Chinese
论曰。于果性等。分位之处。取彼事已。而兴言说。异彼无体。谓于色等。说为因果。一异性。自他性。有见有对性等。若言彼事异于此者。此即便成非因果等。亦无自体由无一事。不待于德。于自体处可成言说。此不异性。有二种失。如前总聚已彰其过。于随有处。应可思之。若于有法。说无异性。舍不舍性。亦如前辨。或此于身相续转时。有差别性。譬如牛味。于热病者。能为止息。复能于此。为发动因。已说三种假设之事。异不异性所有过失。总拨无者。次当辨释。颂曰。 若不许身是实有 无倒说法应无益 又复应无邪见人 亦无差别作用事 论曰。如于身处。颠倒说为常乐我净。无倒为说四念住法。若无身者。应成无用。又若不许有相续者。能治所治便成差别。如于余身执以为常为对治彼。便于余身为说无常。此成无用。复次若无分位差别者。说无常等法。亦为无用。又邪见人。说无施无受等。及诸总聚所有福事。应非邪见。然衣食等所有施物。皆是总聚。如有说言。风不能吹。河不流等。言无相续。亦非邪见。然非佛教。许彼风等有实业用。虽有风吹等用。然而不许彼能向余方相续生起。若无 现代汉语译本： 于果性等分位处（在果的自性等不同阶段），取彼事已施言说（选取那些事物之后才进行描述）。 若异彼者事无体（如果说事物与那些阶段不同，那么事物本身就没有实体），不异二过辨如前（如果说事物与那些阶段没有不同，那么就会犯下前面已经辨析过的两种过失）。 论曰：于果性等分位之处（在果的自性等不同阶段），取彼事已（选取那些事物之后），而兴言说（才进行描述）。异彼无体（如果说事物与那些阶段不同，那么事物本身就没有实体），谓于色等（例如对于色等），说为因果（说它们是因果关系），一异性（同一性与差异性），自他性（自身与他身），有见有对性等（可见性与有对性等）。若言彼事异于此者（如果说那些事物与这些阶段不同），此即便成非因果等（那么这些事物就不能成为因果等关系），亦无自体由无一事（也没有自身的实体，因为没有任何事物），不待于德（不依赖于属性），于自体处可成言说（可以在自身实体上进行描述）。此不异性（这种没有差异性），有二种失（有两种过失），如前总聚已彰其过（就像前面讨论总和时已经阐明的那样）。于随有处（在任何存在的地方），应可思之（都应该思考这些问题）。若于有法（如果对于存在的事物），说无异性（说它们没有差异性），舍不舍性（放弃与不放弃的性质），亦如前辨（也像前面那样进行辨析）。或此于身相续转时（或者当身体在相续流转时），有差别性（会有差别性），譬如牛味（例如牛奶的味道），于热病者（对于患有热病的人），能为止息（能够止息病情），复能于此（又能够对于这些人），为发动因（成为病情发动的因素）。已说三种假设之事（已经说了三种假设的情况），异不异性所有过失（差异性与非差异性所具有的过失）。总拨无者（如果完全否定这些），次当辨释（接下来应当辨析）。颂曰： 若不许身是实有（如果不承认身体是真实存在的），无倒说法应无益（那么正确的说法应该没有益处）。 又复应无邪见人（而且应该没有持邪见的人），亦无差别作用事（也没有不同的作用和行为）。 论曰：如于身处（例如对于身体），颠倒说为常乐我净（颠倒地说成常、乐、我、净），无倒为说四念住法（正确地说是四念住的修行方法）。若无身者（如果没有身体），应成无用（那么这些说法就应该没有用处）。又若不许有相续者（又如果否认有相续存在），能治所治便成差别（能治疗的和所治疗的就会变得不同）。如于余身执以为常为对治彼（例如对于其他的身体执着认为是常，为了对治这种执着），便于余身为说无常（就对其他的身体说无常）。此成无用（这就会变得没有用处）。复次若无分位差别者（再次，如果没有阶段性的差别），说无常等法（说无常等法），亦为无用（也会变得没有用处）。又邪见人（而且持邪见的人），说无施无受等（说没有布施，没有接受布施等），及诸总聚所有福事（以及所有关于总和的福德之事），应非邪见（应该不是邪见）。然衣食等所有施物（然而衣服食物等所有布施之物），皆是总聚（都是总和）。如有说言（例如有人说），风不能吹（风不能吹动），河不流等（河流不会流动等）。言无相续（说没有相续），亦非邪见（也不是邪见）。然非佛教（然而佛教不），许彼风等有实业用（承认风等有实际的作用）。虽有风吹等用（虽然有风吹等作用），然而不许彼能向余方相续生起（然而不承认它们能够向其他方向相续生起）。若无
English
English version: At the stage of fruit-nature and so on, having taken those things, speech is uttered. If it is different from those, the thing has no substance; if not different, the two faults are discerned as before. Treatise says: At the stage of fruit-nature and so on, having taken those things, speech arises. If it is different from those, it has no substance, meaning that with regard to form and so on, it is spoken of as cause and effect, identity and difference, self-nature and other-nature, visible and obstructive nature, and so on. If it is said that those things are different from these stages, then these things will not become cause and effect, and so on, and will also have