English
That such a subjective idealism of the pluralistic type has its own besetting difficul¬ ties cannot be gainsaid. For example, as the critics of Vacaspati have pointed out, there still lurks the same fallacy from the grips of which he sought to extricate the master. But, Vacaspati might dispose of the objection by insisting on the co-existence of avidya and jiva without any temporal priority on the part of the one over the other. They are the equal partners of a joint partnership; and, although there may be logical interdependence between the two, it is'in no sense vicious. Following in the footsteps of the master, lie might press the very same remarks which Samkara made by way of rebutting the alleged fallacious inter-dependence between Karma and A SYSTEMATIC STUDY OP THE VEDANTA Creation : ‘ On the hypothesis of beginninglessness there is no fallacy in arguing out the case after the manner of the relation between the seed and the sprout.’* Sarpkara, however, would repudiate all such improvisations and apologetics. From his point of view the alleged hopeless predicament is a purely gratuitous one, and can easily be got rid of by ab¬ juring all futile attempts to encompass fully the nature of avidya. God-and-the-world-of-created- beings is some thing ultimate, an irreducible duality indispensable for our epistemology. To seek to trace the origin of avidya, from something more funda¬ mental is, as Samkara pointed out by way of anti¬ cipating Kant, to make the transcendent use of an empirical category. In Sarnkara’s metaphysics such a pretentious enquiry is perpetually placed under a ban. The charge is so often laid at the door of Saipkara’s philosophy that it fails to account for the realm of appearances or Maya itself. Well, as Saipkara might equally urge in the very words of Inge, the world of names and forms, this Maya, is a solid fact which we have to accept as such, and not to account for. Our business is on the stage and we get none the wiser by peeping behind the screen. In short, Maya, or Avidya, is merely the admission of the fact of individuation, but is no explanation there¬ of. It only co-exists with ttvara and is co-eternal therewith as being a Sakti (*!%•,) of Paramesvara. But how it can co-exist with Brahman is a matter which passes human comprehension, and is accord- BIIAHMAN AND MAYA 237 ingly styled ‘ inexplicable ’ ( ). Then, m the next place, the equation of Maya. and A vidya in Samkara is no lapsus calami, but a studied one, emerging from his system as a whole. Even on granting that Maya, and A vidya are primarily objec¬ tive and subjective in reference respectively, it must yet be acknowledged that the two arc, from the stand¬ point of an Absolute Idealism such as Samkara’s, the distinguishable but strictly inseparable elements of one undivided whole. They are, in the end, the twin aspects of one and the same principle of self- heterisation of Brahman, Gaitanyam ( ) or the Absolute. What Sainkara is hinting at by this indiscriminate use of Maijd and Avidya is that the phenomenal self ( sftcp, ) and the phenomenal world ( ) are strictly correlative aspects of one and the same principle, which is as much subjective as objective, as much individual as universal, as much psychological as ontological. Summarily, we may note here that Samkara in this conception of Maya or Avidya avoids as much the pitfalls of Mentalism as of Materialism'. Further, what he seeks herein to establish is the non-duality () between Brahman and the world as based on a transcendental analysis of causation. It is fundamentally wrong to label Samkara’s position in this regard as ‘ abstract monism,’ or to compare it, in conformity with the spirit thereof, to a ‘ lion’s den ’ that swallows up all the traces of particular facts of experience. As we have already seen (in connection with our elabora¬ tion of the notion of and treatment of the Dialectic of Causation), Samkara is far from imply¬ ing hereby the identity of Brahman and the world A SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF THU VEDANTA as such, but is only seeking to deny the existence of the world apart from Brahman. Advaitism is not monism or singularism —it is only the state¬ ment of what it is, viz., the denial of duality or affirmation of ‘ not-tironess,’ as Edmond Holmes has truly grasped the distinction, and oriented it to Western thought. Following in the wake of the commentator who repudiated this possible misconstruction of his position in the most em¬ phatic terms—“ What is sought to be established is the non-existence of a being (in the effect) other than that of the cause, and not their absolute identity ( wcron gqg* #*nfwniN) the Ycdantic thinkers have untiringly harped on the same theme, c.g., Vacaspati Misra commenting on the position in the Bhamati thus : “ Verily we do not mean by ‘ ananyatvnm ’ affirmation of identity or oneness, but we only denied difference’ fa ^FTOcST- fawft? snffam). Anandagiri affirming in his scholium: “ it is only by way of the denial of in¬ dependence or difference, and not of the suggestion of identity ’ ’ ( .