English
English version: Chapter 3: Refuting Erroneous Views The proponent says: 'If someone says there are sentient beings, even those who have life (jīvaka, living beings) and souls (jīva, soul), how do we know this? Because of root (hetu, cause) and perception (pratyaksa, sensation). For example, nirupadhisesa-nirvana (nirupadhisesa-nirvana, the state of nirvana without remainder) is not perceived, so it is considered non-existent. Sentient beings are not like this, so we know they exist. The self (atman, soul) is an eternal principle (nitya-dharma, eternal law). Why? For example, the fruit of an Arhat (arhat-phala, the fruit of an Arhat) exists only at that time, but not before or after, so it is considered non-existent. Like a second head or a third hand, which originally did not exist but now do, so we know they did not exist before. Having existed, they then cease, so we know they do not exist after. The self is not like this, so it is eternal.' The refuter says: 'Like the roots of a tree and the water underground, we do not say they do not exist because we cannot see them. Arhats are also like this; they are not non-existent, but you have not realized them.' The proponent says: 'It is not like that. Water is not visible because of the obstruction of the earth. What obstructs us from seeing Arhats now? Therefore, we know Arhats do not exist.' The refuter says: 'You use the invisibility of a second head or a third hand to prove that Arhats do not exist, but this is not correct. Although there is no second head, it does not mean there is no first head. To say that Arhats do not exist is to say that they do not exist at all. How can you use this as a metaphor?' Furthermore, you say that because there is no sensation, there is no nirvana, but this is also incorrect. Like the water in the ocean, we do not know how many drops there are, but can we say that there is no ocean? If we do not know the number of drops, but the ocean still exists, nirvana is also like this. Although it is imperceptible, it truly exists. If you say it does not exist, you should explain the reason. If you cannot explain it, your theory is untenable.' This is a proper debate. Furthermore, if you say that because there is no sensation, there is no nirvana, others will have doubts. Like seeing a tree at night, one will doubt whether it is a stump or a person. One should know that this tree is not definitely a person, nor is it definitely a stump. If you believe that the absence of sensation necessarily means that nirvana has no cause, then there should be no doubt. Moreover, the retribution of karma (karma-vipaka, the consequences of actions) cannot be destroyed, so there is nirvana. Why? For example, a great fire burns down a forest, so fire is the cause of destruction. What is the cause of destruction that can destroy these karmic retributions now? If one attains nirvana, they will be scattered and destroyed.' The proponent says: 'There is indeed a cause of destruction, but it is not visible because of obstruction.' The refuter says: 'There is also nirvana, but it is not visible because of the obstruction of ignorance.' Furthermore, if you cannot now distinguish that all karmas have a cause of destruction, your theory is untenable. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chinese