no self-nature because there is no single thing. Without relying on attributes, speech can be made about the self-nature. This non-difference has two kinds of faults, as the faults have already been revealed in the previous discussion of aggregates. In any place where there is existence, these questions should be considered. If it is said that there is no difference in things that exist, the nature of abandoning and not abandoning is also discerned as before. Or, when this body is continuously transforming, there is a difference, like the taste of milk, which can stop the illness of those with fever, and can also be a cause for the onset of the illness in these people. The faults of difference and non-difference have been spoken of in the three hypothetical situations. If all of these are completely denied, then the following should be discerned. The verse says: If it is not admitted that the body is truly existent, then the correct teachings should be of no benefit. Moreover, there should be no people with wrong views, and there should be no different actions and functions. Treatise says: For example, with regard to the body, it is wrongly said to be permanent, pleasurable, self, and pure; the correct teaching is the practice of the Four Foundations of Mindfulness (Sati Patthana). If there is no body, then these teachings should be useless. Furthermore, if it is denied that there is continuity, then what can be cured and what needs to be cured will become different. For example, clinging to other bodies as permanent in order to counteract this clinging, then saying impermanence to other bodies. This becomes useless. Furthermore, if there are no differences in stages, then teaching impermanence and so on will also be useless. Moreover, people with wrong views, saying that there is no giving, no receiving, and so on, and all the meritorious deeds related to aggregates, should not be wrong views. However, all the things given, such as clothing and food, are aggregates. For example, if someone says that the wind cannot blow, the river does not flow, and so on. Saying that there is no continuity is also not a wrong view. However, Buddhism does not admit that the wind and so on have real functions. Although there are functions such as the wind blowing, it is not admitted that they can continuously arise in other directions. If there is no --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chinese
