English
To that end we * wrm srofa asnfa g qflq *r sn?' snr gwraaur i vruug iminraw* i i ^nfr tt* *it *r jww—C om, on V.S. 1. 1 . iv, 130 A SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF THE VEDANTA have got to make a distinction beween evidence and certitude, which very nearly corresponds to that between pramdna an d prama (tot) . ‘ -Evi¬ dence,’ as the etymology of the word shows,' is simply ‘ bringing to light ’ or manifestation of ob¬ jective truth; certitude is the result of reflection. Evidence, in other words, is a quality of objects known, certitude—a state of the subject knowing. The essential conditions of the criterion of truth may be summed up as follows : in the first place, it must be intrinsic. It is mainly negative in signifi¬ cance and application—meant to exclude the cri¬ terion of Traditionalists or Dogmatists. In its in¬ sistence on anubhava ( ) or experience in its integrity as the terminus ad qaem of all Sruti- pramdnyam or scriptural authority, the Advaita-Vedanta has forced into prominence the essence of intrinsic evidence. Secondly, it must be objective. It is meant to combat the criterion of the pragmatists and subjectivists in general. Des¬ cartes’ criterion of ‘ clearness and distinctness of perceptions’ or Spencer’s test of ‘ the inconceiv¬ ability of the opposite’ come under this ban. Clear¬ ness or distinctness of perceptions or its opposite does in no way add to or detract from the determi¬ nate nature of truth which is independent of all such variations in apprehension. Spencer also errs in basing the truth of an idea on subjective incon¬ ceivability. An idea is true not because its con¬ tradictory is inconceivable, but its contradictory is inconceivable because it is true. It is interesting to note that Samkara has, in his searching analysis of the Mimamsaka criterion of truth, expressed his AN APPROACH THROUGH EPISTEMOLOGY 187 own view in no uncertain terms. Truth or “ the knowledge of the real nature of things does not de¬ pend on subjective apprehension.the true knowledge of all the things (or accomplished facts) depends on the things themselves.”* The third or the last condition attaching to the criterion of truth is that it should be immediate. This condition only reinforces the first, emphasising only the unde- rivate and self-validating character of the criterion. It has come in for a whole-hearted recognition in the logic of the Vedanta which affirms, in connec¬ tion with the problem of pramdnyam, that the ‘ cri¬ terion of truth is dependent on the general condi¬ tions of knowledge and does not presuppose any extra quality or condition, for truth (of whatever kind it may be) does not reveal the presence of any such invariable condition.’f This directly points to the moot question whether the criterion of truth (irujpgq) is immediate (ign: ) or mediate (tWK). The VeddntaparibMsha begins by splitting up the question into two subdivisions : svatastvam, (WTOP() or immediacy or paratastvam ), first, as regards its generation (Hipfaj) and second¬ ly, as regards its apprehension fafHj). It is deci¬ sively of opinion that the evidentiary value of all the six recognised sources of knowledge is generated as well as known immediately. Thus, the criterion of * u sjarogurtNq muiNf — Com. on V.8.1. r. ii. t un (mwtf) NmwwewO wN u g ufW NguugNiNTUiq— Ved&nta-paribh&eha, Chap. VI, 18 138 A' SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF THE VEDANTA truth is defined as the form of knowledge which, as comprehending both apprehension and memory, prompts an activity that ends in fruition or har¬ mony, and has the same form as the object (of knowledge) has. It is also known immediately. To be known immediately means knowledge in virtue of those (minimum) conditions which reveal its own substratum, there being all the while the absence of any defect (such as doubt, etc.).* The Ved’ftntio cri¬ terion of truth, thus delineated, has all the three aforesaid conditions, viz., intrinsicness, immediacy and objectivity '() which is evidently realistic in significance—and has another in addition, viz., ‘harmony with experience’ which, however, is pragmatic in conception. The pragmatic or realistic test of truth embodies only a half-truth, and a half-truth is necessarily distorted into untruth when taken as the whole truth. The Samkara-Vedanta criterion of truth has the merit of incorporating into itself the complementary half- truths enshrined by each, and thus goes beyond both pragmatism and realism as philosophical radicals. Thus, following the approach through Episte¬ mology we are led to the threshold of Vedantic meta¬ physics, and to a tentative formulation of the final object or end of our quest. “ Philosophy, we saw,” as says Bradley, “ was a search for that which in * vwymwl wwwrt nwN ’em v* 'srrpro^, vra* v i awfvww- gwwwrt Tirfir wmrov i vnrft * srortf u: i wfr starort — Ved&nta-paribhdh&, Chap. VI, AN APPROACH THROUGH EPISTEMOLOGY 1901 the end is true. And we observed that so for as a man stands outside of this pursuit, it cannot in the end justify its existence against him. He may de¬ cline to some extent at least, to enter into the pur¬ suit.but if he enters on it and so far as he en¬ ters on it, he commits himself inevitably to a tacit assumption.”