English
Therefore, it becomes contradictory, because one and many are mutually contradictory. Third, divided into two: refuting by examining time, and refuting by examining agent and object. First, the noble Nāgārjuna, that is, what the protector Nāgārjuna said. Among them, "Nāga" means dragon, and "Arjuna" means accomplishing benefit, so the meaning is dragon accomplishing benefit. However, the words in between are not obviously omitted, so it is called Nāgārjuna. What he said, in the Ratnāvalī, says: that is, the view of the mere appearance proponents of mind-only, the various appearances of external objects are also due to the influence of habit that they appear as such, therefore they are not truly established, and the consciousnesses related to those things, because they are not related to the continuity of years and months, therefore, a partless moment of the present is truly established. They say this. This is refuted: consciousness, the moment at the end of time is also not partless, that is, the last moment, and similarly the initial part, and the middle part between the two, thus it becomes three parts that must be analyzed. Thus, the initial moment also has the distinction of its initial part, middle and last three parts, and similarly, the middle and last are also distinguished, it becomes nine parts. Moreover, those are also divided into three parts, it becomes twenty-seven parts, etc., it will become the fault of endless parts. Thus, it is impossible for all these worlds to exist in one moment in an extremely small time, because as shown above, the initial, middle and last are divided into three moments to analyze, therefore it is established as a part with parts. The consciousnesses that have become the initial, middle and last parts, those are unborn, because they are not produced from self, other, and both. That one moment at the end of time has multiple parts is clearly shown by direct perception reasoning, for example, the sun's wheel moving around the four continents with the speed of wind is very fast, even in the duration of one moment at the end of time, there is usually a journey of about one yojana. For example, suppose that in that time, it runs around the edge of a large mountain, that mountain has countless dust particles, and those dust particles are
Chinese
应当以踩踏太阳轮的每个微尘的位置的方式行进。因为微尘的数量有多少，时间也有先后。因此，对于一个最终刹那的时间长度，将会了知该数量的层级有多少分。第二，现在的识是无分刹那，与境相遇或不相遇？如果相遇，那么相遇时是一个时间，相遇后了知境时是一个时间，因此变成两个部分，与无分相违。而且，如果不与境相遇，那么与识<是>相违，因为没有境的识是不可能的。仅仅相遇的时候不了知境，相遇后了知境，因此识与境相遇的时候，不了知境的识不产生，了知境的时候，与境相遇的时候的识已灭，因此变成有分。对此，认为识与境进入本体相同，因此不会变成有分，对此，也有进入境的本体相同的一个部分，和进入完毕的阶段两个，因此，变成有分。如果进入完毕不存在，那么与境本体相同进入相违。以上是遮止相的理路，相是识，因为没有不包括所取相和能取相二者的识。此处的最初两个理路是遮止唯识宗认为相是真实的理路，也是遮止某些个别识是真实的理路，后面的两个理路是对所有认为识是真实成立者，共同适用的总的理路。第三，讲述共同遮止境和相二者的理路时，论证无我的主要理由是：见到遮止自性的一与多分离，和遮止周遍的四边生灭二者，这样认为有两个主要理由。四句生灭和缘起的理路二者，如同下面将要讲述的那样，仅仅是种类而已，不是论证无我的主要理由。因此，讲中观的主要理由有四种，在意义上也是合理的。
English
One should proceed by treading on the position of each particle of the sun's disc. Since there is a before and after in time depending on how many particles there are, one will realize how many divisions there are in the duration of a single final instant. Secondly, the present consciousness is an indivisible instant. Does it meet with the object or not? If it meets, then there is one time of meeting with the object, and one time of knowing the object after meeting, so it becomes two parts, which contradicts being indivisible. Moreover, if it does not meet with the object, then it contradicts being consciousness, because consciousness without an object is impossible. At the time of merely meeting, the object is not known, and after meeting, the object is known, so when consciousness meets with the object, the consciousness that knows the object does not arise, and at the time of knowing the object, the consciousness at the time of meeting with the object has ceased, so it becomes divisible. To this, thinking that consciousness enters into the same entity as the object, therefore it will not become divisible, to this, there is also one part of entering into the same entity as the object, and two stages of having already entered, therefore, it becomes divisible. If having already entered does not exist, then entering into the same entity as the object is contradictory. The above is the reasoning that refutes aspects, aspect is consciousness, because there is no consciousness that does not include the two, the apprehended aspect and the apprehending aspect. The first two reasonings here are the reasoning that refutes the proponents of the Mind-Only school who believe that aspects are real, and it is also the reasoning that refutes some particular consciousnesses as being real, and the latter two reasonings are the general reasoning that applies in common to all those who believe that consciousness is truly established. Thirdly, when explaining the reasoning that commonly refutes both object and aspect, the main reason for proving selflessness is: seeing the negation of essence as one and separate, and the negation of pervasion as the four extremes of arising and ceasing, thus considering there to be two main reasons. The four extremes of arising and ceasing and the reasoning of dependent origination are merely types, as will be explained below, and are not the main reason for proving selflessness. Therefore, it is also reasonable in meaning to explain that there are four main reasons for the Middle Way.
