English
Then, to challenge him, "Does he know the immediately future as to its root and so on, by that knowledge of the future?" he said, "Future root," and so on. There, "root," and so on, are all synonyms for cause. For a cause, that which produces its effect, that is where it roots, stands firm; hence, "root." And from that, it impels, sets in motion; hence, "cause." That very thing it indicates, "Come, seize it!"; it sends forth, makes manifest; hence, "condition." From that, it originates; hence, "origin." It arises; hence, "source." And there it arises, or it causes it to arise; hence, "arising." That very thing it brings; hence, "sustenance." And that is its object, in the sense of being indispensable. That very thing, having depended on, comes; hence, "condition." From that, it arises together; hence, it is called "arising." But since the immediately subsequent thought cannot be known by these means, therefore he rejects it, "No, indeed." "Future cause-condition" means he knows the conditionality in immediately future thoughts. That is, he knows those things that are cause-conditions there. The same method applies in the remaining terms. "Gotrabhu," and so on, is said to show in its own form that future knowledge which does not arise. "Of Pāṭaliputta," this sutta is brought to show that future knowledge which does arise. But since this is not proof of all future knowledge, therefore it is not brought forward. Explanation of the Discourse on Knowledge of the Future. 9. Explanation of the Discourse on Knowledge of the Present 441-442. Now, there is the Discourse on Knowledge of the Present. There, those who, relying on the statement that "when all conditioned things are seen as impermanent, that knowledge too is seen as impermanent," hold the view that "there is knowledge in all the present without distinction," like the blind men; with reference to them, "present" is the question of one's own side, the assertion of the other. Then, to challenge him, "If there is knowledge in the present without distinction, it must be so even in the momentary present. Since two knowledges cannot exist together, does he know that with that very knowledge?" "It should be thus," is a challenge, hence the question by one holding his own view. There, in the first question, the other denies that it is possible to know it by that alone. In the second question, the affirmation refers to continuity, by the same person. Seeing the breaking down in sequence, he sees the knowledge of contemplating dissolution by contemplating dissolution. By that knowledge, he knows that knowledge, and so on, this is the method. "By that contact, they contact that," and so on, these were said to prevent even a little opportunity for doubt. But what was said by him to establish his doctrine, "Surely all conditioned things," and so on. There, in principle, that knowledge is seen, but not as an object, with this intention, the affirmation is by one holding his own view. Therefore, even though his doctrine is thus established, it is still unestablished. Explanation of the Discourse on Present Knowledge. 10. Explanation of the Discourse on Fruition Knowledge 443-444. Now, there is the discourse on knowledge in fruition. There, "Just as Buddhas teach the Dhamma for the attainment of noble fruition by beings, so too do disciples. Thus, by this similarity, just as Buddhas have knowledge of the fruition to be attained by each being, so too do disciples," this is the doctrine of some, like the blind. Referring to them, the question "Does a disciple?" is by one holding his own view, the affirmation is by the other. Then, to challenge him, "If a disciple has knowledge of fruition, just as Buddhas, even in the same stream-entry fruition, declare the distinctions of the fruition by the power of their knowledge, 'This is a one-seeder, this is a clan-to-clan, this is a seven-times-at-most,' do they also, in this way, does a disciple declare the distinctions of the fruition?" He denies it. "Does a disciple have the higher and lower distinctions of fruition?" and so on, was said to question the reason for the existence of knowledge in fruition. Here, the intention is this: Buddhas have what is called the higher and lower distinctions of fruition, that is, the knowledge of the varying states of fruitions, "This fruition is higher, this is lower." Likewise, the higher and lower distinctions of faculties and individuals, because of the existence of those, knowing that particular fruition according to the faculties of that particular individual. "Does your disciple also have such a range of knowledge?" The statements beginning with "The disciple has the classification of aggregates" and so on, are said to challenge: "If your disciple has knowledge of the fruition like the Buddhas, then he must have these classifications. Does he have them? Can he know or formulate these classifications by his own power?" The statement "The disciple is a conqueror" and so on, is said to challenge: "If the disciple has knowledge of the fruition like the Buddhas, then in that case, he is himself a conqueror." The same method applies to the question "The disciple of one who has not arisen." In the question "Is he ignorant?", it is refuted because ignorance, which is synonymous with lack of knowledge, has been destroyed, but he does not have knowledge of the fruition like the Buddhas. Therefore, the proponent of the opposing view is unstable. Explanation of the Discourse on Knowledge of Fruition. The Fifth Chapter. The Great Section is complete. 