English
As it has been observed : * Those that are mentally inefficient, incapable of imme¬ diately experiencing the supreme indeterminate Brahman, represent [It] through specific deter¬ minations ; and when, by reason of (constant) asso¬ ciation with saguna Brahman, their minds are brought under control there ensues the immediate experience of the same Being divested of all imagin¬ ary limits.”* Whatever be the particular status oi I6vara or Saguna Brahman in the system of Vedanta, and whatever the relation in which it stands to the Absolute or Brahman, this much is certain that they are not the two aspects of one and the same being, as is sometimes supposed. In the system of Samkara-Vedanta, a reality that has two sides or aspects or is the union of contradictories fails ipso facto to pass for the highest reality. Such a union of contradictories, as we have seen in a previous refer¬ ence, can give us at best an empirical reality. Pile up your relativities or aspects as you may, you never rise on the stepping-stones of the relative to the * f nforarnu WMbararereupraSg: i nr to i ’aftent torml i ISVABA AND BRAHMAN 249 Absolute. Hence the Kantian criticism of the Cosmological or the Teleological argument on the score of its ever falling short of establishing an In¬ finite or Absolute is quite to the point. Although Bradley is in agreement with Samkara on the point that to think the Absolute is to bring it down to the level of the relative and the finite, Bradley seems, in spite of the hesitating language he employs on the question, to be in favour of construing the Absolute as a systematic unity of differentiated particulars. But Samkara is uncompromising on that question. His Absolute is the Nirguna Brahman which is absolutely transcendent and undifferentiated () —transcending the compass of all philosophy and all discursive thought. Now, we are in a position to tackle the question of upaddnakaranam ( ) or causa mate¬ rials and nimittakdranam ( frfilTOfTOP! ) or causa efficiens in the system of Samkara-Yedanta. At the very outset one has to accept cum grano salis an unqualified dictum like the following: “ Every¬ where Samkara has repeatedly declared Brahman to be—* ;—that is to say, his Brahma is to be regarded in both of its aspects, i.c., Brahma’s transcendency and immanence are inseparable ( ) aspects.’’* “ Brahman is both the efficient cause and material cause of the world. ”f It is true that Sarnkara dees stand committed to such a con¬ struction so far as he has made the unambiguous * Pandit Kokileawar Sastri: Advaita Philosophy, p. 5. t Ibid, p. 4. 32 250 A SYSTEMATIC study of the vedinta statement: “ Brahman is to be admitted as a material as well as an efficient cause.”* For the sake of precision, he ought to have substituted the word ‘ IfSvara ’ for ‘ Brahman ’; but, as we have seen, Samkara uses this pair of terms as well as the other pair, Maya, and Avidya, rather indiscriminate¬ ly, perhaps not to< leave the faintest shadow of a dualism or duality in his advaita (non-dualistie) metaphysics. But there is hardly any room for doubt that he here means ‘ Isfoara ’ as is clearly evident from his commentary on the Chandot/ya Upanishad (III. xiv. 2) where he says : ‘‘The highest Brahman becomes the lower T6vara through associa¬ tion with a pure limitation ( fq^iJifviWWUl) when one conceives of it.” This meaning or stand¬ point of the master becomes increasingly apparent in the Neo-Vedantic School, beginning with his immediate disciples and reaching down in apostolic succession to Dharmarajadhvarindra, the author of the Vedanta-paribhasha. Sureiwar Acaryya, for example, brings out the true sense in which the master’s utterance, which is admittedly somewhat cryptic, is to be construed. Says he in Bis famous Varttika : *' Brahman is called the material cause of this cosmic panorama (of duality) [by implica¬ tion] or by way of the support of Nescience which is (directly) the material cause of the tout ensemble of duality.”t Hence there is justification for super- • wmuiuu’w ft flranwi —Com. on V.S., L iv. 23. t Stowiw i TOrt Hit • ISVAliA AND B1UIIMAN 251 seding the letter of Sainkara’s commentary in favour of the spirit thereof, and it becomes the more im¬ perative if we try to comprehend the true significance of Samkara’s dictum, as we needs must, in the light of the progressive differentiation in later Vedanta Schools of the metaphysical issues involved in this very problem. Instead of pursuing the distracting varieties of opinion obtaining in the Neo-Vedantic school on this specific question, we shall content ourselves with a few typical ones. The first important view one encounters in this connection, is that of Vacaspati MiSra who holds Brahman (which is, in his opinion, the object of Nescience*) to be the material cause of this empirical world of plurality (jpren), Maya, bejng only an auxiliary Strictly, in accord¬ ance with his own view of the relation between Jiva and Brahman, Vacaspati ought to have said, as it was later pointed out by Brahmananda Sara swat! and Madhusudana, that it is not Brahman but Jiva, (as the real support of Avidya) that is the material cause of the empirical order or, rather, Jiva asso¬ ciated with Avidya is the material cause—and this position does not conflict with that of the Scriptures purporting to hold Brahman as the causa materialis in as much as there is, transcendentally speaking, no difference between Jiva and Brahman .f Amala- * In accordance with his view that Maya is centred in Jiva and has Brahman for its object (nun ehrotr mnfeqoi). 252 A kvktkmatic study of this vedanta nanda, the celebrated autlior of the Vedanta-kalpa- taru and a staunch supporter of the Bhdmatl, takes exception to this construction of Vacaspati's utter¬ ances on the point. He seems to be favouring a far too literal construction of g a mkara’s original state¬ ments on the problem, so far as he re-aflirms that Brahman is the material cause, Avklyd as inhering in Jlva being the instrumental cause of the world. The position is buttressed by the classic analogy of the ‘ rope-serpent ’ illusion. In point of fact what appears as the serpent is the rope, the real sub¬ stratum of the illusion. As the rope affords the material of the illusion, our ignorance serving in an instrumental relation thereto, or as a contributory cause, so the matter of the manifold is Brahman, the ignorance innate in Jlva being instru¬ mental thereto. The next in importance is the view of Sarvajfiatmamuni (about 900 A.D.), a professed follower and adherent of Samkara’s views, who adopts a similar position in his SamkshepaMnraka so far as he holds the absolute Brahman or Being- in-itself to be the material cause of the entire mani¬ fold of existence, there being no other Reality be¬ sides it. He adds the proviso, however, that the Being-in-itself, which cannot eo ipso be the cause of this manifold, can nevertheless serve in that causal capacity, indirectly, as it were, through Mayd. Such a view is, however, strongly contest¬ ed by those who hold that Brahman or Consciousness in its integrity can have no relation to anything and, as such, must be strictly non-relative, absolute or transcendent. This is the view which has been held in a modified form by PrakaMtmayati (almost ISVABA AND liHAllMAN 253 1200 A.D.), the author of Vivarana, and in an uncompromising and radical form by Prakdsdnanda, the author of Vedanta-sidilMnta-muktavali, the former holding Bralmian as conditioned by Mdyd, i.c., Isvara (and not pure Caitanya), to be the material cause of the empirical order—a veritable accident on the part of Brahman (gre a gr ra r), while the latter roundly conceiving Mdyd to be the material cause of the manifold, Brahman as a tran¬ scendent principle being prhna facie incapable of entry into the relation of cause and effect. The author of the Paddrthatattvanirnaya regards Brah¬ man and Maya to be the material cause—the world being a reflection (fa^rT:) of Brahman and a trans¬ formation or evolution ( ) of Mdyd* VUlydranya (about .1350 A.D.) again (who is generally identified with Madbava); field that Is vara is the material cause of the objective, while Jiva is the cause of the subjective world. Of the many interesting variations and developments of this pro¬ blem in later Advaita-Vedanta that are dealt with extensively by Apyayadlkshita (about 1530 A.D.) in his Siddhantalesa, we select the following as being an interesting and important one, viz., that the gross objective world, e.j., the sky, is the transformation of Mdyd as supported by Is vara who is, therefore, the material cause of the universe, while the subtle world of mind, etc., is the evolute or effect of the * tare ; wt ^ qftnufawT tnnuu ^ irero wspiwi i ^rfroi- qfi wWUKW Siddhantaleia, i. 254 A SYSTEMATIC STUDY OP THE VEDlNTA Avidya inherent in Jlva which, again, is the product of the great elements created or evolved by the Maya inhering in Brahman and thus there is joint material eausality here.* As a final statement of the Advaita position with regard to this question, refer¬ ence may be made to the conclusive—the latest as well as the most authoritative—coftiments offered by Dharmarajcidhvanndra (about 1550 A.D.) in the VeddV'ta'-paribtoashd by way of rounding up the dis¬ cussion on this very topic in words to the following effect: “ Nor is it to be maintained that it is Brahman which is the material cause of the universe. Tenable, however, is the representation (of Brah¬ man, as the substratum or locus of' this cosmic ap¬ pearance), but the formless or indivisible Brahman as the transforming material cause (of the universe) is (intrinsically) untenable or inadmissible.