Chinese
不是这样的。其中的第一个，对于一与多分离的理路，有四个方面：立宗、立同品、立周遍、以及陈述能立语。第一，对于外道认为显现和声音的法是真实成立的，先由立宗者这样建立论式：这些内外的事物，是所立，不是自性成立的，原因是什么呢？因为这些事物都是识的对境，是显现和声音的法，既然如此，因为不成一和多中的任何一个。这样建立论式是为了遣除外道认为事物是真实成立的一和多中的任何一个的怀疑。第二，需要在其面前成立同品。其中，遮止成立一的方式如前所述。成立不成多，是因为多是从依靠一积累而产生的。因为没有所积累的一，所以积累它，多就自然被遮止了。而且一和多二者本体互相非常矛盾，因为如果是一，就一定不是多；如果是多，就一定不是一。此外，不仅因为没有一，所以多不成立，<实际上>显现为多，是因为在没有的情况下，显现为多的本体，所以成立是<由分别假立的>虚假的。如果有一个成立一的事物存在于所知中，也许会是真实的，但是任何事物，除了具有部分的事物之外，无分的一成立，在任何时候都<在所知的范围内>不可能存在。第三，成立周遍，如果那个外道心中认为，即使不成一和多中的任何一个，也许会成立为不同于二者的事物。那么，在其面前成立周遍是：如果不成一和多中的任何一个，那么就周遍于不是自性成立的，因为在互相直接相违的对境中，永远不存在第三种事物，因为如果是一，就一定不是多；如果是多，就一定不是一。所以，既是一又是多的第三种情况是不可能的。
English
It is not like that. Among them, the first, for the reasoning of separation of one and many, there are four aspects: establishing the thesis, establishing the similar instance, establishing pervasion, and stating the proof. First, for the opponent who holds that phenomena of appearance and sound are truly established, the proponent should establish the argument in this way: These internal and external objects are the subject, they are not established by their own nature. What is the reason? Because all these objects are objects of consciousness, phenomena of appearance and sound. Since this is the case, because neither one nor many is established. Establishing the argument in this way is to dispel the opponent's doubt that objects are truly established as either one or many. Second, it is necessary to establish the similar instance in front of him. Among them, the ways to prevent the establishment of one are as previously stated. Establishing that many are not established is because many arise from accumulating many based on one. Because there is no one to be accumulated, accumulating it naturally prevents many. Moreover, the two, one and many, are very contradictory in nature, because if it is one, it must not be many; if it is many, it must not be one. Furthermore, not only because there is no one, so many are not established, but <in reality> appearing as many is because, in the absence of it, it appears as the nature of many, so it is established as <falsely imputed by concept>. If there is a thing that establishes one existing in the knowable, it may be true, but any thing, except for things with parts, the establishment of one without parts is never possible <within the scope of the knowable>. Third, establishing pervasion, if that opponent thinks that even if neither one nor many is established, it may be established as something different from the two. Then, establishing pervasion in front of him is: if neither one nor many is established, then it pervades not being established by its own nature, because in the object of direct contradiction with each other, there is never a third thing, because if it is one, it must not be many; if it is many, it must not be one. Therefore, the third situation of being both one and many is impossible.
Chinese
若。因此，内外之事物皆非一与多，驳斥其为虚假，此已成立为彼之自性。周遍成立之譬喻：如镜中之影像，其自性非有，因其亦非异于镜，亦非成立为与镜为一。如是记载。其立宗之法是：镜中之面容，与镜非为一体，因镜为表面光滑，而面容则有眼鼻等高低之相，故二者体性不相同。镜中之影像亦非异于镜，因一处无有二物存在。如是成立，则镜中之影像为无实有，故于驳论者前显而易见地成立。因此，虽未成立依彼而为一与多，然仅显现之此亦为无实有。如是，欲以无实有之名相作为理证之成立。因此，此乃唯立名相之理。彼等乃后周遍，而立反周遍是：若非一与多，则非有实体之事物，若实体真实存在，则不应于一与多之外而见。其理由是：彼二者乃互相排斥而住之相违者。因此，若未成立一与多，则周遍于自性未成立，因若自性成立，则必须成立为一与多。如是欲成立反周遍。第四：凡离一与多者，周遍于无自性。譬如镜中之影像。内外之事物亦因离一与多，故于成立无自性之语中陈述，于外方驳论者心中，生起定解外境事物自性未成立之明智比量。总的来说，成立语乃圣无著之地的正文，说成立语具有五支，即立宗支、因支。
English
Ro. Therefore, these internal and external objects are neither one nor many, and it is established as the nature of the opponent who refutes them as false. An example of establishing pervasion: The image in a mirror is not inherently existent because it is neither different from the mirror nor established as one with the mirror. This is how it is recorded. The way to establish its property is: The face in the mirror is not the same as the mirror because the mirror is smooth, while the face has the appearance of high and low features such as eyes and nose, so the characteristics of the two are not the same. The image in the mirror is also not different from the mirror because two objects do not exist in one place. Thus, it is established that the image in the mirror is unreal, so it is clearly established before the opponent. Therefore, although it is not established as one or many based on that, this mere appearance is also unreal. Thus, it is desired to establish the term "unreal" as the proof of the sign. Therefore, this is the reason for establishing only terms. These are subsequent pervasions, and establishing the reverse pervasion is: If it is not one or many, then it is not an existing substance, and if the substance really exists, then it should not be seen apart from one or many. The reason for this is that the two are contradictory, existing in mutual exclusion. Therefore, if one and many are not established, then it pervades that self-nature is not established, because if self-nature is established, then it must be established as one and many. Thus, it is desired to establish the reverse pervasion. Fourth: Whatever is separated from one and many is pervaded by the absence of self-nature. For example, the image in a mirror. Because these internal and external objects are also separated from one and many, it is stated in the words of establishing the absence of self-nature, so in the mind of the external opponent, a clear and inferential understanding arises that the self-nature of external objects is not established. In general, the establishing statement is the main text of the Bodhisattva Asanga's grounds, and it is said that the establishing statement has five limbs, namely the limb of the proposition and the limb of the reason.