。若灭因无故而不说者亦无障碍。何须说耶。以是等缘知业不灭。是则名为如法论也。立者曰。汝若以海水有故成有涅槃。岂复能令二头有耶。若设二头不可为有。涅槃云何独得有耶。汝海水喻尚不能立。涅槃为有。何能成于二头有乎。难曰。汝意若谓涅槃无者。为有是无。为当无无。若无无者。云何觉知无涅槃耶。若有此无。云何而言都无所有。若言虽有是无涅槃之法。犹自无者尚有是无。何故不得有涅槃耶。当说因缘。若不能说。当知涅槃决定实有。是亦名为如法论也。 问曰。神为是常为无常乎。立曰。神非造作故常。瓶等作法故是无常。难曰。若以无作明神常者。是事不然。何以知之。生人疑故。若非造作神即常者。不应生疑为常无常。以生疑故当知有过。立曰。此过非但唯独我有。一切论者皆有斯过。如言声常无形色故。有过去身以宿命智知故。如是立义如前生疑。故一切处皆有是过。难曰。喻者决疑。汝所引喻令我生疑。是不成喻。喻不成者义则自坏。即堕负处。而汝乃言一切有过非独我有。斯则自咎非余过也。所以者何。如人被诬而不自明。而言一切皆悉是盗。当知此人即自为盗。汝亦如是故堕负处。今汝若欲自宣明者。理极于先。必欲复说则堕多过。汝第一立第二已破。第三之义我又为难。欲 现代汉语译本：如果灭因不存在，那么不说灭也是没有障碍的，又何必说呢？通过这些因缘可知业不会灭。这就可以称为如法的论述。立论者说：你如果因为海水存在而成立有涅槃，难道还能让两个头存在吗？如果假设两个头不可能存在，那么涅槃又凭什么独自存在呢？你用海水作比喻尚且不能成立涅槃是存在的，又怎么能成立两个头是存在的呢？反驳者说：你的意思是说涅槃不存在，那么是有这个‘无’，还是没有‘无’呢？如果没有‘无’，又怎么能觉知没有涅槃呢？如果有这个‘无’，又怎么能说完全没有所有呢？如果说虽然有这个‘无’，涅槃的法仍然是‘无’，尚且有这个‘无’，为什么就不能有涅槃呢？应当说明因缘。如果不能说明，应当知道涅槃决定是真实存在的。这也可以称为如法的论述。 问：神是常还是无常呢？立论者说：神不是造作的，所以是常；瓶子等是造作的，所以是无常。反驳者说：如果用不是造作来证明神是常，这是不对的。为什么知道不对呢？因为人们会怀疑。如果不是造作，神就是常，那么不应该怀疑是常还是无常。因为产生了怀疑，应当知道这里有错误。立论者说：这个错误不仅仅是我有，所有的论者都有这个错误。比如，说声音是常，因为没有形色；有过去的身，因为有宿命智。像这样立论，像前面一样产生怀疑。所以，所有的地方都有这个错误。反驳者说：比喻是为了解决疑惑。你所引用的比喻让我产生怀疑，这是不成立的比喻。比喻不成立，论证的意义就自己瓦解了，就陷入了失败的境地。而你却说一切都有错误，不仅仅是你自己有。这实际上是责备自己，而不是别人的错误。为什么这么说呢？就像一个人被诬陷，不为自己辩解，却说所有的人都是盗贼。应当知道这个人就是盗贼。你也像这样，所以陷入了失败的境地。现在你如果想要为自己辩解清楚，道理在于先前的论证。如果一定要重复说，就会陷入更多的错误。你第一次立论，第二次已经被我驳倒，第三次的意义我又提出了疑问，想要
English
English version: If the cause of cessation does not exist, then not speaking of cessation is also without obstruction. Why is it necessary to speak of it? Through these conditions, it is known that karma does not cease. This is called a 'Dharma-like' discussion. The proponent says: If you establish the existence of Nirvana because the ocean exists, can you also make two heads exist? If it is assumed that two heads cannot exist, then how can Nirvana exist alone? Your analogy of the ocean cannot even establish the existence of Nirvana. How can it establish the existence of two heads? The opponent says: If you mean that Nirvana does not exist, is there this 'non-existence,' or is there no 'non-existence'? If there is no 'non-existence,' how can one be aware of the absence of Nirvana? If there is this 'non-existence,' how can you say that there is absolutely nothing? If you say that although there is this 'non-existence,' the Dharma of Nirvana is still 'non-existent,' and there is still this 'non-existence,' why can't there be Nirvana? The causes and conditions should be explained. If you cannot explain them, you should know that Nirvana definitely exists in reality. This is also called a 'Dharma-like' discussion. Question: Is the Atman (soul/self) eternal or impermanent? The proponent says: The Atman is not created, therefore it is eternal; pots and the like are created, therefore they are impermanent. The opponent says: If you use 'not created' to prove that the Atman is eternal, this is not correct. How do we know it is not correct? Because people have doubts. If the Atman is eternal because it is not created, then there should be no doubt about whether it is