English
English version: This is a statement that slanders the doctrine of universal accessibility. Let us set aside these side discussions and now explain the main text. 'The fourth, 'Cognitive Consciousness' refers to the first of the six aspects of the seventh consciousness (Manas-vijnana), namely the aspect of cognition. Attachment to results is called defiled and pure dharmas. Because it discriminates these defiled and pure dharmas and clings to 'I' and 'mine,' it is said to discriminate defiled and pure dharmas. 'The Continuous Consciousness' is the Mano-vijnana (mind consciousness). It is the aspect of continuity among the six aspects mentioned above. 'Because it is constantly associated with thought,' this explains the name 'continuity' from the perspective of its own uninterrupted nature. 'Sustaining' and the following explains the name 'continuity' from the perspective of its function. This consciousness can generate love and grasping, thus it can draw and maintain the actions generated by past ignorance, enabling them to become capable of bearing future results. Therefore, it is said to sustain the past results so that they are not lost. This meaning is fully explained in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra. Moreover, consciousness can generate afflictions that moisten rebirth, enabling the karmic results to continue uninterruptedly, so it is said to accomplish present and future retributions without difference or contradiction. Thus, the cycle of cause and effect in the three times flows continuously, and the function lies in consciousness, hence it is called continuity. 'The statement 'it thinks of past events and contemplates future events' shows that the function of this consciousness is different from that of Cognitive Consciousness, because it only cognizes present objects. This passage proves that this Continuous Consciousness is precisely the Mano-vijnana, different from the Continuous Mind mentioned above. 'Therefore' and the following concludes with the principle of Vijnanavada (Consciousness-only). The five consciousnesses mentioned above do not have separate self-natures; they all rely on the principle of one mind (eka-citta). Therefore, the three realms are false and are all created by the mind alone. 'The statement 'all dharmas arise from deluded thoughts, and all discriminations are discriminations of one's own mind; the mind cannot see the mind, and no characteristic of the mind can be obtained' is like the verse in the ten-fascicle sutra: 'Body, resources, sustenance, if like what is seen in a dream, there should be two kinds of minds, but there are no two characteristics. Just as a knife cannot cut itself, nor can a finger point to itself. Just as an eye cannot see itself, so is the matter.' What is the meaning of this? If the things seen in a dream, as they are seen, are truly existent, then there should be two aspects, the grasper and the grasped. But in a dream, there are actually no two aspects of grasper and grasped. The minds of the three realms are all like this dream. Therefore, it is said that all discriminations are discriminations of one's own mind, and discussing one's own mind --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chinese
