English
The sense-organ is only a different collo¬ cation of the object meant or designed for the recog¬ nition of its own nature.verily like a lamp.” It is this all-round living experience,—in which, as Bosanquet puts it so happily, a particular content of externality ‘ comes alive ’—steeped in feeling and throbbing with activity, that, after all, counts in the principle of individuation or creation. This is the meaning of individuality which Samkara has in view when he remarks, with pointed reference to his thesis of a ‘ steadily increasing manifestation of knowledge and power ’ * of a transcendent principle of unity ’ that it comes about through gradations (of excellence) in the psychical apparatus or the faculty of memory (which is the true principle of internality)4 It is, then, the chitto which is, * Bk. HI, Chap. TV., ♦ ftym wn n irtM yWwaftvfaA vmrifer iw.sftaq—II. iv. ll. t wnfk ftnwrct w rq ‘ a wqwwfomfiw ftt t JtVA AND JAG AT 311 according to Samkara, the true principium indivi- duationis; for, as he further expounds the doctrine, ‘ wherever we have Rasa (**n) chitta is there pre¬ supposed (as an operative agency); and wherever we have chitta, there is inferred, by reason of the communicative expansion (or sympathetic thrill) of such rasa, the fact of individuation.’* This very statement, at once revealing and far-reaching in its significance, when read in the context of the scrip¬ tural text, no less illuminating on the point,—that the Supreme Being or God is verily Ananda or Rasa (a term which is far more comprehensive), and having evoked or elicited this rasa, He realises ananda or enjoys His own being (^ ??: i nfi Nn r VagT’pft -gives us the pivotal principle of creation as conceived by Advaita-Vedanta. Excep¬ tion might be taken, however, to this presentation of Advaita-Vedanta, as being suspiciously similar to the Christian conception of God as Love and, therefore, flagrantly unorthodox—presumably an interpolation made by well-meaning apologists. Even admitting for argument’s sake that there was direct and conscious borrowing here, then there would be still sufficient excuse for it in as much as it has been made much better by such borrowing, and wrought so marvellously into the structure of the Advaita-Vedanta. Whatever explanation we may offer, it is there, and let us leave it at that. In spite of a full and frank recognition of the de facto claims of individuality in a philosophical 312 A SYSTEMATIC STUDY OP THE VEDlNTA reference, there is no denying the fact that there are copious other passages in Samkara-Vedanta that tend to discount the importance thereof. As a proof of Samkara’s bona-fides, reference might be made to the fundamental distinction he draws (e.g., in his commentary on II. ii. 17) between * svardpa ’ f^TCtr.) and ‘ sambandh&rUpa -■ of a finite individual, fortified by a clear enunciation or defini¬ tion. “ Verily, that being which is not dependent or conditional on some other being, is the very essence or individuality of a being. What is, how¬ ever, dependent on an Other is not the essence or individuality—for the simple reason of its extinction on the disappearance of that Other.”* If we may, in the light of this outspoken utterance of Samkara, we should, by the way, like to put up a plea for a re-interpretation of that celebrated quatrain in the Mohamudgara (lit., the club for disillusionment) which has always been interpreted to mean and preach unmitigated or rank individualism, cynicism or nihilism—in a word, a characteristically sneakish or cowardly shunning of the world of family and social duties. The word ’ in the fourth line of the verse (which reads as follows : (?p^ fonq nfef tiT 7 !*.), having a clearly metaphysical implication challenges and gives the lie direct to the pernicious turn that has been given to what is honestly meant to be an exhortation to assume a metaphysical frame of * to toW w w[, jut jtwt ; a sn&TfUf—Com. on Taittirtya Upantehad, Brahmananda VdUt, H. 8. JIVA AND JAGAT 318 mind. Moreover, the interpretation in question is flatly contradicted by an altogether gratuitous, if not a nugatory, form of accosting a fellowman as ‘ brother ’ in a context which is presumed to preach the gospel of cynical aloofness or self-centredness. If one, thus metaphysically disposed, cares to read between the lines, one will undoubtedly discover herein a vindication of that Transcendental Selfhood, or, if we may style it, a Transcendental Hedonism in and through the countless desires and attach¬ ments of everyday life—in strict accordance with the Orthodox teaching of Advaita-Vedanta—the very pith and marrow of which was conveyed in a moment of rapt philosophic contemplation by the sage Yajflavalkya to Maitreyl, his