Chinese
。问言相应者是何义耶。答阿毗达磨诸大论师咸作是说。言相应者是平等义。问有心起位心所法多。有心生时心所法少。云何平等是相应义。答依体平等作如是说。若一心中二受一想。可非平等。是相应义。然一心中一受一想。思等亦尔。故说平等是相应义。复次等不乖违。是相应义。等不离散。是相应义。平等运转。是相应义。如车众分故名相应。复次同一时分同一所依同一行相同一所缘同一果同一等流同一异熟。是相应义。此复云何。谓受想思乃至广说。问何故先说受非先说想等。答行相粗故。受虽无碍不住方所。而行相粗如色施设。故世间说。我今手痛足痛头痛。乃至广说。想思触等无如是事。受云何。谓领纳性。有领纳用名领纳性。即是领受所缘境义。此有三种。谓乐受苦受不苦不乐受者。若能长养诸根大种。平等受性名为乐受。若能损减诸根大种。不平等受性名为苦受。与二相违非平等非不平等受性名不苦不乐受。复次若于此受令贪随眠二缘随增。谓所缘故。或相应故。是名乐受。若于此受令瞋随眠二缘随增。谓所缘故。或相应故。是名苦受。若于此受令痴随眠二缘随增。谓所缘故。或相应故。名不苦不乐受。虽痴随眠于一切受二缘随增。而不共痴自依而起。自力而转。多与不苦不乐受俱。余明了故不作是 说。由可意不可意顺舍境有差别故。建立如是三领纳性。是故但说有三种受。而实受性有无量种。有余欲令无实乐受及不苦不乐受。问彼何缘说无实乐受。答经为量故为契经说。诸所有受无非是苦。又契经说。汝应以苦观于乐受。若乐受性是实有者。如何世尊教诸弟子观乐为苦。又契经言。于苦谓乐名颠倒故。若有乐受应无于苦。谓乐想倒心倒见倒。又契经说。诸有漏受苦谛摄故。此中摄者。是自性摄。非实乐受。是苦自性。云何可言是苦谛摄。既说苦谛摄故无实乐受。又相异故。谓逼迫相说名为苦。非实乐受有逼迫相。如何可言诸有漏受皆苦谛摄。又现观故。谓观一切有漏皆苦。说名现观。若乐受性是实有者。观乐为苦成颠倒见。应非现观。是故定知无实乐受。阿毗达磨诸论师言。实有乐受经为量故。谓契经说。佛告大名。若色一向是苦非乐。非乐所随有情不应贪着诸色。乃至广说。又契经言。并乐并喜于四圣谛我说现观。又契经说。有三种受。谓乐受苦受不苦不乐受。又契经言。诸乐受生时乐住时。乐由无常有过患。诸苦受生时苦住时。苦由无常有过患。若乐受性非实有者。应非如苦作一类说。应于乐受作别类说。应于苦受作别类说。又若乐受非实有性。应无轻安。以无因故。如契经说。由有喜故身心轻安。若无 说：由于可爱、不可爱、顺舍境的差别，才建立了这三种领纳性。因此，只说有三种受，而实际上受的性质有无量种。有些人想认为没有真实的乐受和不苦不乐受。问：他们根据什么说没有真实的乐受呢？答：因为经典是衡量标准。因为契经上说：‘所有一切的感受，没有不是苦的。’又契经上说：‘你应该以苦来观察乐受。’如果乐受的性质是真实存在的，世尊怎么会教导弟子们观察快乐为痛苦呢？又契经上说：‘对于苦认为是乐，这叫做颠倒。’如果存在乐受，就不应该有对于苦，认为是乐的想倒、心倒、见倒。又契经上说：‘所有有漏的感受都属于苦谛所摄。’这里所说的‘摄’，是指自性上的摄属，而不是说真实的乐受是苦的自性。怎么能说它是苦谛所摄呢？既然说是苦谛所摄，就没有真实的乐受。又因为相状不同。逼迫的相状被称为苦，而真实的乐受没有逼迫的相状。怎么能说所有有漏的感受都是苦谛所摄呢？又因为现观的缘故。观察一切有漏法都是苦，这叫做现观。如果乐受的性质是真实存在的，那么观察快乐为痛苦就成了颠倒见，就不应该是现观。所以一定可以知道没有真实的乐受。 阿毗达磨（Abhidharma，论藏）的论师们说：真实存在乐受，因为经典是衡量标准。因为契经上说：‘佛告诉大名（Mahanama，人名）：如果色（rupa，物质）完全是苦而不是乐，没有被快乐所伴随，有情（sattva，众生）就不应该贪着这些色。’乃至广说。又契经上说：‘连同快乐和喜悦，我对四圣谛（Four Noble Truths）说现观。’又契经上说：‘有三种受，即乐受、苦受、不苦不乐受。’又契经上说：‘诸乐受生起时是快乐的，安住时也是快乐的，但由于无常而有过患。诸苦受生起时是痛苦的，安住时也是痛苦的，但由于无常而有过患。’如果乐受的性质不是真实存在的，就不应该像苦一样被归为一类。应该把乐受和苦受分别归为不同的类别。而且，如果乐受不是真实存在的，就不应该有轻安（Prasrabdhi，身心轻快安适）。因为没有原因。正如契经上所说：‘由于有喜悦，所以身心轻安。’如果没有
English
It is said that these three kinds of perception are established because of the differences in agreeable, disagreeable, and neutral objects. Therefore, only three kinds of feeling are mentioned, but in reality, the nature of feeling is immeasurable. Some wish to argue that there is no real pleasurable feeling or neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling. Question: On what basis do they say there is no real pleasurable feeling? Answer: Because the scriptures are the standard. Because the sutras say: 'All feelings are nothing but suffering.' Also, the sutras say: 'You should contemplate pleasure as suffering.' If the nature of pleasure were real, how could the World-Honored One teach his disciples to contemplate pleasure as suffering? Also, the sutras say: 'Regarding suffering as pleasure is called delusion.' If there were pleasurable feeling, there should be no delusion of regarding suffering as pleasure, no inverted thought, inverted mind, or inverted view. Also, the sutras say: 'All contaminated feelings are included in the truth of suffering.' Here, 'included' means included by nature, not that real pleasurable feeling is the nature of suffering. How can it be said to be included in the truth of suffering? Since it is said to be included in the truth of suffering, there is no real pleasurable feeling. Also, because the characteristics are different. The characteristic of oppression is called suffering, but real pleasurable feeling does not have the characteristic of oppression. How can it be