不能自见。如刀指等。故言心不见心。现无他可见。亦不自见。则无所见。所见无故。能见不成。能见所见。皆不可得。除此之外。更有何相。故言无相可得。如彼偈云。非他非因。非分别分别事。五法及二心。寂静无如是。问如集量论诸说。心心法皆证自体。是名现量。若不尔者。如不曾见。不应忆念。此中经说云。不自见如是。相违云何会通。答此有异意。欲不相违。何者。此经论意。欲明离见分外无别相分。相分现无所见。亦不可说即此见分反见见分。非二用故外向起故。故以刀指为同法喻。集量论意。虽其见分不能自见。而有自证分用。能证见分之体。以用有异故。向内起故。故以灯炎为同法喻。由是义故。不相违背。又复此经论中。为显实相故。就非有义。说无自见。集量论主。为立假名故。依非无义。说有自证。然假名不动实相。实相不怀假名。不怀不动。有何相违。如此中说。离见无相故。见不见相。而余处。说相分非见分故见能见相分。如是相违何不致怪。当知。如前亦不相怀。又说。为显假有故。说有相有见。为显假无故。说无相无见。假有不当于有故。不动于无。假无不当于无故。不怀于有。不怀于有故。宛然而有。不动无故。宛然而无。故如是甚深因缘道理。萧焉靡据。荡然无碍。岂容违诤于 现代汉语译本：不能自己看见自己，就像刀刃不能切割自身，手指不能指向自身一样。所以说心不能看见心。现在没有其他东西可以被看见，心也不能自己看见自己，那么就没有什么可以被看见的了。因为所见之物不存在，能见之心也无法成立。能见之心和所见之物，都是不可得的。除此之外，还有什么形象可得呢？所以说没有形象可以获得。就像那首偈颂所说：‘非他非因，非分别分别事，五法及二心，寂静无如是。’ 问：如《集量论》等所说，心和心法都能证知自身，这被称为现量。如果不是这样，就像从未见过一样，就不应该有忆念。而此经中说‘不自见’，这两种说法相互矛盾，应该如何会通呢？ 答：这里有不同的含义，想要使它们不相互矛盾。是什么呢？此经论的意图，在于说明离开见分之外，没有其他的相分。相分现在没有所见，也不能说就是这个见分反过来见见分，因为见分没有两种作用，而且是向外产生的。所以用刀刃和手指作为相同的比喻。《集量论》的意图是，虽然见分不能自己看见自己，但是有自证分的作用，能够证明见分的本体。因为作用不同，而且是向内产生的。所以用灯焰作为相同的比喻。因为这个缘故，它们并不相互矛盾。 而且，此经论中，为了显示实相，就非有的意义来说，说没有自见。《集量论》的作者，为了建立假名，就非无的意义来说，说有自证。然而假名不会动摇实相，实相也不会包含假名，不包含不动摇。有什么矛盾呢？就像此经论中说，离开见分就没有相分，所以有见和不见的相。而在其他地方，说相分不是见分，所以见能够看见相分。这样的矛盾为什么不值得奇怪呢？应当知道，就像前面所说，它们也不相互包含。 又说，为了显示假有，所以说有相有见；为了显示假无，所以说无相无见。假有不等于真有，所以不会动摇真无；假无不等于真无，所以不会包含真有。不包含真有，所以宛然存在；不动摇真无，所以宛然不存在。所以这样甚深的因缘道理，空旷而没有依据，广阔而没有阻碍，怎么能容许争论呢？
English
English version: It cannot see itself. Like a knife's edge or a finger. Therefore, it is said that the mind cannot see the mind. Now, there is nothing else to be seen, nor can the mind see itself. Then there is nothing to be seen. Because what is seen does not exist, the seeing mind cannot be established. The seeing mind and what is seen are both unattainable. Besides these, what other form can be obtained? Therefore, it is said that no form can be obtained. As the verse says: 'Not other, not cause, not discriminating discriminated things, the five dharmas and the two minds, are quiescent and not like this.' Question: As stated in works like the *Collected Arguments* (*集量论* - Ji Liàng Lùn), the mind and mental phenomena all prove themselves, which is called direct perception (*现量* - xiànliàng). If this were not the case, it would be like never having seen something, and there should be no recollection. But this sutra says 'does not see itself.' How can these contradictory statements be reconciled? Answer: There are different meanings here, intending to avoid contradiction. What are they? The intention of this sutra and treatise is to clarify that apart from the seeing aspect (*见分* - jiàn fēn), there is no separate object aspect (*相分* - xiàng fēn). The object aspect has nothing to be seen now, nor can it be said that this seeing aspect turns around to see the seeing aspect, because the seeing aspect does not have two functions and arises outwardly. Therefore, the knife's edge and finger are used as analogous examples. The intention of the *Collected Arguments* is that although the seeing aspect cannot see itself, it has the function of a self-cognizing aspect (*自证分* - zì zhèng fēn), which can prove the substance of the seeing aspect. Because the function is different and arises inwardly, the flame of a lamp is used as an analogous example. For this