English
English version: Because of the nature of having parts (avayavin), what you adhere to as 'having parts' becomes 'non-existent'. Thus, let's analyze the acceptance of 'non-difference' (ananyatva), which has two flaws. The verse says: 'Difference is also the same, because one side separately operates in the parts, One side then has infinite flaws, or it is not one and completely non-existent.' The treatise says: 'Difference is also the same' has two flaws. The argument flows to this point because when it operates in its own parts, it either operates separately or universally. Here, let's analyze the meaning of separate operation. If one side operates with parts in places like the hand, it is also one side, like the hand, and another side should arise accordingly. In this way, going on and on, there are infinite flaws. 'Or it is not one,' because difference has infinite flaws, so the word 'or' is used. If it is said that one side of the body part no longer operates, then there should be no meaning of 'having parts', and it becomes 'having parts' with only one side. If so, it should be admitted that there are only hands, etc. Why be biased towards one's own parts operating with parts? 'And completely non-existent,' because one side is infinite, and there are more flaws, so the word 'and' is used. When this one side operates in parts, then there is completely no 'having parts' to be obtained. Because it is not 'having parts', like hands and feet, having its one side. If it is said that when separating hands, etc., there are no other parts, and the nature of 'having parts' is one, if it is like this, then it becomes universally operating in those other parts separately. There are only these two calculations, and there is no third separate attachment, so the verse says: 'If it is universal, it becomes multiple natures, and there is no difference between hands, etc., Or this is not that, therefore it becomes all things having the same subtle nature.' The treatise says: If it is said to be universal, the 'having parts' that is admitted is the same in quantity as the parts, because it is pervasive in every place, it becomes multiple natures. There is a different meaning, so the word 'and' is used. Because it is universally present in one place, because it does not admit the nature of that other place, and the remaining parts are even more without difference from each other. Because they are combined, when in the same place, things have no difference. In this way, the hand should admit having a foot, which violates the common sense of the world. 'Or this is not that,' there is a different calculation, so the word 'or' is used. In order to avoid the previous flaws, it is said that the nature of 'having parts' --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chinese
。于足转时非于手等有分别转此则无有。于余支分同处过者。此同捺瘿反出眼睛。若如是者。一切有分成一实事。是故诸事成一极微。由彼有分。于自支分。展转起时。乃至唯有一实极微。住处可得。此一支分。便与有分。同一极微。此有分执理成无用。及违自宗。若言离于色等。别有极微。即无如前所说之过。由彼不于色等处转故无此失。理亦不然。于此亦有二执过故。故应许此。有别方分。或无方分。若尔何过。颂曰。 有方分性非极微 为遮一性异性故 或无方分多不聚 或复众同于一微 论曰。由非如是所执极微。理得成就。有方分故。由此方分。更成转细。又复彼遮一异性故。由此于彼自支分处。或同或异。唯此二种。无第三计。已斥其过。非诸极微。有方分故。既无方分。假令共聚。亦不和杂。设许同处。皆同一微。然此极微。不得和聚。一与诸微。相障碍故即诸微体。共成于一。由同处故。如是已说总聚有聚一异之过。颂曰。 相续若一舍婴孩 渐次乃至童年位 应失自身非不异 若言不失便相杂 论曰。若许相续。于有续事。无异性者应许自性。有其二种。由此说为相续自性。或但遮余。此之二种同前总聚。已斥其过。于中别者。今更决择。若别别位领受之时。为 现代汉语译本：当足部转动时，手等其他肢体并没有分别的转动，因此这里不存在（有方分）。如果其他肢体在同一位置上发生移动，比如像捺瘿（一种病症）一样，眼睛会突出。如果像这样，一切有分就变成了一个实在的事物。因此，所有事物都变成了一个极微（最小的物质单位），因为它们具有有分。当有分在自身的各个部分之间依次产生时，最终只有一个实在的极微可以存在。这个肢体就与有分是同一个极微。因此，执着于有分在理论上变得毫无用处，并且违背了自己的宗派。如果说离开色等（色蕴等）之外，另有极微存在，那么就不会有前面所说的过失，因为它们不在色等处转动，所以没有这个过失。但这种说法在理上也是不成立的，因为这里也存在两种执着的过失。所以应该承认，这个（极微）有不同的方位部分，或者没有方位部分。如果这样，会有什么过失呢？颂文说： ‘具有方位部分就不是极微，这是为了遮止同一性和异性的缘故；或者没有方位部分，多个极微就不能聚集，或者众多极微都相同于一个极微。’ 论述说：由于并非像所执着的极微那样，道理才能成立，因为它具有方位部分。由于这个方位部分，会变得更加细微。又因为它遮止了同一性和异性，因此对于它自身各个部分的位置，或者相同或者相异，只有这两种情况，没有第三种说法。已经驳斥了它的过失，因为各个极微没有方位部分。既然没有方位部分，即使共同聚集，也不会混合。假设允许在同一位置，都相同于一个极微，然而这个极微不能和合聚集，因为一个极微与其他的极微相互障碍，即各个极微的本体，共同成为一个，因为在同一位置的缘故。像这样已经说了总聚有聚集、同一性和异性的过失。颂文说： ‘相续如果是一，舍弃婴儿时期，逐渐直到童年时期，应该失去自身，而不是不异；如果说不失去，那就互相混杂。’ 论述说：如果允许相续，对于有连续的事物，没有异性，就应该允许自性有两种。因此说为相续自性，或者只是遮止其余的。这两种情况与前面的总聚相同，已经驳斥了它的过失。在其中不同的地方，现在进一步抉择。如果在不同的阶段领受的时候，为...