said that all contaminated feelings are included in the truth of suffering? Also, because of direct perception. Observing all contaminated phenomena as suffering is called direct perception. If the nature of pleasurable feeling were real, then observing pleasure as suffering would become a deluded view and would not be direct perception. Therefore, it can be definitely known that there is no real pleasurable feeling. The Abhidharma (Abhidharma, collection of treatises) masters say: Real pleasurable feeling exists because the scriptures are the standard. Because the sutras say: 'The Buddha told Mahanama (Mahanama, a person's name): If form (rupa, matter) were entirely suffering and not pleasure, and not accompanied by pleasure, sentient beings (sattva, beings) should not be attached to these forms.' And so on. Also, the sutras say: 'Together with pleasure and joy, I speak of direct perception of the Four Noble Truths (Four Noble Truths).' Also, the sutras say: 'There are three kinds of feeling, namely pleasurable feeling, painful feeling, and neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling.' Also, the sutras say: 'When pleasurable feelings arise, they are pleasant; when they abide, they are pleasant, but because of impermanence, there are faults. When painful feelings arise, they are painful; when they abide, they are painful, but because of impermanence, there are faults.' If the nature of pleasurable feeling were not real, it should not be classified in the same category as suffering. Pleasurable feeling and painful feeling should be classified into different categories. Moreover, if pleasurable feeling were not real, there should be no tranquility (Prasrabdhi, lightness and comfort of body and mind). Because there is no cause. As the sutras say: 'Because there is joy, there is tranquility of body and mind.' If there were no --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chinese
轻安亦应无乐。展转乃至应无涅槃无渐次因果非有故。彼师于此作救义言。如上地中虽无有喜。而非无有身心轻安。故引证言。非为决定。彼救非理。所以者何。以上地中都无喜故。应观此义。如健达缚三事和合。食名色经。如契经言。父母交会有健达缚正现在前。而见有时无父母会。有健达缚亦现在前。如受湿生及化生者。非受胎卵二生有情离父母合有入胎义。又如经言。三事和合谓寿暖识。然无色界虽无有暖而有寿识。非欲色界寿识离暖。又如经说。身依食住。非上二界住由三食。欲界亦然。非欲界中住由四食。上界亦尔。又如经言。名色缘识识缘名色。非无色界虽无有色而名与识展转相缘。令欲色中亦有此义。此中亦尔。若有喜处。由有喜故得有轻安。若处喜无轻安亦有。由余缘故不应为责。何谓余缘。谓先欲界有胜喜受。引未至定轻安令起。初二静虑有胜喜受。引上地中轻安令起。若全无喜则无轻安。由此证知定有乐受。又如初果在上二界。虽不能得而彼能得阿罗汉果。先力引故。此亦应然不应为责。又如以杖先击于轮。后舍杖时其轮犹转。此亦应尔。由先喜力引后轻安。是故轻安定由有喜。喜即喜受乐受所摄。是故定知实有乐受。又由乐受有希望故。如契经说。若有乐者于法希望。乐受若无则应于法无希望 现代汉语译本 轻安（Passaddhi，一种身心轻快安适的状态）也应没有乐受。辗转推论乃至应该没有涅槃（Nibbāna，佛教术语，指解脱），因为没有渐次的因果关系。那位论师对此提出辩护说，就像在上地（指色界和无色界）中虽然没有喜受，但并非没有身心轻安。所以引用经文说，并非是决定性的。但他的辩护是不合理的。为什么呢？因为在上地中根本没有喜受。应该观察这个道理，就像健达缚（Gandhabba，指中阴身）的三事和合，以及食、名色（Nāma-Rūpa，佛教术语，指精神和物质）的经典。如契经所说：‘父母交合，有健达缚正现在前。’但有时没有父母交合，也有健达缚现在前，比如受湿生和化生者。非受胎生和卵生的有情，离开父母的结合，有入胎的道理。又如经中所说：‘三事和合，谓寿、暖、识。’然而没有**，即使没有暖，也有寿和识。非欲**，寿和识离开暖。又如经说：‘身依食住。’但上二界（指色界和无色界）的住不是由三种食（段食、触食、意思食）维持的，欲界也是如此。并非欲界的住是由四种食（段食、触食、意思食、识食）维持的，上界也是这样。又如经言：‘名色缘识，识缘名色。’即使没有**，即使没有色，名和识也辗转相缘。令欲界和色界中也有这个道理。这里也是一样，如果有喜受的地方，因为有喜受，所以有轻安。如果某个地方没有喜受，但轻安也有，因为有其他的因缘，不应该责难。什么是其他的因缘呢？就是先前的欲界有殊胜的喜受，引导未至定（Upacāra-samādhi，指接近禅定的状态）的轻安生起。初禅和二禅有殊胜的喜受，引导上地中的轻安生起。如果完全没有喜受，就没有轻安。由此可以证明一定有乐受。又如初果（Sotāpanna，指须陀洹果）在上二界虽然不能得到喜受，但他们能得到阿罗汉果（Arahat，指阿罗汉果），因为先前的力量引导。这里也应该这样，不应该责难。又如用杖先击打轮子，后来舍弃杖时，轮子仍然转动。这里也应该这样，由先前的喜受的力量引导后来的轻安。所以轻安的生起一定是因为有喜受。喜受就是喜，属于乐受所摄。所以一定可以知道确实有乐受。又因为有乐受，所以有希望，如契经所说：‘如果有乐受的人，对于佛法就有希望。’如果乐受没有，那么对于佛法就应该没有希望。
English
