Chinese
者。是故定知实有乐受。又可爱业应无果故。若无乐受诸可爱业应空无果。诸可爱业定以乐受为其果故。亦不应言诸可爱业以诸乐具为异熟果。乐具但是增上果故。谓诸乐具是增上果非异熟果。所以者何。所有乐具可有与他共受用故。自命终已不失坏故。谓诸乐具与他有情可共受用。诸异熟果定无与他共受用义。堕自相续不共他故。又诸乐具自命终已。如象马等犹不失坏。诸异熟果与身命俱。身命若无彼定失坏。故可爱业若无乐受应空无果。其理决定。又摄益故。若无乐受诸根大种应无摄益。若谓摄益。由诸有情分别境界非由乐受。理亦不然。应知摄益如由苦受有损害故。又正加行必有果故。若无乐受则正加行应空无果。正加行者。应以苦受为异熟果。无乐受故。如邪如行必以苦受为异熟果故。正加行应以乐受为异熟果。更相违故。如明与闇影与光等。又由乐受起恶行故。若无乐受恶行应无。由诸有情贪着乐受。起诸恶行感苦受果。恶行若无应无苦受。苦受既有恶行非无。既有恶行定有乐受。又法受故。如契经说。有四法受。或有法受现乐后苦。或有法受现苦后乐。或有法受现乐后乐。或有法受现苦后苦。若无乐受法受应一。不应有四。由如是等种种因缘定有乐受。问若有乐受。世尊所说违乐受经有何理趣。答有别理 因此可以确定确实存在乐受（sukha-vedanā，快乐的感受）。此外，可爱的业（karma，行为）应该不会没有结果，如果不存在乐受，那么所有可爱的业就应该都是空无结果的，因为所有可爱的业都必定以乐受作为其结果。也不应该说所有可爱的业以各种快乐的器具作为其异熟果（vipāka-phala，成熟的果报），因为快乐的器具只是增上果（adhipati-phala，增上缘的果报）。也就是说，各种快乐的器具是增上果而不是异熟果。为什么这么说呢？因为所有的快乐器具都可以与他人共同享用，而且在自己命终之后也不会消失损坏。也就是说，各种快乐器具可以与其他有情共同享用，而异熟果则必定没有与他人共同享用的道理，因为它属于自己的相续，不与他人共有。而且，各种快乐器具在自己命终之后，比如象、马等，仍然不会消失损坏，而异熟果则与身命俱在，身命如果不存在，它必定会消失损坏。所以，如果可爱的业没有乐受，就应该空无结果，这个道理是确定的。此外，因为有摄益（saṃgraha，滋养）的缘故，如果不存在乐受，那么诸根（indriya，感官）和大种（mahābhūta，四大元素）应该没有摄益。如果认为摄益是由各种有情分别境界所致，而不是由乐受所致，这个道理也是不成立的。应该知道摄益就像由苦受（duḥkha-vedanā，痛苦的感受）而有损害一样。此外，因为正确的加行（prayoga，努力）必定有结果，如果不存在乐受，那么正确的加行就应该空无结果。正确的加行应该以苦受作为异熟果，因为没有乐受的缘故，就像邪行（mithyācāra，错误的行为）必定以苦受作为异熟果一样。正确的加行应该以乐受作为异熟果，因为它们是相互违背的，就像光明与黑暗、影子与光亮等。此外，由于乐受会引发恶行（pāpakarma，不善的行为），如果不存在乐受，那么恶行就应该不存在。由于各种有情贪着乐受，从而引发各种恶行，感受苦受的果报。如果恶行不存在，就应该没有苦受。既然有苦受，那么恶行就不是不存在的。既然有恶行，就必定有乐受。此外，因为有法受（dharma-vedanā，法的感受）的缘故，就像契经（sūtra，佛经）所说，有四种法受：或者有法受是现在快乐而未来痛苦，或者有法受是现在痛苦而未来快乐，或者有法受是现在快乐而未来也快乐，或者有法受是现在痛苦而未来也痛苦。如果不存在乐受，那么法受就应该只有一种，不应该有四种。由于像这样的种种因缘，可以确定存在乐受。问：如果存在乐受，那么世尊（Bhagavān，佛陀）所说的违背乐受的经典有什么道理呢？答：有其他的道理。 现代汉语译本
English
Therefore, it can be definitively known that pleasurable feeling (sukha-vedanā) truly exists. Furthermore, virtuous actions should not be without result. If pleasurable feeling did not exist, all virtuous actions would be fruitless, because all virtuous actions definitely have pleasurable feeling as their result. It should also not be said that virtuous actions have pleasant objects as their resultant fruit (vipāka-phala), because pleasant objects are merely the dominant fruit (adhipati-phala). That is, pleasant objects are the dominant fruit, not the resultant fruit. Why is this so? Because all pleasant objects can be shared with others, and they do not perish after one's death. That is, pleasant objects can be shared with other sentient beings, but resultant fruits definitely cannot be shared with others, as they belong to one's own continuum and are not shared. Moreover, pleasant objects, such as elephants and horses, do not perish after one's death, whereas resultant fruits are concomitant with the body and life. If the body and life are absent, they definitely perish. Therefore, if virtuous actions did not have pleasurable feeling, they would be fruitless, which is definitively not the case. Furthermore, because of the benefit of nourishment (saṃgraha), if pleasurable feeling did not exist, the faculties (indriya) and the great elements (mahābhūta) would not have nourishment. If it is argued that nourishment is due to sentient beings distinguishing objects and not due to pleasurable feeling, this is also