English
the eel-wrigglers, when asked a question on various points, resort to verbal equivocation, to eel-wriggling? Here, monks, some ascetic or brahmin does not truly understand 'this is wholesome', does not truly understand 'this is unwholesome'. It occurs to him thus: 'Indeed, I do not truly understand "this is wholesome", I do not truly understand "this is unwholesome". If I, however, not truly understanding "this is wholesome", not truly understanding "this is unwholesome", were to declare 'this is wholesome'... or declare, 'This is unwholesome.' Therein I might have desire or lust or hatred or aversion. Where I might have desire or lust or hatred or aversion, that would be my clinging. What would be my clinging, that would be my vexation. What would be my vexation, that would be my hindrance. Thus, from fear of clinging, from loathing clinging, he does not declare, 'This is wholesome,' nor does he declare, 'This is unwholesome.' Being questioned on this or that matter, he resorts to verbal equivocation, to eel-wriggling – 'It is not thus for me; it is not so for me; it is not otherwise for me; it is not not for me; it is not not-not for me.' This, monks, is the second ground, based on which, relying on which, some recluses and brahmins are eel-wrigglers, being questioned on this or that matter, they resort to verbal equivocation, to eel-wriggling. 64. And, good sirs, what is the third ground, based on which, relying on which, some recluses and brahmins are eel-wrigglers, being questioned on this or that matter, they resort to verbal equivocation, to eel-wriggling? Here, monks, a certain recluse or brahmin does not truly know, 'This is wholesome,' does not truly know, 'This is unwholesome.' It occurs to him thus: 'Indeed, I do not truly know, "This is wholesome," I do not truly know, "This is unwholesome." If I, not truly knowing, "This is wholesome," not truly knowing, "This is unwholesome," were to declare, "This is wholesome," or declare, "This is unwholesome," there are indeed recluses and brahmins who are wise, subtle, skilled in debate, like hair-splitters, they go about, as it were, shattering the views of others with their wisdom. They might question me on that, press me on that, discuss me on that. Those who might question me on that, press me on that, discuss me on that, I would not be able to stand up to them. To whom I would not be able to stand up, that would be my... That is a vexation. What is a vexation for me, that is an obstacle for me. Thus, fearing interrogation, disgusted by interrogation, he does not declare this as skillful, nor does he declare this as unskillful. Being questioned on various points, he resorts to verbal equivocation, to endless equivocation: ‘It is not so for me; it is not thus for me; it is not otherwise for me; it is not not so for me; it is not not not so for me.’ This, bhikkhus, is the third ground, relying on which, taking which as their basis, some recluses and brahmins, being endless equivocators, when questioned on various points, resort to verbal equivocation, to endless equivocation. 65. “And on what ground, sirs, relying on what, taking what as their basis, do some recluses and brahmins, being endless equivocators, when questioned on various points, resort to verbal equivocation, to endless equivocation? Here, bhikkhus, some recluse or brahmin is dull, is stupid. Being dull and stupid, when questioned on various points, he resorts to verbal equivocation, to endless equivocation: ‘If you ask me, “Is there another world?” if I were to think, “There is another world,” then I would declare to you, “There is another world.” ‘It is not so for me; it is not thus for me; it is not otherwise for me; it is not not so for me; it is not not not so for me.’ ‘If you ask me, “Is there no other world?” (he resorts to the same equivocation) ‘If you ask me, “Is there and is there not another world?” (he resorts to the same equivocation) ‘If you ask me, “Is there neither nor is there not another world?” (he resorts to the same equivocation) ‘If you ask me, “Are there spontaneously arisen beings?” (he resorts to the same equivocation) ‘If you ask me, “Are there no spontaneously arisen beings?” (he resorts to the same equivocation) ‘If you ask me, “Are there and are there not spontaneously arisen beings?” (he resorts to the same equivocation) ‘If you ask me, “Are there neither nor are there not spontaneously arisen beings?” (he resorts to the same equivocation) ‘If you ask me, “Is there fruit and result of good and bad deeds?” (he resorts to the same equivocation) ‘If you ask me, “Is there no fruit and result of good and bad deeds?” (he resorts to the same equivocation) ‘If you ask me, “Is there and is there not fruit and result of good and bad deeds?” (he resorts to the same equivocation) ‘If you ask me, “Is there neither nor is there not fruit and result of good and bad deeds?” (he resorts to the same equivocation) ‘If you ask me, “Does the Tathāgata exist after death?” (he resorts to the same equivocation) ‘If you ask me, “Does the Tathāgata not exist after death?” (he resorts to the same equivocation) ‘If you ask me, “Does the Tathāgata both exist and not exist (after death)?” (he resorts to the same equivocation) "The Tathagata after death... 