English
In the first place there have been those Vedantic thinkers ( i ) who draw an initial distinction between Maya and avidya, and (ii) those that do not draw this distinction but insist upon the oneness of the principle of Nescience, maya or avidya. According to the first view, Mdyd is mUla-prakrti with the predominance of the attri¬ bute of Sattva(q&t() or Thought, and is the upadhi of Ihara, while avidya is the m&la-prakrti with the predominance of the attribute of rajas or Activity, and is the upadhi of Jiva. The former accounts for an objective order, subsisting in Ihara which is the world-soul, while the latter gives a subjective order or world of existence centred in Jiva, the individual soul. According to the second class of thinkers, however, a distinction is drawn, within avidya itself, between the avydkrta or un¬ manifested and the vydkrta or manifest state and thus is made possible the difference between IS vara and Jiva. Ihara is the consciousness reflected upon the former, unmanifest or causal state of avulyd, while Jiva is the consciousness reflected upon the manifest, actual state of avidya, i.e., the psychical mechanism ( antahkaranam ). According to a slight¬ ly different construction of this view, avidya admits of degrees or modifications, and, as such, Ihara is the primary Jiva with the totality of avidya, as upddhi while caitanyam with individual units or modes of one primal avidya as upadhi is Jiva. 324 A systematic study op The vedanTA Broadly speaking, these views may be classed under two heads: the One-soul theory or eka-jlva- vdda and the many-souls theory or aneka-jlvavada. The former is the view of those who hold avidya, or nescience to be one in principle, and accordingly maintain that Jlva is only one. It is Brahman apparently becoming Jlva through maya or avidya and sustaining in itself the entire manifold appear¬ ance including I&vara which constitutes its pre¬ sentation-continuum. This theory has been, on the ground of superficial similarity to the Brhaddranyaka simile of a prince reared by hunters in obliviscence of his royal descent, attributed to Samkara; but it is a mistake. Samkara frankly allows and accepts the hypothesis of manifold Jlvas or centres of experience from the empirical or practical point of view. Se¬ condly, the theory of many souls or Jlvas is accepted by those, like Vacaspati Mi6ra and others who accept that avidya, is manifold and consequently finite individuals or selves are not one but many. The world is the idea or creation of each Jlva or conscious subject. But the innate solipsism of such a stand¬ point is redeemed through the conception of ‘ inter- subjective intercourse ’ which suggests, reasonably enough, the conception of an objective order or a trans-subjective world. The Jlva no doubt imagines or constructs—subjectivity and objectivity being the twin products of the double-faced activity of ne¬ science—its own world, but it does ipso facto attain to a trans-subjective world. That is the implication of his famous dictum that maya or avidya, has Jlva for its locus and Brahman for its object ( nwfSnwT). JtVA AND JAGAT 325 Kindred herewith is the Vedantic distinction between the witnessing, self and the thinking- feeling-willing empirical self or individual (sforc) on which again, Vedantists are sharply divided. Here, however, it is to be remembered that Samkara- Vedanta scrupulously maintained the distinction between the two all through its various expositions. It originates in such famous Upanishadic texts as *srat%rcr forat Omqra’or ‘st w’f ...*pqts*- importing the ‘ spectator-theory ’ of consciousness which is unmistakably reminiscent of the Samkhya conception of Purusha and the ‘ I think ’ of Kant, posited as the logical presupposition of all experience in the finite souls. In the first place, we may proceed by way of a principal bifur¬ cation of ( i ) those that hold Jlva to be the sdkshi or witness and ( ii ) those who consider Brahman to be the sdkshi or witness. The former class, again, admits of a two-fold sub-division : (a) Those (c.g., Prakaiatmayati, the author of Vivarana) who view Jlva as a reflection of consciousness upon avidyd, which acts as its upddhi or limitation, and accord¬ ingly, is itself the direct witness, as being the all- pervasive consciousness. Vacaspati also shares this view, but with a difference of emphasis. Like the author of Vivarana, he also accepts the avidya-nnits to be the limiting conditions of consciousness. Consciousness thus limited is Jlva, while conscious¬ ness as witnessing this limiting condition itself is Sdkshi or the witness, while, according to the former, the witness or the sdkshi is one, as the Jlva is one, Vacaspati would, in strict consistency with 826 A systematic study op the vedInta his hypothesis of aneka-jivavada, posit a witnessing self or sakshl for each conscious unit or jiva. This seems to have been the authority in support of the outspoken multiplication of the Jlva-sakshi or the witnessing selves to which the author of the Vedanta- paribhdshd resorts, by way of substantiating very cogently the epistemological demand of personal identity on the basis of the unity of apperception.