English
English version: When the foot rotates, the hand and other limbs do not rotate separately, so there is no (directional division) here. If other limbs move in the same position, such as with a 'nāḍī-granthi' (a type of disease), the eyes will protrude. If it is like this, all 'avayava' (parts) become a single real entity. Therefore, all things become a 'paramāṇu' (smallest unit of matter) because they have 'avayava'. When 'avayava' arise sequentially among their own parts, eventually only one real 'paramāṇu' can exist. This limb is then the same 'paramāṇu' as the 'avayava'. Therefore, clinging to 'avayava' becomes theoretically useless and contradicts one's own school. If it is said that apart from 'rūpa' (form) etc., there are other 'paramāṇu', then there will be no faults as mentioned earlier, because they do not rotate in the place of 'rūpa' etc., so there is no such fault. But this statement is also not logically valid, because there are also two clinging faults here. Therefore, it should be admitted that this ('paramāṇu') has different directional parts, or no directional parts. If so, what fault will there be? The verse says: 'Having directional parts is not a 'paramāṇu', this is to prevent oneness and otherness; or without directional parts, multiple 'paramāṇu' cannot gather, or many 'paramāṇu' are the same as one 'paramāṇu'.' The treatise says: Because it is not like the 'paramāṇu' that is clung to, the principle can be established, because it has directional parts. Because of this directional part, it will become more subtle. Also, because it prevents oneness and otherness, therefore for the position of its own parts, either the same or different, there are only these two situations, there is no third statement. Its fault has been refuted, because the various 'paramāṇu' do not have directional parts. Since there are no directional parts, even if they gather together, they will not mix. Assuming that it is allowed in the same position, they are all the same as one 'paramāṇu', but this 'paramāṇu' cannot gather together harmoniously, because one 'paramāṇu' obstructs the other 'paramāṇu', that is, the essence of each 'paramāṇu' together becomes one, because they are in the same position. In this way, the faults of aggregation, oneness, and otherness of the total aggregation have been discussed. The verse says: 'If the 'saṃtāna' (continuity) is one, abandoning infancy, gradually until childhood, one should lose oneself, rather than not being different; if it is said that one does not lose oneself, then they are mixed together.' The treatise says: If it is allowed that the 'saṃtāna', for things that have continuity, has no otherness, then it should be allowed that the 'svabhāva' (self-nature) has two kinds. Therefore, it is said to be the 'saṃtāna' 'svabhāva', or it just prevents the rest. These two situations are the same as the previous total aggregation, and its faults have been refuted. In the different places among them, further discernment is now made. When receiving at different stages, for... --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chinese
舍前位。而领于后。为当不舍。斯有何过。若舍婴孩。至童年位。应失自身。汝若许此。于婴儿位。是不异者。彼移易时。自体应失。于此位中。无异性故。故汝宗云。凡诸实事。有别法起。有别法生。为转变者。无如是理。然非不异。移转位别。安危异故。言不异者。此即是彼如是且论转舍之过若不失者。法相和杂。不舍婴孩。领童年位。孩童等位。体相和杂。应成无别。然不见有如斯之事。已说不异性过。颂曰。 若是异性身不安 为欲求安劳妄设 转不相应及生灭 若言体别成实事 论曰。相续有续。体若异者。诸有先病。后时求差。所有劬劳。皆成妄设。流转之理。不相应故。曾不见有别体之物。如牛马等。得相续故。若言不可说事亦不见者。此难非理。是所成立故。由离二边。于世间事。因果之处。见有斯事非于余处。又如酸酒。欲转成美。心散乱人。修令寂定。所设劬劳。并应无益。由体异故。若异性者。生灭之理。亦不相应。诸有生灭。相续起者。应于现在。支分处转过未现在。云何转耶。一分全遍。并如前破。又性异者。相续体殊。不应生灭。此复何过。若言别者。有为相异。所许相续成实事有。此不应理。次后当说相续一异。已彰其过。复次分位差别。于果性等。其事云何。颂曰 现代汉语译本 舍弃前一阶段的状态，而进入后一阶段的状态。如果说不舍弃，那会有什么过失呢？如果舍弃了婴儿阶段，进入童年阶段，就应该失去自身。如果你认可这种说法，那么在婴儿阶段，自身与童年阶段的自身没有区别。当发生转变时，自身就应该消失，因为在这个阶段中，没有不同的自性。所以你们宗派说，凡是真实的事物，有不同的法生起，有不同的法产生，对于转变来说，没有这样的道理。然而并非没有不同，只是转变的状态不同，安稳与危险也不同。如果说没有不同，那么这就是它。像这样且先讨论转变舍弃的过失。如果不失去，那么法的体相就会混合杂乱。如果不舍弃婴儿阶段，而进入童年阶段，那么婴儿、孩童等阶段的体相就会混合杂乱，应该变成没有区别。然而没有看到有这样的事情发生。已经说了不异性的过失。偈颂说： ‘如果是异性，身体不安稳，为了寻求安稳而白费力气。转变不相应，以及生灭不相应。如果说本体不同，就成了真实的事物。’ 论述说：相续是有延续的。如果本体不同，那么先前生病，后来求得痊愈，所有的努力都成了白费力气，因为流转的道理不相应。从未见过有不同本体的事物，如牛和马等，能够得到相续。如果说不可说的事物也看不见，这种责难没有道理，因为这是所要成立的。由于远离二边，在世间事物中，因果之处，可以看到这样的事情，而不是在其他地方。又如酸酒，想要转变成美酒；心散乱的人，想要通过修行使其寂静安定，所做的努力都应该没有益处，因为本体不同。如果是异性，那么生灭的道理也不相应。凡是有生灭，相续生起的事物，应该在现在的支分处转变，过去、未来、现在，如何转变呢？一部分全部遍及，都如前面所破斥的。又如果自性不同，相续的本体就不同，不应该有生灭。这又有什么过失呢？如果说不同，有为法的体相就不同，所认可的相续就成了真实的事物。这不应该成立。接下来将要说相续的一异，已经彰显了其中的过失。再次，分位的差别，对于果的自性等，这件事怎么样呢？偈颂说：
