English
If, like thinking that emptiness destroys things, emptiness becomes the cause of destroying things, that is unreasonable. In the Holy Jewel Heap Sutra, it says: "Light Protector, furthermore, by separately contemplating the Middle Way of all dharmas, it is not by the separation itself that the dharmas are emptied, but the dharmas themselves are emptiness; by the absence of characteristics, the dharmas are not made without characteristics, but the dharmas themselves are without characteristics; by the absence of aspiration, the dharmas are not made without aspiration, but the dharmas themselves are without aspiration." And so on, it is extensively taught. Therefore, things do not arise by their own nature. If, in the ultimate sense, all dharmas are without arising, but in the conventional sense, they arise from others, if it is not like that, then there is no arising in the conventional sense either, and would it not become two truths? In the ultimate sense, there are no two truths, however, in name, the conventional truth is also a means to realize the ultimate, without analyzing arising from others, but relying on the customs of the world to acknowledge it. For example: Because if these things are analyzed, one cannot find existence outside of suchness, therefore one should not analyze the truth of worldly conventions. Because if one analyzes whether form and feeling, etc., arise from themselves or from others, in the ultimate sense, one cannot find things that have become like that, having arising and ceasing, etc., outside of the nature of suchness emptiness, the nature of no arising and no ceasing. Therefore, for the truth of worldly conventions, one should not analyze self and other, etc., but should acknowledge to the extent that worldly people see "if this exists, then that arises," that is, from the perspective of relying on others. As Arya Deva said: "Just as the language of a foreign tribe cannot be understood by others, so too, apart from the worldly, one cannot understand the world." It is like that. If analyzed, worldly conventions will also be destroyed. As it is said in the sutra: "For example, relying on wood and strings, the effort of the hand
Chinese
三事聚合时，从弹奏琵琶、笛子等乐器中，也会产生声音。之后一些智者进行观察，探究声音从何而来，又往何处去。在各个方向和角落进行探究，却无法找到声音的来处或去处。同样，一切诸行皆由因和缘而生。如实观见的瑜伽士，视诸行为空性，无有动摇。五蕴、十二处、十八界，内外皆空，无有众生我，无有处所，法之体性即是虚空之性。如是说。如果有人说，执着于世俗谛的真实，会成为一切烦恼和清净的因，因此某些事物必须在世俗中以自性而生。那么，说这种话也只是空谈而已。因为，在彼真实之际，以何种理，从自和他生亦不合理，以是理，于世俗中亦不合理，你的生从何而有？在胜义谛的观察中，以如上所说的何种道理，成立了事物从自和他生是不合理的，那么以同样的道理，在世俗谛中，从自和他生也是不合理的。那么，你的事物的生将如何成立呢？因此，对于事物来说，以自性而生，在二谛中都是不成立的。第二，驳斥对否定的不合理之处，分为：消除与现量相违，阐述业果关系合理。第一，如果二谛中，它们的生都不以自性成立，那么，它们的自性如何在世间显现呢？事物是空性的，如影像等，依赖于聚合，并非不为人知。如同在那里，影像等从空性中，产生了彼识的显现一样。同样，一切事物虽然是空性的，却能从空性中显现。
English
When three things come together, sound arises from playing musical instruments such as the lute and flute. Then, some wise people investigate, exploring where the sound comes from and where it goes. Investigating in all directions and corners, they cannot find the source or destination of the sound. Similarly, all conditioned things arise from causes and conditions. Yogis who see reality as it is, see all conditioned things as emptiness, without movement. The five aggregates, twelve sources, and eighteen realms are empty both internally and externally, without a self of sentient beings, without a place, the nature of phenomena is the nature of space. Thus it is said. If someone says that clinging to the truth of conventional reality becomes the cause of all afflictions and purification, therefore some things must arise in conventional reality by their own nature. Then, saying such words is just empty talk. Because, in that reality, by what reason is it not reasonable for things to arise from self and other, by that reason, it is also not reasonable in conventional reality, from what does your birth come? In the investigation of ultimate truth, by what reason as mentioned above, it is established that it is not reasonable for things to arise from self and other, then by the same reason, in conventional truth, it is also not reasonable to arise from self and other. Then, how will the arising of your things be established? Therefore, for things, arising by their own nature is not established in either of the two truths. Second, refuting the unreasonableness of negation, it is divided into: eliminating contradiction with direct perception, and explaining that the relationship of karma and result is reasonable. First, if in both truths, their arising is not established by their own nature, then, how will their own nature appear in the world? Things are empty, like images, etc., dependent on aggregation, are not unknown. Just as there, images, etc., arise from emptiness, the appearance of that consciousness arises. Similarly, although all things are empty, they can arise from emptiness.
Chinese
如果存在，就不会不为人知。因此，就像影像等从自性空性中，由对境的意识生起影像的显现一样，色和受等一切事物即使自性为空，也会从自身的因和缘的空性中产生。因此，即使没有自性，在名言中生起也不矛盾，例如影像等。如是说：犹如极其清净的镜子中，如何显现无自性的影像一般，了知世间诸法。因此，在二谛中也没有自性。因此，它们不是常，也不是断。因为事物像影像一样没有自性。因此，在胜义谛和世俗谛二者中都没有自性。因此，它们不是常，也不是断。如同论典中所说：如果存在自性，就不会不存在，因此是常。如果说先前存在而现在不存在，那么就会陷入断灭。同样，如果承认事物存在，就会陷入常和断的观点，因为事物是常和无常变化的。就像这样说的。 缘起成立无常断的功德。
English
If it exists, it would not be unknown. Therefore, just as images and the like arise from the emptiness of inherent existence, and the consciousness of the object arises in the form of that image, similarly, even though all things such as form and feeling are empty of inherent existence, they arise from the emptiness of their own causes and conditions. Therefore, even without inherent existence, arising in name is not contradictory, just like images and the like. As it is said: Just as in a perfectly clear mirror, how an image without inherent existence appears, understand the phenomena of the world in the same way. Therefore, there is no inherent existence in either of the two truths. Therefore, they are neither permanent nor annihilated. Because things are without inherent existence like images. Therefore, there is no inherent existence in either the ultimate truth or the conventional truth. Therefore, they are neither permanent nor annihilated. As it is said in the treatise: If there is an essence, it is permanent because it is not non-existent. If it is said that it existed before but does not exist now, then it would entail annihilation. Similarly, if things are asserted to exist, then one would fall into the views of permanence and annihilation, because that thing changes between permanence and impermanence. It is like this. The merit of dependent origination being established as neither permanent nor annihilated.