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because of the saying, "an upapātika, one who attains final Nibbāna there." To the question, "Is he an Arahant?" he denies it, just as in the case of an Arahant who attains final Nibbāna here. Asked again, he affirms it in the case of one who attains final Nibbāna there. In the cases of "Does an Arahant have rebirth?" and so on, the meaning should be understood in terms of one who attains final Nibbāna there and one who attains final Nibbāna here. To the question, "Does he attain final Nibbāna there without having penetrated the unshakeable?" he denies it, wishing for his penetration of the unshakeable by the path cultivated here itself. The first example, "Just as a deer," is by the proponent of the other's doctrine, the second by the proponent of his own doctrine. The rest is everywhere of obvious meaning. The Brahmacariya Discourse is finished. 3. Description of the Discourse on Partial Release 274. Now, there is the discourse on partial release. There, those who desire the abandonment of defilements bit by bit, partially, according to the various attainments of Stream-enterers and so on, through the seeing of suffering and so on, just as now the Sammatiya and others do, to break up their doctrine, the question "Partial release?" is by the proponent of his own doctrine, the affirmation by the proponent of the other's doctrine. Again, the further inquiry is by the proponent of his own doctrine, the denial by the proponent of the other's doctrine, because of the absence of the state of Stream-enterer and so on in part. By this method, the meaning should be understood in all cases. Partial release? Commentary on the Debate. 4. The Abandoning Debate 1. Commentary on the Nasutta-quotation Debate 279. Now, the abandoning debate begins. In it, those who hold the view that "a worldling who has attained absorption is called a non-returner along with the comprehension of the truths, and for him, lust and hatred are abandoned even in the worldling stage," like the Sammitiya sect of today, to break their view, the question "does the worldling abandon?" is for the proponent, while the assertion is for the opponent, since he does not see the arising of defilements in those whose minds are suppressed by absorption. But since even for those whose minds are suppressed by absorption, the abandoning is complete only by the path of non-returning, therefore the further inquiry "is it complete?" is for the proponent, and the denial is for the other, because of the absence of such abandoning. The question "does it suppress?" is asked by the proponent, referring only to complete suppression. After that, there is a comparison of the worldling with the one established in the path of non-returning. That is clear in meaning. 280. After that, when asked "does he abide in the fruit of non-returning?" he affirms, referring to the absorption-non-returner. When asked "does he abide in arahantship?" he denies, because of the non-abandonment of the higher fetters by the path of seeing. When asked "are there three paths, unarisen and without a final one?" he denies, because of the absence of such a practice. When asked again, he affirms, referring to the common function of the three paths. The same method applies to the questions about the fruits of asceticism. When asked "by which path?" he says "by the path of non-returning," referring to the absorption-non-returner. When asked again about the abandonment of fetters, he denies the abandonment of those defilements by the path of non-returning, because they are not to be abandoned by the three paths. When asked a second time, he affirms, referring to the fact that the first path itself is the absorption-non-returning path. The rest here is clear in meaning. The Abandoning Debate. 5. The "Everything Exists" Debate 1. Commentary on the Reasoning of the Argument 282. Now, the debate on the "everything exists" view begins. In it, because of the statement "whatever form, past, future, or present... this is called the aggregate of form" (Vibha. 2), "all past The elements are distinct, they do not abandon the nature of aggregates, therefore, the doctrine is "everything exists," just like the Sarvāstivādins nowadays. To purify their doctrine, the question "everything exists" is posed to the proponent of his own doctrine, standing by the previously stated view, the opponent makes the assertion. "In everything?" he asks, "does everything exist in the entire body?" "In all time?" he asks, "does everything exist in all time?" "In every way?" he asks, "does everything exist in every way?" "In all things?" he asks, "does everything exist in all things?" "Unsuitable," because there is a combination of diverse natures, not of one nature. Thus, in this question, form and feeling, or feeling and form, making them non-different, of one characteristic, he asks, "does everything exist?" "Even what does not exist, does it exist?" he