相续。皆无如是邪见之事。若无分位差别者。于一色处苦集二相拨无之时邪见差别应成非有色无别故。亦无差别作业之事。又若不许有总聚者。于毗诃罗窣堵波等。福德差殊。应皆非有。又相续别故。其福亦殊。如世尊告勇健长者曰。若有苾刍。受食食已。入无量意定。正念而住。于如是等福德差别。应成非有。若不许有分位差别者。此差别故。业用差别亦成非有。事虽不殊势力有异。其用亦别。是共许故。犹如毒药。和余物时。便为害命。疗病用故。如是等类。拨无其事。皆有过失。若有如是众过失者。何不许彼是实物有。此不应理。有过失故。何者是耶。颂曰。 由遮一性异性故 非是展转藉因成 自体亦是可说故 似境唯从于识起 论曰。由于色等。是实有故。更互相望一异之性。是可说故。其总聚等。是不可说。若如是者。身望余身。云何名异。此由非是更互相因。凡诸事物。若舍于彼。而心取此者。斯则不名取因假设。由不取彼以为因故。然于身等。更互相待。若舍彼时。意不取此。此乃方名取因假设。若舍色等。无其总聚。是故应知。但于自事一异之性。是不可说。非于一切然分位差别。于异性等。更互名异。说之为假。若如是者。于色等处。亦不取故。说为异性。应非实有。理不应尔 现代汉语译本 相续。都没有像这样邪见的事情。如果没有分位差别，那么在同一个色处，否定苦集二相的时候，邪见的差别就应该不存在，因为色没有差别。也没有差别作业的事情。又如果认为没有总聚，那么对于毗诃罗（Vihara，精舍）、窣堵波（Stupa，佛塔）等，福德的差别，应该都不存在。又因为相续不同，所以福德也不同。例如世尊告诉勇健长者说：‘如果有比丘，接受食物后，进入无量意定，以正念安住。’像这样的福德差别，应该不存在。如果不承认有分位差别，那么因为这种差别，业用的差别也就不存在。事情虽然没有不同，但势力有差异，其作用也不同，这是大家公认的。就像毒药，和其它东西混合时，就会害命；用于治疗疾病。像这些情况，否定它们，都是有错误的。如果有这么多过失，为什么不承认它们是真实存在的呢？这不合理，因为有这些过失。那是什么呢？颂说： ‘由于遮止一性和异性，不是辗转依靠因缘而成，自体也是可以说的，（所以总聚等）类似外境，只是从识产生的。’ 论说：因为色等是真实存在的，所以互相观待的一异之性，是可以说的。而总聚等，是不可说的。如果这样，身体相对于其他身体，为什么称为不同呢？这是因为不是互相作为因缘。凡是事物，如果舍弃了那个，而心取这个，这就不能称为取因假设。因为不取那个作为原因。然而对于身体等，互相依赖，如果舍弃了那个，意识不取这个，这才能称为取因假设。如果舍弃了色等，就没有总聚。所以应该知道，只是对于自身的一异之性，是不可说的，不是对于一切。然而分位差别，对于异性等，互相称为不同，说是假立的。如果这样，对于色等处，也不取，所以说为异性，应该不是真实存在的。道理不应该是这样。
English
English version Continuity. There are no such things as wrong views. If there were no distinctions in phases, then when denying the two aspects of suffering and its origin in a single realm of form, the difference in wrong views should not exist, because there is no difference in form. There would also be no differentiated actions. Furthermore, if one does not accept the existence of aggregates, then the differences in merit for Viharas (Vihara, monasteries), Stupas (Stupa, Buddhist monuments), etc., should not exist. Also, because continuities are different, their merits are also different. For example, the World Honored One told the Elder Daksasura: 'If there is a Bhiksu (Bhiksu, monk) who, after receiving food, enters the Samadhi (Samadhi, meditative state) of Immeasurable Intent, abiding in mindfulness.' Such differences in merit should not exist. If one does not acknowledge the distinctions in phases, then because of this distinction, the differences in the functions of actions would also not exist. Although things are not different, their power is different, and their functions are also different, which is commonly accepted. Just like poison, when mixed with other things, it becomes deadly; when used for healing diseases. Denying such things is a mistake. If there are so many faults, why not admit that they are real? This is unreasonable because of these faults. What