faithful consort, in words of undying memory. The characteristic refrain *3f *T sft WWTAI ^ fod qnfflra find trafa’ (i-e., all things and beings do not verily become dear to us for their own sake and for the sake of our desiring them, but they become dear for the sake, of the Self and Self alone whom we hold dear and desire in and through all our mani¬ fold desires), epitomising, as it does, the best meta¬ physics of love, represents all our human desires and affections and love in a transfigured light, effecting in the end a transvaluation of all values’ of life. There is undeniably, in Samkara a subdued tone of disparagement so far as he presents the case of individuality (sitarasf, as something adjectival (vfcffftiPiraf), or with the characteristic im¬ patience of the Absolutists, gives a grudging recog¬ nition to it. It might be contended, however, that 40 314 A SYSTEMATIC STUDY OP THE VEDANTA statements with regard to the finitude or limitation ( ) of Jtvas are simply, statements or judgments of fact and not judgments of value—im¬ porting explicit cr implicit disparagement. The contehtion is, indeed, plausible; but it does not go far enough to counteract the impression which his language is not unreasonably suggestive of. Let Samkara present his own case. Having rejected those existihg interpretations of the relation of Jim to the Supreme being which give quarter to ever so slight difference or difference and non-difference between the two, Samkara embraces the one spon¬ sored by KSiiakrtsna inasmuch as it is in keeping with the meaning of the famous text * thou art that.’* This he further pronounces to be the only authoritative interpretation acceptable to all Vedantists, viz., that the difference between the finite individual and the Absolute is not a metaphysical, constitutive, or real one, but is due to adjuncts in the form of body, etc., individualised and condi¬ tioned by avidyd. f That jwatva or individuality is due to an adjunct is further emphasised in a later section of the commentary on Veddnta-sutras (II. iii. 17) which leaves no room for doubt as to Samkara’s persuasions. “ This One Supreme Being has no intrinsic differentiations, as evidenced by the Sniti text ‘ One Supreme Lord, all-pervasive * Com. oq I. iv. 98, t win —Com. on 7 • 8*| la iv, 29b JIVA Alto JAGAT $15 and all-abiding as the Soul of all souls, lies hidden in all beings.” The appearance of its sundering (into many) is conditioned by (its association with) adjuncts like the apperceptive function (of the psychical mechanism), just as (there is the appear¬ ance of sundering) of space due to association or relationship with jars, etc.”* On account of this adventitious delimitation “ the one, Absolute Brahman, undifferentiated and integral in its own being, reveals -itself as made up of a plurality of conscious centres of experience. The (said) fact of its being so made up is (to be really understood as) the fact of its so appearing or being so reflected owing to the non-appearance or obscuration of the intrinsic nature (of that being) apart from its ap¬ parent or manifested nature in the same way as a contemptible fellow is called effeminate or uxori¬ ous. ”t All alleged incompatibility between the Sruti texts bearing on the question of creation of finite individuals ceases to exist, in Samkara’s opinions, on the clear enunciation of the principle that it is the undifferentiated Brahman that appears as Jlva or the finite individual (*rf*T8t?refa STBPift lOTPQtPTtnq). That the Jwa does appear, Samkara * urn vftwm: i ‘vafr ta: t m varfaiavi sajsdarailamnfinwsi ftfimwwwfimw i qyrowiHWrt aim wiftaa sctih —Com. on V. 8. II. iii. 17.. 316 A SYSTEMATIC STUDY OP THE VEDANTA does not indeed pretend to deny; but he says that we do not presume to know how it is exactly that the Absolute appears as the Jiva, a finite individual. When faced with such an impending deadlock, our only availing resource is to fall back upon figurative expressions or ‘ myths ’ in the Platonic sense. Sanakara does not indeed shun this highway through which humanity has travelled for ages. He is also seen frequently employing the simile of space and its parts, or of the Sun and its reflections (vide the stitra ! H<WT in. ii. 18). In one place (in his commentary on Brhadaranyaka Upanishad, ii. 1) he seems to be favouring the allegory of the prince, carried away by forest-rangers or hunters and brought up in such ignoble associa¬ tions, coming to learn accidentally about his royal descent and thus regaining his intrinsic royalty—a view which was popularised later by SureSvara of the Advaita Vedanta School.* Thus, our birth into this world of diversity is but ‘ a sleep and forgetting ’ of the ‘ imperial palace ’ from whence we came.