* g ). Finally, the frank admission of the inexplicable or indescribable nature of Maya is not to be construed as an unconditional surrender to that cheap scepti¬ cism or agnosticism, which stands self-condemned. If it is to be called a scepticism at all, it must be designated an enlightened one, which is the befitting attitude of a philosophic inquirer before questions pertaining to first beginnings. LECTURE YTTI. Is VARA AND BRAHMAN .* GOD AND THE ABSOLUTE. If, according to Samkara, Kvara is but Brah¬ man invested with Maya, and Maya, as the matrix of names and forms ( ) is to be construed in an ultimate reference ns the sakti or power of Idvara, the determination of the locus or modus exist endi of Maya becomes a question of first-rate philosophic importance. It may indeed be pertinently enquired —How is the existence of this indescribable mdya known at all?—Where does it inhere, or whose is this nescience or ajnana ? Such are the queries that must inevitably crop up, although all such questions relating to mdyd or avidyd have been perforce inter¬ dicted as bristling with dialectical difficulties. Samkara, it must be confessed, has not taken up these questions seriatim and answered them proper¬ ly. But these have been taken up in right earnest by his philosophic successors, who had to meet the criticisms of dialecticians of rival schools of philoso¬ phical thought. These may not have been always quite illuminating from the philosophical point of view. But they cannot be ignored all the same. As regards the manifesting agency of avidyd, it has been held by the Advaitasiddhi, for example, that it is the object, not of pure consciousness but of consciousness as witness ( ), it being manifested by the consciousness which it 240 A SYSTEMATIC study OP THE VEDANTA veils, verily as the mythical Rahu (or the eclipsing agency) is shown forth by the Sun which it eclipses (*ri*n fft) • As an ob ject of knowledge, therefore, it is real and positive in character,—its reality being only of an adventitious character, liable to be suhlated by knowledge of Truth. As CitsukM puts it: ‘ avidya is a begin¬ ningless positive entity which is destroyed by knowledge ’ As such it is not absolute Reality and its existence is inferred from its effects even as heat is inferred as the power of fire ufamklfa- Broadly speaking, it is Brahman, the ab¬ solutely Real, that is the locus, substratum or illumi¬ nating agency of maya or avidya. But as trans¬ cendent, there can be no mayd or avidya in Brah¬ man. As enveloped by, or as exercising this power ( JTTOTUfw:), Brahman becomes phenomenalised and relative. It ceases to be the Absolute and becomes Ihara or Personal God or even the Saguna Brahman jhj). So far as we are in the region of logic and dialectic, the region of the dvaita the highest category is undoubtedly this determinate Ihara, strictly correlative to the world of names and forms ( ), whether evolved or at least charged with a nisus towards evolution and mani¬ festation. But above and beyond these looms the silent background of a still higher irrelative Reality, the indeterminate Brahman ( fag*nt 9 W ),—the white canvas on which there is the interplay of light *1. i. 18. t Paltgadaii. IS VARA AND BRAHMAN 241 and shade, of change and mutation, of creation and destruction. The Spinozistic natura naturans, which is strictly correlative to natura naturata, is not the ultimate principle—the Absolute, the Indeter¬ minate, characterless Brahman ( nirguna Brahman) n the Samkarite sense—but is only the I&vara or personal God relative to, and immanent in, the world. Samkara is uncompromising with regard to the transcendent nature of Nirguna Brahman, the ultimate Reality—transcending all predication and discursive thinking. With a Bradleyan emphasis, Samkara rules out the claim of thought to over-reach the distinction of subject and object, and reconstruct the Absolute which must for all times lie on the other side of thought—behind the subject-object relation which is ultimate for thought. The relation between Samkara’s Brahman and I& vara has, indeed, proved a hard nut to crack to ( many oriental scholars of note, Deussen and Max Muller not excepted. Isvara is admittedly the highest in the realm of the finite existence, albeit finite, relative and phenomenal—an * appearance ’ in Bradley’s sense. It is the God of religious con¬ sciousness and Avorship ; and thus ‘ with this admit¬ ted imperfection ’ in our notion of God ‘ our religion is saved.’* True it is that ‘ we must needs love the highest’—but on condition that ‘we see it.’ Verily ‘ no man can see God’s face and live.