English
English version To abandon a previous state and enter a subsequent one. If it is said that one does not abandon, what fault is there? If one abandons the infant stage and enters childhood, one should lose oneself. If you accept this, then in the infant stage, oneself is no different from oneself in childhood. When transformation occurs, oneself should disappear, because in this stage, there is no different self-nature. Therefore, your school says that for all real things, different dharmas arise, and different dharmas are produced; for transformation, there is no such principle. However, it is not that there is no difference, but that the state of transformation is different, and stability and danger are also different. If it is said that there is no difference, then this is it. Like this, let's first discuss the fault of transformation and abandonment. If one does not lose, then the characteristics of the dharmas will be mixed and confused. If one does not abandon the infant stage and enters childhood, then the characteristics of the infant, child, and other stages will be mixed and confused, and should become indistinguishable. However, one has not seen such a thing happen. The fault of non-difference has already been discussed. The verse says: 'If it is a different nature, the body is not stable; to seek stability is to labor in vain. Transformation is not corresponding, and neither is arising and ceasing. If it is said that the essence is different, it becomes a real thing.' The treatise says: Continuity has continuation. If the essence is different, then those who were previously sick and later seek recovery, all their efforts become futile, because the principle of flowing is not corresponding. One has never seen things with different essences, such as cows and horses, being able to obtain continuity. If it is said that unspeakable things are also not seen, this criticism is unreasonable, because this is what is to be established. Because of being away from the two extremes, in worldly matters, in the place of cause and effect, one can see such things, but not in other places. Also, like sour wine, wanting to transform into fine wine; a person with a scattered mind, wanting to make it tranquil and stable through practice, all the efforts made should be of no benefit, because the essence is different. If it is a different nature, then the principle of arising and ceasing is also not corresponding. All things that have arising and ceasing, arising continuously, should transform in the present branches, past, future, and present. How does it transform? A part is completely pervasive, all as refuted before. Also, if the self-nature is different, the essence of continuity is different, and there should be no arising and ceasing. What fault is there in this? If it is said that it is different, the characteristics of conditioned dharmas are different, and the continuity that is accepted becomes a real thing. This should not be established. Next, the one and the different of continuity will be discussed, and the faults therein have already been revealed. Again, the difference in stages, for the nature of the fruit, etc., what is the matter? The verse says: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 。 于果性等分位处 取彼事已施言说 若异彼者事无体 不异二过辨如前