English
The branch of example, the branch of proximate application, and the branch of conclusion are stated as the five branches. If arranged in this way, these internal and external phenomena, as subjects, are not established by their own nature, because neither the true one nor the many are established. For example, like the image in a mirror, it is separate from either one or many. Similarly, these internal and external phenomena are also separate from either one or many. Therefore, these internal and external phenomena are not established by their own nature, like stating it in this way. In this case, any party, according to Dharmakirti, has the fault of excess in the proximate application, the proposition, and the conclusion. Furthermore, it is not appropriate because the statement of pervasion is incomplete. Therefore, they mainly consider the two-part proof statement as the primary one. However, since this system of the Great Vehicle Madhyamaka relies on meaning, if it is possible to generate knowledge and subsequent cognition based on the sign for the opponent, and if there is no fault of being unrelated to the meaning of the statement, then there is no need to consider the minor faults of excess or deficiency in the branches. If these two main aspects of meaning are established, then there is no difference in the elaboration or abbreviation of the expression. Therefore, the proof statement can be arranged as desired, from two parts to five parts. Second, the reasoning of the four extremes of denying particularities and denying origination. The Tibetan Madhyamikas call this "Vajra Splinters Examining Causes," but since it is merely a conceptual designation, this itself is called the "Reasoning of Denying Origination from Four Extremes." The meaning of "denying particularities" is also that it establishes the absence of inherent existence of the individual entities of phenomena through the reasoning of being separate from one or many, and because it denies the very origination of their particularities, it is called that. That is, these internal and external phenomena are not established by their own nature because they do not arise. The reason for this is that these internal and external phenomena, as subjects, do not arise by their own nature, because by their own nature they do not arise from themselves, nor do they arise from others, nor do they arise from both, nor do they arise from no cause. This is the establishment of the root statement. And the establishment of its positive instance is: the eye, etc., as subjects, do not arise from themselves, because they exist. This is the first proof that they do not arise from themselves, and the eye.
Chinese
等等法，不是从自身产生，因为你（指现象）的产生依赖于其他条件，这是显而易见的。这是为了提出第二个理由。第一个论证的含义是，例如，如果第二个刹那的眼识是由自身产生的，那么作为产生者的第二个刹那的眼识，由于自身尚未产生，所以是不存在的。因此，第二个刹那的眼识怎么可能是它自身的产生者呢？这是不可能的。此外，如果第二个刹那的眼识是由自身产生的，那么第二个刹那的眼识是由已经存在的产生，还是由尚未存在的产生？如果第二个刹那的眼识是由已经存在的产生，那么就没有产生的必要，因为对于已经存在的事物来说，不需要产生者。此外，如果第二个刹那的眼识是由当时尚未存在的自身产生，那也是不合理的，因为自身尚未存在，怎么能产生呢？它无法产生。此外，产生也不是，因为它依赖于与自身和因相同性质的种子。如果不是这样，那么因和非因就会变得相同，因为所有因和非因都会产生所有果和非果。如果从他者产生的果不依赖于与自身和因相同性质的种子，那么与因相同性质的种子就不需要条件的帮助。此外，如果从他者产生，是从已坏灭的他者产生，还是从未坏灭的他者产生？如果从已坏灭的因他者产生，那么就会变成从无因产生，因为已坏灭的是过去，是无实体的。如果从未坏灭的因他者产生，那么因和果两者同时成为相互，因此，所生和能生的因果是不可能的。因此，即使不是从已停止和未停止产生，如果说因正在停止，而果正在产生，产生是这样的因果顺序，那么一般来说，这种世俗存在方式的果的产生方式是真实的，但是，如果用胜义谛的推理来分析，这也是不成立的，因为停止
English
Etc., dharmas, are not born from themselves, because your (referring to phenomena) arising depends on other conditions, which is clearly seen. This is to present the second reason. The meaning of the first proof is, for example, if the second moment of eye consciousness is produced by itself, then the producer, the second moment of eye consciousness, does not exist because it has not yet arisen. Therefore, how could the second moment of eye consciousness be its own producer? It is impossible. Furthermore, if the second moment of eye consciousness is produced by itself, is the second moment of eye consciousness produced by something that already exists, or by something that does not yet exist? If the second moment of eye consciousness is produced by something that already exists, then there is no need for production, because for something that already exists, there is no need for a producer. Furthermore, if the second moment of eye consciousness is produced by itself, which does not exist at the time, then that is not reasonable, because how can something that does not yet