theirs, such as oppressiveness, arising, and leading out, are called characteristic truths, and there are no sufferings, etc., other than those with the characteristics of oppressiveness, etc. The intention in "protections," etc., should be understood in the same way as stated above. To the question "Is the truth of suffering...?" he affirms, with respect to his doctrine, referring to the characteristic. To the question "Is suffering...?" he denies, referring to the object. From here on, the questions of purification and the questions of connection should all be understood according to the Pāli text. In the end, the sutta brought forth to establish the doctrine is virtually as if it were not brought forth, because the meaning is wrongly grasped. Explanation of the Truth Discourse. 4. Explanation of the Formless Discourse 455-456. Now, there is the Formless Discourse. Here, regarding those who, relying on the statement "The four formless states are imperturbable," hold the doctrine that "all those things are unconditioned," concerning them, the question "Is the sphere of infinite space...?" is from the proponent of his own view, the affirmation from the other. The rest here is quite straightforward in meaning. The supporting sutta, too, is virtually as if it were not brought forth, because its meaning is not understood. Explanation of the Formless Discourse. 5. Explanation of the Discourse on the Attainment of Cessation 457-459. Now, there is the Discourse on the Attainment of Cessation. Here, the attainment of cessation is the non-occurrence of the four aggregates. But since it is done while being done, attained while being attained, therefore, it is It is called not. But due to the absence of characteristics of the conditioned and unconditioned, it should not be said, "It is conditioned" or "It is unconditioned." There, those whose view is, "Since it is not conditioned, therefore it is unconditioned," just like the Andhakas and the Uttarāpathakas; regarding them, the question about cessation attainment is for the proponent of one's own doctrine, the affirmation for the other. "Producing" etc., is said only in terms of the power of attaining and emerging. However, just as form etc., produce unconditioned phenomena; no one actually produces it. "Cessation is purification, arising" should be understood as fruition attainment. But the unconditioned is not there at all, therefore it is rejected. Therefore, since it is not conditioned, therefore it is the view that it is unconditioned. But this reason for being unconditioned is like something unsaid even when said. Explanation of the Discussion on Cessation Attainment. 6. Explanation of the Discussion on Space 460-462. Now, there is the discussion called the space discussion. There, space is of three kinds – limited space, space by removal of the kasina, and unobstructed space. "Empty space" is also a name for that same thing. Among them, limited space is conditioned, the other two are mere concepts. But those whose view is, "Since both kinds are not conditioned, therefore they are unconditioned," just like the Uttarāpathakas and the Mahīsāsakas; regarding them, the question about space is for the proponent of one's own doctrine, the affirmation for the other. The rest here is clear in meaning. Explanation of the Discussion on Space. 7. Explanation of the Discussion on Space with Visible Impression 463-464. Now, there is the discussion called the space with visible impression discussion. There, those whose view is, relying on the occurrence of knowledge in holes in trees etc., "All unobstructed space has a visible impression," just like the Andhakas; regarding them, the question about space with visible impression is for the proponent of one's own doctrine, the affirmation for the other. Then, to challenge him, "If it has a visible impression, it would be like this," "form" etc., is said for the purpose of refutation. Rejecting the question, "Having arisen dependent on the eye," due to the absence of such a sutta, relying on the perception of the space between the scales etc., He acknowledges. Between two trees, seeing the form of the tree with the eye, and the absence of form in between, mind-door consciousness arises as space, not eye-consciousness. The same method applies to the rest. Therefore, this is not proof. Explanation of the discourse on space being visible. 10. Explanation of the discourse beginning with the earth element being visible. 465-470. Now, there is the discourse called the earth element being visible, and so on. There, those who, seeing the color object, the movement of stone, water, nets, and trees, and the spaces where the five senses are established, and the form of the hand, foot, etc., at the time of bodily expression, have the view that "the earth element, etc., are visible," just like the blind men; referring to them, in all the discourses, the initial question is for the proponent of their own view, the acknowledgment is for the other. The rest should be understood everywhere according to the text and the method stated below. The discourse beginning with the earth element being visible and ending with bodily action being visible is concluded. The sixth chapter. 7. The seventh chapter 1. Explanation of the discourse on inclusion. 471-472. Now, there is the discourse called inclusion. There, since there is no such thing as some things being included by some things, like oxen by ropes, etc., therefore, those who have the view that "there are no things included by any things, therefore, the inclusion of form in one way, etc., is meaningless," just like the Rajagirikas and the Siddhatthikas; referring to them, to show the state of inclusion in another sense, the question is for the proponent of their own view, the acknowledgment is for the other, according to his own view. Now, to show the sense in which inclusion is obtained, "Surely, are there some things?" etc., is begun. All of that is easily understood because of the method stated below. However, the simile that the opponent brings, such as "just as with a rope," etc., to establish his view, the proponent of his own view, without approving of it, without refuting it, should understand that "if indeed with a rope," his view is different. Here is the meaning: if for you, oxen, etc., are included by ropes, etc., "Not included," namely, are there any states not included by any states? Explanation of the "Included" Discussion. 2. Explanation of the "Concomitant" Discussion 473-474. Now, there is the "Concomitant" discussion. Here, since feelings and so on are not inherent in perceptions and so on like oil in sesame, therefore, "There are no states concomitant with any states; thus, 'concomitant with knowledge' and so on are meaningless," is the view of some, such as the Rajagiriya Siddhatthikas. Referring to them, the question is by the proponent of one's own view to show concomitance with a different meaning, and the assertion is by the other according to their own view. The rest here is straightforward in meaning, as the method has been stated below. But this question of simile, "like oil in sesame," which was brought up by the opponent, is inappropriate because there is no distinction in characteristic establishment between sesame and sesame oil, as there is between feelings and perceptions. For in all heaps of sesame seeds, there is only the designation "sesame." Therefore, when sesame is produced and taken, the former shape is no longer recognized as sesame. Thus, it is like something not brought up. Explanation of the "Concomitant" Discussion. 3. Explanation of the "Mental Factor" Discussion 475-477. Now, there is the "Mental Factor" discussion. Here, since there is no such thing as "contact-related," therefore, "There should be no mental factor; thus, there is no mental factor state," is the view of some, such as the Rajagiriya Siddhatthikas. Referring to them, the question is by the proponent of one's own view, and the assertion is by the other. "Co-arisen" is said referring to concomitance and co-arising. "Contact-related" is the question by the opponent who does not see such a usage. What is the harm in saying, "As a mental factor is dependent on mind, so too, it is contact-related because it is dependent on contact," if it is said with usage, just as "dependent on mind"? There is no fault, is the assertion by the proponent of one's own view. The rest is straightforward in meaning. Explanation of the "Mental Factor" Discussion. 4. Explanation of the "Giving" Discussion 478. Now, there is the "Giving" discussion. Here, giving is threefold: the volition of relinquishment, abstinence, and the object of giving. "Faith, shame, and merit are giving" (AN 8.30) is stated. Giving with a mind of generosity is dāna. Restraint in a situation where "one gives safety" is virati. Material gifts in a situation where "one gives food and drink" is deyyadhamma. There, the generosity of mind, "he gives or they give a gift," is dāna. Virati is dāna in the sense of non-breaking or cutting off. For as it arises, it cuts off, breaks, or severs the immoral intention consisting of fear and terror, thus it is dāna. Deyyadhamma is dāna because it is given. Thus, all three, in essence, are twofold: mental states and material gifts. There, those who hold the view that "only mental states are dāna, not material gifts," like the Rajagirikasiddhatthikas, for them, the question about mental states is from the proponent of one's own doctrine, the affirmation from the other.