not reasonable. It should be understood that nourishment is like harm caused by painful feeling (duḥkha-vedanā). Furthermore, because correct effort (prayoga) definitely has a result, if pleasurable feeling did not exist, then correct effort would be fruitless. Correct effort should have painful feeling as its resultant fruit, because there is no pleasurable feeling, just as wrong conduct (mithyācāra) definitely has painful feeling as its resultant fruit. Correct effort should have pleasurable feeling as its resultant fruit, because they are mutually contradictory, like light and darkness, shadow and light. Furthermore, because evil actions (pāpakarma) arise from pleasurable feeling, if pleasurable feeling did not exist, evil actions would not exist. Because sentient beings are attached to pleasurable feeling, they engage in various evil actions and experience the result of painful feeling. If evil actions did not exist, there would be no painful feeling. Since there is painful feeling, evil actions are not non-existent. Since there are evil actions, there must be pleasurable feeling. Furthermore, because of the feeling of dharma (dharma-vedanā), as the sūtra (佛经) says, there are four feelings of dharma: some feelings of dharma are presently pleasant but later painful, some are presently painful but later pleasant, some are presently pleasant and later also pleasant, and some are presently painful and later also painful. If pleasurable feeling did not exist, there would only be one feeling of dharma, not four. Due to such various reasons, it can be definitively determined that pleasurable feeling exists. Question: If pleasurable feeling exists, what is the reason for the sūtras (契经) spoken by the Blessed One (Bhagavān) that contradict pleasurable feeling? Answer: There is a different reason. English version --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chinese
趣。且初经说。诸所有受无非苦者。当知彼经依三苦说。何谓三苦。一者苦苦。二者坏苦。三者行苦。若诸苦受由苦苦故。说名为苦。若诸乐受由坏苦故。说名为苦。若诸不苦不乐受由行苦故。说名为苦。如契经说。无常故苦。应知彼经有此理趣。 五事毗婆沙论卷下 现代汉语译本： 很有意思。而且最初的经文说，‘所有感受没有不是苦的’。应当知道那部经是依据三种苦来说的。什么是三种苦呢？第一种是苦苦，第二种是坏苦，第三种是行苦。如果各种苦的感受由于苦苦的缘故，被说成是苦。如果各种乐的感受由于坏苦的缘故，被说成是苦。如果各种不苦不乐的感受由于行苦的缘故，被说成是苦。如契经所说，‘因为无常所以是苦’。应当知道那部经有这样的道理。 《五事毗婆沙论》卷下
English
English version: It is interesting. Moreover, the initial sutra says, 'All feelings are nothing but suffering.' It should be known that that sutra speaks based on the three sufferings. What are the three sufferings? The first is suffering of suffering (苦苦, Kukkura), the second is suffering of change (坏苦, Viparinama-dukkha), and the third is suffering of conditioning (行苦, Sankhara-dukkha). If various painful feelings are said to be suffering because of the suffering of suffering. If various pleasant feelings are said to be suffering because of the suffering of change. If various neither-painful-nor-pleasant feelings are said to be suffering because of the suffering of conditioning. As the sutra says, 'Because of impermanence, there is suffering.' It should be known that that sutra has this principle. 《Pancasatika-vibhasa》, Volume 2 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------