* Now, the ‘ assumption ’ in ques¬ tion, so far as Samkara is concerned, is ‘ the general assumption or current notion regarding Brahman as being of the nature of self ’ ( an atam and this specific object of our quest ( dfesjtf Rf?T ) about which there are so many con¬ tradictory opinions (fanfaHTT.) gives the impulse to philosophical inquiry, so that the vague, incipient knowledge of the supreme object of our inquiry may be consummated in an integral experience O’ffjjVTN:), a felt totality, a higher immediacy or ‘ knowing and being in one, ’ which is ‘ the ultimate goal of our knowledge and of every endeavour.’t * Essays on Truth and Reality, pp. 15-16. t Ibid, p. 281, LECTUBE V Analysis of Experience If knowledge presupposes ‘ desire ’ and conse¬ quently the ‘ search ’ for it, the search itself pre¬ supposes, in a certain sense, the knowledge, how¬ ever vague, of that object of desire or search. No one would evidently care to search or strive for a possession unless he was sure that he could ascertain when the possession in question was or was not secured. All search, therefore, is possible on the assumption of the prior existence of the object of search, which is in no way staked, or contingent upon my activity of search; and search for know¬ ledge forms no exception to this general law. Ac¬ cordingly Samkara observes that it is impossible to establish by any piece of reasoning the introduction of such a Brahman or the knowledge thereof into action. Nor, again, is there the introduction of Brahman into action as an object of the activity of •knowing.’* All seeking, thus, is in a sense a find¬ ing and an implicit possession of the thing sought for; and ' the readiness to seek is already something of an attainment even if a poor one.’t In the * w mnfts gwn hh: iippt i w "w ^TwTfpproT mrw:— Com. on V.S ,1. 1. iv. t Boyce, The World and the Individual , Vol. I, p. 181. ANALYSIS OF EXPERIENCE 141 cryptic language of the scriptures, the Ao'yos or ‘ the Word ’ which ‘ was in the beginning and was with God ’ and even ‘ was God,’ Himself, is ‘ made flesh.’ Now the point of epistemological import¬ ance revealed by the desire to know is that there is no absolute beginning of truth; the pursuit of truth is only a case of progressive initiation. The pursuit of truth to which philosophy stands pledged, is not progress from sheer error or ignorance to complete knowledge or truth, but it is knowledge in progress. In reference to the general acknow¬ ledgment that Brahman is to be enquired into firc n feflg pt), Samkara impresses this truth on our minds by way of a significant query: ‘ Is the Brahman (thus described) known or not known (prior to the philosophic inquiry proposed to be undertaken) ? If it is known,, it need not be enquired into; if not known, it cannot be enquired into.’* Reference might also be made to the familiar couplet fashioned in the same key: ‘ the supreme principle being known, the study of Brahman is useless; the supreme principle being unknown, the study of Brahman is equally useless.’t What we may conveniently note here, in passing, is that the dilemmatic dialectic employed by daipkara is unmistakably reminiscent of its precur¬ sor in the Madhyamika school, specially of Nagdr >- sfow" Com. on V.S., I. 1. i. t ftwft toth firqraii mutt flPWTI 142 A SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF THE VEDANTA juna, the celebrated Buddhist dialectician of the first century A. D. The Sainkara-Vedanta dialec¬ tic was later revived and consolidated by Sreeharsha (about 1190 A.D.) in his famous polemical treatise, KhandanakhandakMdyam (), which had made the dialectical part ( yfflbT?: ) of Sarpkara’s commentary its settled point of depart- ture. Now, we have an analogue of this dialectical form of argument in the Meno. The Socratic pro¬ fession of ignorance of the nature of virtue is readily met by Meno with the objection: ‘ ‘ How will you enquire into that which you do not already know? What will you put forth as the subject of the enquiry? And if you find what you want, how will you recognise that this is the thing which you did not know? ” “ I see what you mean,” answers Socrates, ” but consider what a troublesome dis¬ cussion you are raising. You argue that a man cannot enquire either into that which he knows or into that which he does not know; for if he knows, he has no need to enquire, and, if not, he cannot enquire, for he does not know the very subject about which he has to enquire.