6. The Sixth Chapter 1. Explanation of the Discourse on the Inevitable 445-447. Now, there is the discourse on the inevitable. There, "the inevitable" means the Noble Path, because of the statement "He is capable of entering the inevitable, perfected in wholesome qualities" (Pu. Pa. 13). However, since even when it has arisen and ceased, the person is not called "unstable," therefore, the doctrine of those who hold that "that inevitable is unconditioned in the sense of being permanent" is like that of the blind. The question is directed to the proponent of one's own view, the affirmation to the other. Then, revealing "if it is unconditioned, it must be of such a nature," he says, beginning with "Nibbana." The question of comparison is straightforward in meaning. The statement beginning with "Some hold" is said to reveal the conditioned nature of the inevitable. In the question "Is the path unconditioned?", he refutes it because of its nature of arising and ceasing. In the question "Is the inevitable conditioned?", he refutes it with reference to the existence of the inevitable even when the path has ceased. In the questions beginning with "The inevitable of stream-entry" and so on, the meaning should be understood in this way, both in direct and reverse order. When asked "Are there five unconditioned things?", he refutes it, not seeing the place where the five unconditioned things come from. When asked a second time about the four inevitable perfections, He affirms it due to the immutability of Nibbāna and its unconditioned nature. The question about the fixed wrongness is said to show the unsuitability of being unconditioned by merely stating the fixedness. Explanation of the Discourse on Fixedness. 2. Explanation of the Discourse on Dependent Origination 448. Now, there is the Discourse on Dependent Origination. There, those who hold the view that "dependent origination is unconditioned," based on statements in the Nidāna section such as "whether Tathāgatas arise or do not arise, this element remains, this stability of the Dhamma," (SN 2.20) like the Pubbaseliyas and the Mahīsāsakas; regarding them, the question is from the proponent of a different view, the affirmation from the other. 449. The questions beginning with "Is ignorance unconditioned?" are stated to show that ignorance and the like are themselves dependent origination. The meaning by which each factor there is called "dependent origination" is already stated in the Vibhanga of Dependent Origination. 451. "Conditioned by ignorance, volitional formations": the purpose of stating this is to refute the view established by the sutta where it says, "this stability of the Dhamma," etc., by showing its meaning. Here, the meaning is this: that which is stated below as "this element remains, this stability of the Dhamma, this fixed order of the Dhamma" does not exist separately as one thing apart from ignorance and the like. But this is a name for the conditions of ignorance and the like. Even when a Tathāgata has arisen or has not arisen, volitional formations arise from ignorance, and consciousness and the like arise from volitional formations and the like; therefore, "conditioned by ignorance, volitional formations," in this phrase, the stability of the Dhamma is the state of standing as the cause of the phenomena of volitional formations. And the fixed order of the Dhamma is that the very phenomena are fixed in the state of being the cause, thus it is called ignorance. And he asks whether that is unconditioned, and whether Nibbāna is unconditioned. The opponent, according to his view, affirms it, and then, asked whether there are two unconditioned things, rejects it due to the absence of a sutta, and affirms it according to his view. The same method applies to the remaining phrases. But what is similar to what is stated below should be understood in the same way as stated there. Discourse on Dependent Origination. Commentary. 3. Explanation of the Truth Discourse 452-454. Now, there is the Truth Discourse. Here, regarding those who, relying on the sutta "These four, monks, are truths, not untruths" (SN 5.1090), hold the doctrine that "the four truths are eternal and unconditioned," like the Pubbaseliyas; concerning them, the question is from the proponent of his own view, the affirmation from the other.