reason, they are not contradictory. Moreover, in this sutra and treatise, in order to reveal the true nature, it is said that there is no self-seeing from the perspective of non-existence. The author of the *Collected Arguments*, in order to establish provisional names, says that there is self-cognition from the perspective of non-non-existence. However, provisional names do not shake the true nature, and the true nature does not contain provisional names, nor does it contain non-shaking. What contradiction is there? Just as this sutra and treatise say that there is no object aspect apart from the seeing aspect, so there is the aspect of seeing and not seeing. And elsewhere, it is said that the object aspect is not the seeing aspect, so the seeing can see the object aspect. Why is such a contradiction not considered strange? It should be understood that, as mentioned before, they do not contain each other. Furthermore, it is said that in order to reveal provisional existence, it is said that there is an object aspect and seeing; in order to reveal provisional non-existence, it is said that there is no object aspect and no seeing. Provisional existence is not equivalent to true existence, so it does not shake true non-existence; provisional non-existence is not equivalent to true non-existence, so it does not contain true existence. Not containing true existence, it is clearly existent; not shaking true non-existence, it is clearly non-existent. Therefore, such profound causal principles are vast and without basis, broad and without obstruction. How can contention be allowed? -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 其问哉。
Chinese
复次 以下。第二释意识章门。意识犹是先相续识。但就其能与法执粗念相应生后义边。名相续识。约其从前念生。能起见爱烦恼义边。名为意识。故言意识者。即此相续识。上六相内受相行蕴。相从入此意识中摄。又此论且依一意识门故。不别出五识相也。文相可知。 言依无明熏习 以下。第二重显因缘体相。于中有二。一约心体。显因体相染净难测。二不达以下。约诸染净。明缘体相差别之义初言依无明熏习所起识者。牒上依阿梨耶识说有无明不觉而起。此文正明自性清净心因无明风动。故言无明所起识也。若此心体。一向生灭。直是染心。则非难了。又若一向常住。唯是净心。亦非难知。设使体实净。而相似染者。亦可易解。如其识体动。而空性静者。有何难了。而今此心。体净而体染。心动而心静。染净无二动静莫别。无二无别。而亦非一。如是之绝故难可知。 言心自性净而有其染心者 是明净而恒染。 虽有染心而常恒不反者 是显动而常静。由是义故。唯佛穷了。如十卷经云。以如来藏是清净相。客尘烦恼垢染不净。我依此义。为胜鬘夫人及余菩萨等。说如来藏阿梨耶识。共七识生名转灭相。大惠。如来藏阿梨耶识境界。我今与汝及诸菩萨甚深智者。能了分别此 其问哉（这是个提问的开端）。 复次（再次），以下是第二章，解释意识。意识仍然是先前的相续识（Samtanasantana-vijnana，持续不断的意识流）。但就其能够与法执（Dharma-graha，对法的执着）和粗念相应，产生后续意义而言，称为相续识。从前念产生，能够引起见爱（Drishti-trishna，由见解产生的爱）烦恼的意义上来说，称为意识。所以说意识，就是这个相续识。前面的六个相中的受相（Vedana-skandha，感受蕴）和行蕴（Samskara-skandha，行蕴），都从此进入这个意识中。而且这部论典只是依据一个意识之门，所以没有单独列出五识（Panca-vijnana，眼、耳、鼻、舌、身五种感觉意识）的相状。文句的意义可以理解。 言依无明熏习（由于受到无明的熏习）以下，是第二次着重显示因缘的体相。其中有两点：第一，从心体（Citta-dhatu，心的本质）的角度，显示因的体相，染净难以测度；第二，‘不达’以下，从各种染净的角度，说明缘的体相的差别意义。首先说‘依无明熏习所起识者’，是承接上面依据阿梨耶识（Alaya-vijnana，藏识）而说有无明不觉而生起。这段文字正是说明自性清净心（Prakriti-citta-prabhasvara，本性清净的心）因为无明之风的扰动而产生。如果这个心体一直处于生灭变化之中，直接就是染污的心，那就不是难以理解的。又如果一直处于常住不变的状态，只是清净的心，也不是难以理解的。假设心体实际上是清净的，而表面上看起来像是染污的，也容易理解。如果识体是动摇的，而空性（Sunyata，空性）是寂静的，又有什么难以理解的呢？而现在这个心，体是清净的又是染污的，心是动摇的又是寂静的，染净没有差别，动静没有区别。没有差别也没有区别，但也不是完全一样。像这样绝妙的状态，所以难以理解。 言心自性净而有其染心者（说心自性清净却又有染污的心），是说明清净的同时又是恒常染污的。 虽有染心而常恒不反者（虽然有染污的心，却始终不改变），是显示动摇的同时又是恒常寂静的。因为这个缘故，只有佛才能彻底了解。如《十卷经》所说：‘因为如来藏（Tathagatagarbha，如来藏）是清净的相，而客尘烦恼垢染是不清净的。我依据这个意义，为胜鬘夫人（Shrimala，胜鬘夫人）和其他菩萨等，说如来藏阿梨耶识，与七识（Sapta-vijnana，七种意识）共同产生，名为转灭相。大慧（Mahamati，大慧），如来藏阿梨耶识的境界，我现在为你和各位具有甚深智慧的菩萨，能够了解和分别这些。’