is it? The verse says: 'Because of denying oneness and otherness, it is not formed by relying on causes in a roundabout way; the self-nature is also speakable, (so aggregates, etc.) are like external objects, arising only from consciousness.' The treatise says: Because form, etc., are real, the nature of oneness and otherness in relation to each other is speakable. But aggregates, etc., are unspeakable. If so, why is one body called different in relation to another body? This is because they are not mutually causal. In general, if one abandons that thing and the mind takes this thing, then it cannot be called a causal assumption. Because it does not take that as the cause. However, for bodies, etc., they depend on each other; if one abandons that and the mind does not take this, then it can be called a causal assumption. If one abandons form, etc., there are no aggregates. Therefore, it should be known that only the nature of oneness and otherness in itself is unspeakable, not for everything. However, the distinctions in phases, in terms of otherness, are mutually called different, and said to be hypothetical. If so, for form, etc., one does not take them, so saying they are otherness should not be real. It should not be so. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chinese
。由彼自体。是可说故。亦是可得体相别故。非于余事不弃舍故。然此似境。亦从识起。于彼所有一切境相。若离识者。即不能知所有自性。亦是假设。故无有过。如有颂言。 鬼傍生人天 各随其所应 同处心异故 许境非实有 又总聚等非实物有。非是有为无为性故。一切诸法。皆是有为无为性摄。此且非是有为之相。颂曰。 相不相应非有为 若言有说是密意 于数取趣亦见说 若是无为应不坏 论曰。若是有为。应如识等。有生住等有为之相。此不如是。于总聚等。二微聚时。相乃无边。有无穷过。亦非假事。有如是相。一事便有。无边相故。然于现有假施设事。聚集等时。便有生灭。可了知故。若言有说者。实有此言。说总聚等有为之相。如有颂曰。 积聚皆消散 崇高必堕落 合会终别离 有命皆归死 此谓三谟诃等。说有灭相。于毗诃罗等。说有生相。虽有此说。皆是密意。非于胜义有如是相。此生等相。世人皆知。于假处有。即如其事。而为说法。此由随顺离欲事故。虽非胜义。顺清净故。为欲利益诸有情故。作如是说。佛告诸苾刍。若见女人。与母状同者。应为母想。如是等言。皆是假说。宁知生等。是密意说。非胜义耶。于补嗢揭罗。说有生 现代汉语译本：因为它们可以通过自身来描述，并且可以获得不同的体相，而且不会舍弃其他事物。然而，这些看似外境的事物，实际上也是从识（vijñāna）产生的。如果离开了识，就无法了解它们所具有的一切境相的自性，这些境相也只是假设的，所以没有过失。正如颂文所说： ‘鬼、傍生、人、天，各自随其所应，同处心异故，许境非实有。’ 此外，总聚等并非真实存在的实物，因为它们不具有有为（saṃskṛta）和无为（asaṃskṛta）的性质。一切诸法都包含在有为和无为的性质中。而总聚等不具有有为的相状。颂文说： ‘相不相应非有为，若言有说是密意，于数取趣亦见说，若是无为应不坏。’ 论曰：如果是有为法，应该像识等一样，具有生、住等有为的相状。但总聚等并非如此。当两个微尘聚集时，相状是无边的，有无穷的过失。也不是假的事物，具有这样的相状。因为一件事物便有无边的相状。然而，在现有的假施设的事物，如聚集等发生时，便有生灭，可以了解。如果有人说总聚等具有有为的相状，这确实有这样的说法，但这是密意。如有颂文说： ‘积聚皆消散，崇高必堕落，合会终别离，有命皆归死。’ 这是指三谟诃（tri-moha）等，说有灭相；对于毗诃罗（vihara）等，说有生相。虽然有这样的说法，但都是密意，在胜义谛（paramārtha-satya）中没有这样的相状。这些生等相，世人都知道，在假立之处有，就如实地为此说法。这是因为随顺离欲的缘故，虽然不是胜义谛，但顺应清净的缘故，为了利益一切有情，才这样说。佛告诉诸位比丘（bhikṣu）：如果见到女人，与母亲的形貌相似，应该作母亲想。像这样的言语，都是假说。凭什么知道生等是密意说，而不是胜义谛呢？因为对于补特伽罗（pudgala），也说有生。