English
The characterisation of Reality as mere Being stands self-condemned, so far as it fails to excite our interest in it and stimu¬ late an intellectual curiosity. The mere ‘ that ’ of existence does not satisfy us; we ask invariably : ‘ what ’ is ‘ that ’ ?—and this ‘ what ’ that sup¬ plements the mere ‘ that ’ meets the strictly philo¬ sophic demand. Hence, there is the mention of Ananda (jtpp^O in order to indicate the presence of a value or a ‘ good ’ in Brahman as something * Essays on Truth and Reality, pp. 18, 8. t nwmfnfv i Com. on V.S. 1.1. ia 124 A systematic study OP THE VEDANTA ultimate ( rcrI).* * * § Nor is the term cit (f^l) (as occurring in the definition of Brahman as Saccidanandam) devoid of meaning; for what it signifies is that it is ananda ( ), known as such, that alone can figure as a human end or good ( * ...ira9TPn<mHr Or, as the Bhdmati carries this thought a step further, Ananda and its expression are one and the same ).t All values, 'n this sense, are conscious values. Now, if truth has a value, and value is to he •measured, as some contend, by the satisfaction it affords, we are sure to he deflected from the path of truth-seeking. ‘ What we mean by value in the world,’ says Lotze, ‘ lies wholly in the feeling of satisfaction or of pleasure which we experience from it.Lotze then proceeds to escape from the covert subjectivism or egoistic hedonism of such a concep¬ tion of value by the somewhat baffling addition that ‘ desire, for one’s own pleasure should not be one’s motive.’§ But his philosophy stands to the last unredeemed of this inherent subjectivism. In point of fact satisfaction connotes something more than what is conveyed by pleasure and pain as pas¬ sive states of the soul. Satisfaction is strictly * From Sikhamani a commentary on Vedantapari- bhashd, Chap. I. t On Saipkara’s Com. on Y.S. I. 1. i. { Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion (tr, by Cony- beare), p. 128. § Ibid, p, 126* AN APPROACH THROUGH EPISTEMOLOGY 125 inseparable from conation or effort, and it ensues upon the attainment of some ‘ good ’ (). Values, therefore, represent our sustained purposes or ends ( ), and imply the satisfaction, not of every passing or chance desire, but of the abiding and deep-seated ones. Truly speaking, the essence of values does not lie in satisfaction, although the inseparable connection of the two gives rise to this presumption. In the technical language of logic, satisfaction may be called the proprium of value. Value, according to Bosanquet, lies deeper and is not conferred by de facto satisfying a conation, but is in ‘ satisfactoriness ’ rather than ‘ satisfaction ’ —in the character of completeness and positive non¬ contradiction which gives the power to satisfy conations because it belongs to what unites all reali¬ ty in itself. This is, indeed, a thorny point in the present-day discussions on the nature of values. It is rather hazardous to predict the net result of such discussions; but this much is certain that these will not follow the lead of the purely subjective or psychological rendering of values, given by the writers of the Austrian school, Meinong and Ehrenfels, who end by making the values matters of satisfaction or pleasurable feeling. Accordingly, idealistic writers, like Bosanquet, combat this psy¬ chologizing of values, and substitute ' satisfactori¬ ness ’ for ‘ satisfaction ’ as being the only satisfac¬ tory method of ensuring the objectivity, and for the matter of that, a philosophy, of values. But the remedy of crass subjectivism or psychologism in the treatment of values^ which Bosanquet has provided 126 A SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF THE VEDANTA in this prescript of his, turns out to be as bad as the disease itself. His is only an escape from the devil of subjectivism into the deep sea of abstractionism. It is his absolutistic logic which has been justly viewed with suspicion,—as being largely responsi¬ ble for the discredit into which his treatment of values has fallen. His distinction of ‘ satisfac¬ tion ’ from ‘ satisfactoriness,’ along with a con¬ centration on the latter, is evidently modelled on the logical detachment of the content and structure of truth from the concrete whole of experience. But the abstraction which is permissible, and is in¬ deed indispensable in logic or any of the special sciences, becomes meaningless in the wider context of philosophy. Values, where persons are not—can there be, as rightly argued by a recent critic, a greater contradiction? Is not a depersonalised value,—and that is exactly what ‘ satisfactori¬ ness ’ amounts to,—a Werth an sich or ‘ value-in- itself ’ as much of a caput mortuum as the Ding an sich or ‘ thing-in-itself ?’ But in all fairness to Bosanquet it must be admitted that he seems to be on the true line of advance so far as he treats the idea of purpose as a finite category—as ‘ a psycholo¬ gical, temporal and ethical idea ’*—and disqualifies it in its application to the whole or the Absolute. Like Bosanquet, ^atnkara too argues from the ‘ teleology of finite consciousness ’ with its inevit¬ able shortcomings to the inadmissibility of purpose * Bosanquet, Principle of Individuality and Value, p. 217. AN APPROACH THROUGH EPISTEMOLOGY 127 or prayojanam (uqtaroj) in a narrower sense, as a principle of cosmic interpretation. It is well known how Satnkara strenuously fights against the ascription of ‘ purpose ’ to Brahman in the sense of ‘ desire for something as yet un¬ attained,’ in so far as it has the patent label of fini- tude upon it, and also conflicts with the scriptural description of Brahman as of ‘ realised pur¬ pose ’ . The same ban is extended, as a matter of course, to the feeling of ‘ satisfaction ’ which is but the correlate of purpose. Nor can the mere desire to know ( ) have, as such, any value whatsoever, far less serve as the criterion of truth in Samkara’s opinion. He is definitely of the opinion that the desire in question is the totum, the whole process from its subjective inception right up to the attainment of the desired object. As it has been aptly remarked, the verb ‘ desiring,’ unlike other transitive verbs, wherein the object and the result are separable, does not admit of a like separa¬ tion of ‘ the object of desire ’ from * the result of desire;’ for example, so far as the transitive verb of * reaching ’ in the proposition * I am reaching home “ (i&i a reg r fa ) is concerned, * the house ’ is the ‘ object ’ of ‘ reaching ’ and the arrival at home its ‘ result.’ When, I say, however, that ‘ I desire to know Brahman,’ Brahman is the object of desire, and the knowledge of Brahman is the result of such desire. The knowledge (), Here spoken of, may stand either for the process, or the product, or both. Now, the * desire ’ can as little be separated from * Brahman,’ as ‘ Brahman ’ 128 A SYSTEMATIC STUDY OP THE VEDANTA from ‘ the knowledge of Brahman ’ (* Desire ’ ■= ‘ Knowledge of Brahman ’ = ' Brahman ’). All are thus parts of one integral whole. It is this tdtum simul. this knowledge of Brahman, that is, accord¬ ing to gamkara, the unit of value ( g?STnrn:) and, as such, it is necessarily imperso¬ nal. involving no reference to the actual attainment of this knowledge hy some particular individual. This does not, however, obliterate all reference to human desire or attainment; for it is in the verv nossihilitv of its being desired or achieved—what Bosanouet would call its * satisfactoriness ’ and Samfcara would denominate it's ‘ desirability ’ —that the essence of value consists. But satisfaction which results, as the psvohologv of volition would have it, as a matter of course, on the attainment of the obieot of desire, is onlv an index of successful conation. Tt does in no wav affect the integral character of value, which is a closed svs- tem bv itself. A svmbolic representation will serve to make the nosition clearer still. Bet ‘ A ’ stand for the ' subject desiring,’ * B ’ for * knowledge of Brahman.’ that is. ‘ the object of desire.’ and ' R for the re’ation of * desirin".’ then A fRl B will represent the unit of value '(Tpruro:'). "When, how¬ ever. this value or good becomes the object of desire to one particular individual say * 'A',® satis¬ faction results on the attainment of the obieot of desire, which is no other than the * knowledge, of Brahman ’ and can be represented thus, * S * stand¬ ing for * satisfaction :’ A' (R) (A (R) B) '+S. S thus in no way affects {A (R) B { in the formula. AN APPROACH THROUGH EPISTEMOLOGY 129 What is important for us to note in this dis¬ cussion is the distinct emphasis which Samkara puts on the object of desire or value rather than on valuation or sense of value. It is clearly evidenced by the fine psychological analysis of jijMsa (fsrBTOf), and of ' desire ’ that he has furnished. He never allows himself to forget that it is not the valuing that is valued, but the objeot to which value is attached. The mere desire to know, or the feeling of satisfaction attendant on its realisation is only a sense of value, and not a de facto value. We may, however, value the sense of value, just as we may love. This is the standing vice of all sub¬ jectivism, vague emotionalism, or of pragmatism. There is, in a strictly philosophical reference, no value in the so-called ‘ desire ’ for ‘ something evermore about to be,’ until and unless such a desire can be shown to be bound for some definite moorings, ^amkara takes exception to the prag¬ matic creed just on this score.