eternal or impermanent. Because doubt arises, it should be known that there is a flaw here. The proponent says: This flaw is not only mine; all debaters have this flaw. For example, saying that sound is eternal because it has no form or color; having a past life because of knowing past lives through supernatural powers. Establishing arguments like this, like before, gives rise to doubt. Therefore, this flaw exists everywhere. The opponent says: An analogy is meant to resolve doubts. The analogy you cited makes me doubt; it is not a valid analogy. If the analogy is not valid, the meaning of the argument collapses on its own, and one falls into a losing position. But you say that everyone has flaws, not just you. This is actually blaming yourself, not the flaws of others. Why do I say this? It is like a person who is falsely accused and does not defend himself, but says that everyone is a thief. It should be known that this person is the thief. You are like this, so you fall into a losing position. Now, if you want to clarify yourself, the principle lies in the previous argument. If you insist on repeating yourself, you will fall into more flaws. You established your first argument, and I have already refuted the second. I have raised questions about the meaning of the third, wanting to --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chinese
以第五而止过者。不出于初及汝后义。是则为重。若有重过即堕负处。 问曰。设第六人更可问乎。 答曰。第五之人已成于过。何有第六得为问耶。若必说之则同前过。问既有过。答应默然。复次第六人过。而第五者不得诘之。所以者何。由第五故是第六人便得为问。既自有过何由过彼。如是等名正法论也。 相应品第四 问曰。汝已分别如法正论。云何名为相应义耶。 答曰。问答相应有二十种。若人能以此二十义助发正理。是人则名解真实论。若不如是。不名通达议论之法。此二十种。要则有二。一异二同。以同显义名同。以异显义名异。凡为义者必依此二故。此二者通二十法。云何名同。如言烦恼尽处是无所有。虚空之性亦无所有。是名为同。云何名异。如说涅槃非作故常。则知诸行作故无常。是名为异。 问曰。此同异义云何为难。 答曰。欲难同者。作如是言。色以眼见声为耳闻。云何言同。若色异声色自无常声应是常。若难异者。以色根觉故无常。我非根觉故常。瓶我俱有有。若同者。瓶既无常。我亦应尔。若说瓶有异我有者。可言我常而瓶无常。常有既同我应无常。如斯难者。有二十种。一曰增多。二曰损减。三说同异。四问多答少。五答多问少。六曰 因同。七曰果同。八曰遍同。九不遍同。十曰时同。十一不到。十二名到。十三相违。十四不违。十五疑。十六不疑。十七喻破。十八闻同。十九闻异。二十不生。是名二十问答之法。 问曰。此二十法应分别说。 答曰。增多者。如言我常非根觉故。虚空非觉是故为常。一切不为根所觉者尽皆是常。而我非觉得非常乎。难曰。虚空无知故常。我有知故云何言常。若空有知则非道理。若我无知可同于虚空。如其知者必为无常。是名增多。损减者。若空无知而我有知。云何以空喻于我乎。是名损减。同异者。如立我常引空为喻。空我一者一法何得以空喻我。若其异者不得相喻。是名同异。复次汝立我常言非根觉。如虚空非根觉故常。然非根觉不必尽常。何得为证。是名问多答少。复次汝立我常言非根觉。非根觉法凡有二种。微尘非觉而是无常。虚空非觉而是常法。汝何得言非觉故常。是名第五问少答多。复次汝以非觉为因故知我常者。空与我异。云何俱以非觉为因。是名因同。复次五大成者皆悉无常。虚空与我亦五大成。云何言常。是名果同。复次汝以虚空非觉故常。然虚空者遍一切处。一切处物岂非觉也。是名遍同。复次微尘非遍。而非根觉是无常法。我非根觉云何为常。是不遍同。复次汝立我常言非根 现代汉语译本： 七是果同。八是遍同。九是不遍同。十是时同。十一是不及。十二是名及。十三是相违。十四是不违。十五是怀疑。十六是不怀疑。十七是比喻被破斥。十八是闻相同。十九是闻相异。二十是不生。这被称为二十种问答的方法。 问：这二十种方法应当分别解说。 答：‘增多’是指，例如说‘我是常，因为不是根所觉知的’。虚空不是觉知，所以是常。一切不是根所觉知的都应该是常。而我不是根所觉知的，难道就不是常吗？’反驳说：‘虚空没有知觉所以是常，我有知觉，怎么能说是常呢？如果虚空有知觉，那就没有道理了。如果我没有知觉，可以和虚空一样。如果我有知觉，必定是无常的。’这叫做‘增多’。 ‘损减’是指，如果虚空没有知觉而我有知觉，怎么能用虚空来比喻我呢？这叫做‘损减’。 ‘同异’是指，如果立论说我是常，引用虚空作为比喻。如果虚空和我是一样的，那么用一个法，怎么能用虚空来比喻我？如果虚空和我不同，就不能互相作为比喻。这叫做‘同异’。 再次，你立论说我是常，说因为不是根所觉知的。如同虚空不是根所觉知的所以是常。然而，不是根所觉知的，不一定都是常，怎么能作为证据呢？这叫做‘问多答少’。 再次，你立论说我是常，说因为不是根所觉知的。不是根所觉知的法，有两种。微尘不是觉知的，但是无常。虚空不是觉知的，但是常法。你怎么能说因为不是觉知的，所以是常呢？这叫做第五种‘问少答多’。 再次，你用不是觉知作为原因，所以知道我是常。虚空和我不同，怎么能都用不是觉知作为原因呢？这叫做‘因同’。 再次，五大（地、水、火、风、空）所成的都是无常的。虚空和我也是五大所成的，怎么能说是常呢？这叫做‘果同’。 再次，你用虚空不是觉知所以是常。然而，虚空遍一切处，一切处的事物难道不是觉知的吗？这叫做‘遍同’。 再次，微尘不是遍一切处的，也不是根所觉知的，是无常法。我不是根所觉知的，怎么能是常呢？这叫做‘不遍同’。 再次，你立论说我是常，说因为不是根