English
The other, because of the non-existence of becoming again of that which has become, denies that it is. Asked the second question, since that present, having become past, has gone to the designation of "having become, it is," therefore he acknowledges it. Then his own-doctrine proponent asks him, "If for you that same present, having become past, has gone to the designation of 'having become, it is,' does it become again, and what of that which, being present, not having become past, not being, has gone to the designation of 'not having become, it is not,' like a hare's horn, does that also not become, not be again?" with the intention of "not having become, it is not, not having become, it is not." The other, thinking, "That which does not exist, because of its non-existence, so let it be that the present, not having become, is not, a It does not become, thus not having become, it is not. Let it be so for now. Again, thinking, "But whence comes to it this state of not having become?" he rejects it. In the third question, which comes combining both, application should be made in this same way. Another method: if that very future is that present, the state of becoming is said of the future in the present, and the state of having become is said of the present in the future. Thus being, the future also, having become, becomes. The present also, having become, becomes indeed. Therefore, we ask him, "Does each of these, having become, become, having become, become?" The other, "That very future is that present," having rejected the question by the method of rejection, being asked again in the second question, affirms by the method of affirmation. Then his own proponent, "That very future is that present," on the basis of the question, "Does each of these, having become, become, having become, become?" asking, reversing the former rejected question, asks, "Not having become, it is not, not having become, it is not?" Its meaning: Surely, "By you, that very future is that present" having been said, by rejecting the first question, the state of becoming of the future, and the state of having become of the present, have been rejected. Therefore, the future is not, indeed, the present is not having become, indeed. And in the second question, "That very future is that present" is affirmed. Thus being, the future also, not having become, is not, indeed. The present also, not having become, is not indeed. Therefore, we ask him, "Does each of these, not having become, not become, not having become, not become?" The opponent, as if completely enveloped by darkness from all sides, not seeing their state of not having become, rejects it, saying, "No, indeed." In the second instance also, if that very present is that past, the state of becoming is said of the present in the past, and the state of having become is said of the past in the present, thus being, the present also, having become, becomes indeed, the past also, having become, becomes indeed. We do not ask him, "Does each of these, having been, come to be, having been, come to be?" The other, that very present, in the manner of rejecting the question about the past, rejects it. Then, asked again, in the manner of acknowledging the second question, he acknowledges it. Then his own-doctrine proponent, "That very present, that past," on the basis of the question, acknowledging that each of these, having been, comes to be, having been, comes to be, reversing the previously rejected question, asks, "Not having been, does it not come to be, not having been, does it not come to be?" Its meaning: Since you, saying, "That very present, that past," rejecting the first question, rejected the state of coming to be of the present, and the state of having been of the past, therefore the present does not come to be. The past does not having been. And in the second question, you acknowledged, "That very present, that past." In such a case, the present also, not having been, does not come to be, the past also, not having been, does not come to be. Therefore we ask him, "Does each of these, not having been, not come to be, not having been, not come to be?" The other-doctrine proponent, as if completely enveloped by darkness from all sides, not seeing their state of not having been, does not acknowledge it. In the third instance also, if that very future, that present, that past; the state of coming to be of the future and present stated in the present and past, and the state of having been of the present and past stated in the future and present, arises. In such a case, the future also, having been, comes to be. The present also, the past also, having been, comes to be. Therefore we ask him, "Does each of these three, having been, come to be, having been, come to be?" The other, "That very future, that present, that past," in the manner of rejecting the question, rejects it. Then, asked again, in the manner of acknowledging the second question, he acknowledges it. Then his own-doctrine proponent, "That very future, that present, that past," on the basis of the question, acknowledging that each of these, having been, comes to be, having been, comes to be, He asks, reversing the question, not having been, it is not; not having been, it is not. The meaning of this is: Did you, in rejecting the first question, by saying that the future is that, the present is that, the past is that, reject the being of the future and present, and the having-been of the present and past? Therefore, the future and present are indeed not. And the present and past are indeed not having been. And in the second question, you affirmed that "the future is that, the present is that, the past is that." Thus, the future is indeed not having been, it is not. The present and past are indeed not having been, they are not. Therefore, we ask you, "Is each of these not having been, it is not; not having been, it is not?" The opponent, as if completely enveloped in darkness, not seeing their not-having-been, not-being, rejects it, saying, "No." The instances of defeat and so on here should be applied in the manner described below. The explanation of the purification of speech is finished. Explanation of the Discourse on Past Eye, Form, etc. 289. In "Is there a past eye?" etc., he affirms existence without abandoning the nature of eye, etc. But when asked about "Does it see?" etc., he rejects them due to the absence of function of those consciousnesses. Explanation of the Discourse on Past Knowledge, etc. 290. In the question, "Does he perform what is to be done by knowledge with that knowledge?" he rejects it, not seeing the possibility of function because that knowledge has ceased. When asked again, he affirms the existence of what is to be done by knowledge with that knowledge, by subtly making the present knowledge, which has a past object, "past knowledge" because it knows past things. Then his own proponent, not giving an opportunity for subtlety, says, "Does he fully understand suffering with that knowledge?" etc. The other rejects it because of the absence of these four functions with knowledge that has only a past object. The same method applies to the question about the future. The question about the present and the question about comparison are easy to understand. Explanation of the Discourse on the Arahant, etc. 291. Ar Even when saying "the past exists," etc., he affirms thus, not abandoning the nature of passion, etc. He rejects "with passion," etc., fearing contradiction with the Suttas and logic. Explanation of the Word-by-Word Analysis 295. Thus, understanding all according to the Pāli, the meaning should be understood as follows: "Does it exist? Could it be past? Or is it not past?" That which exists only in the past is the past. That which exists in the present and future does not exist, that is not the past. Therefore, "past is not past, not past is past," for that reason, past is not past, not past is past. The same method applies to questions about the future and present. Explanation of the Sutta Justification 296. The question "the past exists, the future exists" should not be stated for the justification of the Sutta by the opponent, the affirmation is for one's own side. Again, relying on one's own view, "Whatever form, monks," the application is for the opponent. In the second method, the question is for one's own side, the affirmation is for the other. Thus, the question and affirmation should be understood everywhere. However, that which is shown by the opponent for the purpose of proving the existence of the future, "Was it not said by the Blessed One, 'food as nutriment, monks'?" at the end of the Sutta, "there is rebirth in the future," etc., that does not prove the existence of the future. For that was said there, referring to the inevitable result due to the completion of the causes. This is the intention of the Sutta. The rest is all of obvious meaning. The Explanation of the "Everything Exists" Discourse is Finished. 6. Discourse on Past Aggregates, etc. 1. Explanation of the Discourse on Non-Sutta Justification 297. Now, there is the discourse "past aggregates," etc. There, for one who desires the existence of the past and future, not abandoning the nature of aggregates, etc., the question "are past aggregates?" is for the opponent, the affirmation "yes, because they are included in the past aggregate" is for one's own side. Again, the question "is the past non-existent?" is for the opponent, the rejection is for one's own side, because its existence has been prevented by the Nirutti Patha Sutta. The same applies to questions about elements and spheres. Even in questions about the future, by comparing with the present, and in direct and reverse order in questions about the past, in questions beginning with "past form," the meaning should be understood in this way. 2. Explanation of Establishing by Sutta 298.