exist produce? It cannot produce. Furthermore, it is also not arising, because it depends on the seed that is of the same nature as itself and the cause. If it is not like that, then cause and non-cause will become the same, because all causes and non-causes will produce all fruits and non-fruits. If the fruit arising from others does not depend on the seed that is of the same nature as itself and the cause, then the seed that is of the same nature as the cause does not need the help of conditions. Furthermore, if it arises from others, does it arise from the other that has perished, or from the other that has not perished? If it arises from the other cause that has perished, then it will become arising from no cause, because what has perished is the past, which is non-existent. If it arises from the other cause that has not perished, then the two, cause and effect, become simultaneous and mutually the same, therefore, the produced and the producer, cause and effect, are not possible. Therefore, even if it is not arising from what has ceased and what has not ceased, if it is said that the cause is ceasing, and the fruit is arising, the arising is such a sequence of cause and effect, then in general, this way of arising of the fruit of conventional existence is true, but if analyzed with the reasoning of ultimate truth, then that is also not established, because ceasing
Chinese
正在坏灭也是如此，一部分已经坏灭，一部分尚未坏灭的那部分，就称为正在坏灭。因为没有坏灭和未坏灭之外的正在坏灭，所以种子正在坏灭，也不可能从中产生果实。虽然水、肥料、温度、湿度等其他因缘是由多种因素产生的，但并非是自性成立的、由他者产生的作者。如此，在世俗显现中，这些事物的产生似乎是从他者产生的，这只是在分别念的层面上的显现。其原因在于，在幼芽的阶段，种子已经不存在。种子与幼芽本身也不是一体，因为属于幼芽的同一相续。也不是他体，因为不是异体。因此，种子和幼芽两者无法被说成是一或异，所以种子产生幼芽的显现也只是假立而已。因此，通过对种子和幼芽两者之间有无进行分析，种子产生幼芽的说法也会被摧毁，因为在胜义谛中，没有从彼生彼的情况。如果认为从自他二者产生，那么就像上面所说的那样，具有从自生和他生的两种过失。当从自和他产生被否定时，从二者产生也会随之被否定，例如，当蓝色、黄色和红色三种颜色被否定时，这三种颜色混合而成的杂色也会随之被否定。此外，如果从自他二者产生，那么就会变成依赖于他者的成立的产生，而不是自主的真实的产生，因为自他二者是互相依赖而产生的。从无因而产生是绝对不可能的，要么是因为不依赖于因，要么是因为根本没有产生的因。任何时候都不会产生果，因为无因不依赖于他者，要么恒常存在，要么恒常不存在。如是说。此外，这些事物有时显而易见地产生，这也与无因相矛盾，因为看到因聚集时产生果，因不聚集时不产生果。
English
The state of decaying is also like that. A part has already decayed, and the part that has not decayed is called the state of decaying. Since there is no decaying other than decayed and not decayed, it is not possible for a fruit to arise from a seed that is decaying. Although other conditions such as water, fertilizer, temperature, and moisture arise from various factors, they are not agents that are established by their own nature and produced by others. Thus, in mere conventional appearances, the arising of these things appears to arise from others, but this is merely an appearance on the level of conceptual imputation. The reason for this is that the seed does not exist at the time of the sprout. The seed is not the same as the sprout itself, because it belongs to the same continuum as the sprout. It is also not different, because it is not a separate entity. Therefore, since the seed and the sprout cannot be said to be either one or different, the appearance of the sprout arising from the seed is also merely an imputation. Therefore, by analyzing the presence or absence of the seed and the sprout in relation to each other, the statement that the sprout arises from the seed will also be destroyed, because in ultimate truth, there is no arising of that from that. If it is asserted that it arises from both self and other, then, as stated above, it has the faults of both arising from self and arising from other. When arising from self and other is negated, arising from both is also implicitly negated, just as when the three colors blue, yellow, and red are negated, the variegated color that is a combination of these three is also implicitly negated. Furthermore, if it arises from both self and other, then it becomes an arising that is established in dependence, not a truly independent arising, because both self and other arise in dependence on each other. Arising from no cause is never reasonable, either because it does not depend on a cause, or because there is no cause for arising at all. It would follow that the result would never arise at any time, because without a cause it does not depend on others, and it would either always exist or always not exist. As it is said. Furthermore, the fact that these things sometimes manifestly arise also contradicts having no cause, because we see that when causes are assembled, a result arises, and when causes are not assembled, a result does not arise.