* But it must be remembered, after all, that according to Vacaspati it is the Jlva, and not Brahman, which is the sakshl or witness. ( b ) Those who regard the witness or sakshl to be the Jlva —not in the form of an all-pervasive intelligence—but Jlva as having the psychical apparatus or antahkaranam as its limiting adjunct. But it must not be confused with the Jlva which is also furnished with the inner organ (antahkaranam) as the sine qud non of perception on the ground that the percipient Jlva ceases in deep sleep, while the witnessing self or sakshl as an illuminating agency of the blank and bliss thereof, persists in the back¬ ground. The Vedantist, however, provides for the distinction between the two by way of a subtle dis¬ tinction between a predicate that is essential and intrinsic and a predicate that is non-essential and extrinsic—between videshaiia (fhSto* mj) or propriiim as the functioning adjunct in one case and up&dhi ( wfa ) or accidens in the other. As the Veddnta- paribhashd enforces this distinction : “ The Jiva is * swwt nrnr, tpirS 5 SwHwiwpnri*: —wwilii*: i JIVA AND JAGAT 3 21 verily consciousness modalised or differentiated by inner organ, while the jlva-sdkshl is consciousness limited or conditioned by the inner organ. Their difference is only due to the inner organ functioning respectively as an attribute or property (in one case) and as an accident or limitation (in the other).”* Similarly, as the Siddhdntaleia puts it, ‘ the jiva becomes the witness or sakshi as conditioned by the inner organ while the Jiva is the conscious subject as modified by the inner organ.f (ii) Now, as to those who hold Brahman to be the witness or sakshi. Here also, we have a sub¬ division. (a) Some think that the witness or sakshi is the livara or Brahman so far as it is the inmost being and is immanent in Jlvas (*rcrafeft). It is the principle that has nescience itself, pure blank or non-existence for its object in deep sleep. As the scriptures put it, the individual in deep sleep as being in the embrace of the universal self, verily like the husband in the embrace of a beloved wife, knows nothing without or within, f ( h ) Some again, e.g., the author of Pailcadail, think that the witness or sakshi is not livara but the absolute and immutable consciousness, under- t wim—fatm- $*•.—I. t awn fimsi fwn wfirewt r vrst ftN* ^ q mfrqfrirt sro jjrs’tmmi wlw ft *r vref foNnt*Brhad. Up., IV. 8. xzi. 328 A SYSTEMATIC STUDY OP THE VEDANTA lying all finer and gross bodies and perceiving them, without being in any way affected thereby.* We may, note, by the way, the distinction which the Vedantaparibhasha, draws, on the analogy of that between Jlva and Jlvasdkshl, between Thar a and Idvarasdkshl, the world-soul and the eternal consciousness operating in the universe as a whole. Idvarasdkshl, however, is consciousness conditioned or limited by Maya, and that is one. the condition¬ ing Mdyd itself being one. Consciousness modified or modal ized by mdyd is Paramedvara, the nature of Tdnara being constituted by Mdyd functioning as an attribute or property, and the nature of Idvarasdkshl by Maya functioning as an accident or condition— and it is thus the distinction is made between Idvara and Idvarasdkshl, not that there is distinction in their underlying essence or substance.t It is interesting to note the Vedantic conception of Hiranyagarbha (literally, full of the effulgence or splendour of knowledge within) which compares not unfavourably with the Kantian conception of Bewusstsein ilberhaupt or consciousness in general. It is sometimes also called Prana because of its im¬ manence in all creation and of being the animating principle of knowledge, will, and power. It is the # WB Vf yql n wfjftfli a: i—Paficada6i ‘Kutastha- dlpa,' 26. t H t v r fl g mranni... meu ft rt vtfKr: mn*MnrS t'wan tw- qiftsqtifc, *r 3 nfiWtftTOmSTfarft:— VedantaparibhSshd, Chapter I. JIVA AND JAGAT 329 cosmic counterpart of the Taijasa (the effulgent) which, as determined by the individual subtle body, is the subject of individual dream-consciousness. The Hiranyagarbha, on the other hand, otherwise denominated as the Sdtratma (literally, the con¬ scious principle that threads together all conscious¬ nesses), is determined by the cosmic dream-con¬ sciousness.