'Neither is nor is not the Tathagata after death.' If you ask me this, 'Neither is nor is not the Tathagata after death,' if this were my position, 'Neither is nor is not the Tathagata after death,' thus would I declare it to you, 'It is not thus for me, it is not so for me, it is not otherwise for me, it is not "no" for me, it is not "not no" for me.' This, bhikkhus, is the fourth ground, relying on which, based on which, some recluses and brahmins, eel-wrigglers, when questioned on this or that point, resort to verbal equivocation, to eel-wriggling. 66. "By these, bhikkhus, those recluses and brahmins, eel-wrigglers, when questioned on this or that point, resort to verbal equivocation, to eel-wriggling, on these four grounds. For any, bhikkhus, recluses or brahmins, eel-wrigglers, when questioned on this or that point, resort to verbal equivocation, to eel-wriggling, all of them do so on these four grounds, or on one of them; there is none outside of these by which, speaking rightly, they would truly describe the Tathagata. The Doctrine of Fortuitous Origination 67. "There are, bhikkhus, some recluses and brahmins who are fortuitous-originists, who declare the self and the world to have arisen fortuitously, on two grounds. And those venerable recluses and brahmins, relying on what, based on what, being fortuitous-originists, declare the self and the world to have arisen fortuitously, on two grounds? 68. "There are, bhikkhus, deities called non-percipient beings. And when perception arises for those deities, they fall from that state. It is possible, bhikkhus, that a certain being, having fallen from that state, comes to this state of being. Having come to this state of being, he goes forth from the home life into homelessness. Having gone forth from the home life into homelessness, by means of ardent effort, by means of exertion, by means of application, by means of heedfulness, by means of right attention, he attains such a mental state He attains concentration, and in his concentrated mind he recollects the arising of perception, beyond that he does not recollect. He says thus: 'The self and the world arise without cause. For what reason? Indeed, I was not before, but now I am, having become continuous from non-existence.' This, monks, is the first ground, by resorting to which, by relying on which, some recluses and brahmins, who are fortunists, declare the self and the world to be without cause. 69. And secondly, venerable recluses and brahmins, by resorting to what, by relying on what, who are fortunists, declare the self and the world to be without cause? Here, monks, some recluse or brahmin is a reasoner, an investigator. He, beaten by reasoning, followed by investigation, with his own ingenuity, says thus: 'The self and the world arise without cause.' This, monks, is the second ground, by resorting to which, by relying on which, some recluses and brahmins, who are fortunists, declare the self and the world to be without cause. 70. By these two grounds, monks, those recluses and brahmins, who are fortunists, declare the self and the world to be without cause. Whatever recluses or brahmins, monks, who are fortunists, declare the self and the world to be without cause, all of them do so by these two grounds, or by one of them. There is nothing outside of these... by which, speaking rightly, they would speak the true praise of the Tathāgata. 71. By these eighteen grounds, monks, those recluses and brahmins, who speculate about the past, who hold views about the past, by relying on the past, declare various kinds of speculative tenets. Whatever recluses or brahmins, monks, who speculate about the past, who hold views about the past, by relying on the past, declare various kinds of speculative tenets, all of them do so by these eighteen grounds, or by one of them. There is nothing outside of these. 72. This, monks... Indeed, the Tathāgata knows: 'These views, thus grasped, thus clung to, thus lead to a destination, thus lead to a future state.' And that the Tathāgata knows, and beyond that he knows, and that knowing he does not cling to, and for him, not clinging, Nibbāna is known personally. Having truly known the origin, the passing away, the gratification, the danger, and the escape from feelings, unattached and liberated, bhikkhus, is the Tathāgata. 73. "These, bhikkhus, are those teachings, profound, hard to see, hard to comprehend, peaceful, excellent, beyond the scope of reasoning, subtle, to be experienced by the wise, which the Tathāgata, having directly known and realized for himself, proclaims, and by which, speaking rightly, one would truly praise the Tathāgata." The Second Recitation Section.