Chinese
无因而生，也被世间常识所否定，因为无论什么事物，都普遍认为是从各自的因产生的。第三，建立周遍关系：如果不从四边中的任何一边产生，那就周遍于没有自性产生，因为如果事物产生，必定是从四边中的任何一边产生。其理由是：任何事物都被自身和他者二者所包含，因为不存在既非自身又非他者的事物。第四，陈述论证的语句：既非自生，亦非他生，亦非二者，亦非无因生，如果不从四边产生，那就周遍于没有自性产生，例如乌龟的毛。这些内外的事物，既然不从四边产生，因此就没有自性产生。这样陈述论证的语句，是将三相抛向记忆之中。也就是说，在成立不从四边产生的标志时，外方辩论者的心中已经成立了没有自性的意义，但陈述论证的语句，并将三相抛向记忆之中，对于不从四边产生这一点，就说没有自性产生。这是为了使名称成立。将证明法无我的两个主要理证放在这里，而不将其他的缘起和四句生灭等放在这里的原因是什么呢？这是因为，虽然依靠缘起和观待成立的理证可以破除名言的法，但是，对于具有他性、所生能生的事物的本体进行分析，这种理证并不具有力量。其理由是：例如，如果说“苗芽不是自性成立的，因为它观待种子”，这样陈述，虽然对苗芽自性成立稍微有所损害，但如果分析事物的因果，则不具有力量。因此，由于安立为因的形态必定观待安立为果的形态，所以，即使这种理证破除了它，但依靠本体所观待的本体，这两者也不能最终确定为无自性，例如，将狮子放在脸颊上观待食物的洁净，但狮子脸颊的
English
Arising from no cause is also refuted by worldly conventions, because it is universally accepted that all things, whatever they may be, arise from their respective causes. Third, establishing pervasion: if it does not arise from any of the four extremes, then it is pervaded by not arising from its own nature, because if a thing arises, it is certain to arise from any of the four extremes. The reason for this is that any thing is encompassed by both itself and others, because there is no thing that is neither itself nor others. Fourth, stating the words of proof: neither from self, nor from other, nor from both, nor without cause, if it does not arise from the four extremes, then it is pervaded by not arising from its own nature, like the hair of a tortoise. Since these internal and external things do not arise from the four extremes, therefore they do not arise from their own nature. By stating the words of proof in this way, the three modes are thrown into memory. That is to say, when the sign of not arising from the four extremes is established, the meaning of not arising from its own nature has already been established in the mind of the external opponent, but by stating the words of proof and throwing the three modes into memory, it is said that there is no arising from its own nature for that which does not arise from the four extremes. This is to make the name established. What is the reason for placing the two main reasonings for proving the absence of self of phenomena here, and not placing other dependent origination and the four phrases of arising and ceasing here? This is because, although the reasoning of dependent origination and dependence can refute the phenomena of imputation, it is not powerful to analyze the nature of things that have other-nature, that are produced and that produce. The reason for this is that, for example, if it is said that "a sprout is not established by its own nature, because it depends on a seed," this statement, although it slightly harms the establishment of a sprout by its own nature, it is not powerful to analyze all the causes and effects of things. Therefore, since the form of establishing as a cause necessarily depends on the form of establishing as a result, even if this reasoning refutes it, the two of them, the nature that depends on the nature, cannot ultimately determine as without self-nature, for example, placing a lion on the cheek depends on the purity of food, but the lion's cheek