English version Passaddhi (tranquility) should also be without pleasure. By extension, there should be no Nibbāna (liberation), because there is no gradual cause and effect. That teacher offers a defense, saying that even though there is no joy in the higher realms (referring to the Form and Formless Realms), it is not that there is no physical and mental tranquility. Therefore, the quotation is introduced, not as a definitive statement. But his defense is unreasonable. Why? Because there is no joy at all in the higher realms. This meaning should be observed, like the combination of three things for a Gandhabba (an intermediate being), and the sūtras on food and Nāma-Rūpa (mind and matter). As the sūtra says: 'When parents unite, a Gandhabba is present.' But sometimes there is no parental union, and a Gandhabba is still present, such as those born from moisture or by transformation. For beings born from the womb or from eggs, there is no entry into the womb without the union of parents. Also, as the sūtra says: 'Three things combine, namely life, warmth, and consciousness.' However, without **, even without warmth, there is still life and consciousness. Not ** desire, life and consciousness are separate from warmth. Also, as the sūtra says: 'The body dwells dependent on food.' But the dwelling in the upper two realms (Form and Formless Realms) is not maintained by three kinds of food (physical food, contact, and mental intention), and the Desire Realm is also like that. The dwelling in the Desire Realm is not maintained by four kinds of food (physical food, contact, mental intention, and consciousness), and the upper realms are also like that. Also, as the sūtra says: 'Mind and matter condition consciousness, and consciousness conditions mind and matter.' Even without **, even without matter, mind and consciousness are mutually conditioned. Let there also be this principle in the Desire and Form Realms. It is the same here, if there is a place with joy, because there is joy, there is tranquility. If there is a place without joy, but there is tranquility, because of other conditions, one should not blame. What are the other conditions? It is that the previous Desire Realm has superior joy, leading to the arising of tranquility in Upacāra-samādhi (access concentration). The first and second Dhyānas (meditative states) have superior joy, leading to the arising of tranquility in the higher realms. If there is no joy at all, there is no tranquility. From this, it can be proven that there must be pleasure. Also, like a Sotāpanna (stream-enterer) in the upper two realms, although they cannot attain joy, they can attain the fruit of an Arahat (liberated being), because of the power of the previous causes. It should be like this here, one should not blame. Also, like striking a wheel with a stick first, and then letting go of the stick, the wheel still turns. It should be like this here, the later tranquility is led by the power of the previous joy. Therefore, the arising of tranquility must be because there is joy. Joy is joy, which is included in pleasure. Therefore, it can be known for certain that there is indeed pleasure. Also, because there is pleasure, there is hope, as the sūtra says: 'If there is pleasure, there is hope for the Dharma.' If there is no pleasure, then there should be no hope for the Dharma. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------