asks, "even what is non-existent, like the sixth aggregate or a hare's horn, is it established that even that exists for you?" "The view that everything exists is a wrong view," "the view that exists is a right view," he asks in this way: "this view of yours that everything exists, is that view a wrong view because it is not in accordance with reality?" "And this view of ours, is that view a right view because it is in accordance with reality?" he asks, "does it exist in your system?" The other, in all these ways, rejects the existence due to the absence of the previously stated existence. But in all these ways, "understand the refutation," etc., beginning thus, the entire division of the path of discussion should be understood in detail. This, for now, is the method of argument here. 2. Description of Temporal Connection 283-284. Now, there is a temporal connection: "the past exists." There, "the past exists," etc., is a connection of purification. "Past form exists," etc., is a temporal connection in terms of aggregates. 285. "Having made present form unloved," that is, having abandoned the past and future, making only the present form unloved, indivisible. In the question, "does it abandon the state of form?" because even form that has ceased is included in the aggregate of form, He accepts it. Because even in the reverse question, "Does it not relinquish its form-nature?" it is included in the form aggregate. In "Having made a white cloth disliked," although not all the cloth is white, by saying "having made a white cloth disliked" instead of "by this cloth," the proponent concedes oneness. In the question, "Does it relinquish its white nature?" the proponent's affirmation refers to the disappearance of color. But in "Does it relinquish its cloth-nature?" his denial is because the designation has not disappeared. The same method applies in the reverse. 286. Asked, "Does the past not relinquish its past-nature?" thinking, "If it did, it would be future or present," he affirms. But asked, "Does the future not relinquish its future-nature?" thinking, "If it did not, it would remain future, it would not attain present-nature," he denies. In the question about the present, he denies because the fault of not becoming past would arise. In the direct questions too, the meaning should be understood by this same method. 287. Having stated the method of purification in this way, to show it again in terms of aggregates, "past form," etc., is stated. All of that can be understood according to the Pāli itself. Explanation of Sentence Purification 288. Now, there is sentence purification beginning with "Is there no past?" There, "hañci atītaṃ nvatthīti" means "yadi atītaṃ no atthīti," "if there is no past." "Atītaṃatthīti micchāti" means "atītañca taṃ atthi cāti micchā eva," "the past, and it exists, is certainly false." Asked, "Is that very future that very present?" he denies due to the difference in time, referring to the absence of presentness in the moment of the future. Asked a second time, he affirms because what was future before arising becomes present at the time of arising. "Hutvā hoti hutvā hotīti" means, by your saying "the future, having become, becomes present," "anāgataṃ vā paccuppannaṃ vā hutvā hotī" is said in terms of acquisition, "the future or the present, having become, becomes." "Kiṃ te tampi hutvā hotīti?" "Does that too, having become, become for you?" The other, of what has become, again having become... Because of non-existence, he denies it. Asked the second question, since that future, having become present, has gone to the designation of "having become, it is," therefore he acknowledges it. Then his own-doctrine proponent asks him, "If for you that future, having become present, has gone to the designation of 'having become, it is,' does it become again, and what of that which, being future, not having become present, not being, has gone to the designation of 'not having become, it is not,' like a hare's horn, does that also not become, not be again?" with the intention of "not having become, it is not, not having become, it is not." The other, thinking, "That which does not exist, because of its non-existence, so let it be that the future, not having become present, is not, let the name 'not having become, it is not' exist for now, but whence comes to it again the state of not having become, it is not?" denies it. In the question, "Is that same present, that past?" he also, regarding the non-existence of the pastness of that present moment, because of the difference in time, denies it. Asked the second question, because that which was previously present, due to its past state, acknowledges its pastness. "Having become, it is, having become, it is," this which, by you saying, "The present, having become, is past," in the manner of having obtained "Is that same present, that past?" is said as "Having become, whether present or past, it is," does that also become?