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Apart from Cetana, which is specifically mentioned, many of the mental properties later included in this skandha are found separately enumerated in the sutra Pitaka, but no attempt seems to have been made to give a detailed or definite categorization. In the Hinayana Abhidharma period, elaborate charts of the Samskaras were compiled,1 the individual items con sisting of the various mental properties casually mentioned in the sutras, together with a certain number of factors deduced by individual introspection. It is to be regretted that so many are of the former type, since the use of terms is very vague in the sutras and many psychological terms were but as obiter dicta, which were later enshrined in the Abhidharma works as final revelations of ultimate truth. The right of such items to be considered ultimate factors was therefore very acutely defended by minds able to formulate a far more scientific analysis of mental components. The Sthaviravadins enumerated fifty- two such Samskaras.2 Among the Sarvastivadins there was much variation in number for some considerable time, and it was not until the time of Vasubandhu that the number was definitely put at forty-six, which afterwards remained the standard figure. The Yogacarins hovered between fifty-one, fifty-two, and fifty-three, but fifty-one was eventually considered the orthodox figure.3 Incidentally, the Yogacarin fifty-one is by no means in agreement with the fifty-two Caitasikas of the Sthaviravadins. 5. Vijndna, the last of the skandhas, is usually translated " consciousness " or " cognition ". This definition is quite in accord with all the commentaries, and many references to 1 Of. e.g. Dham. San., part ii (Book I of R.D. trans.). 2 At least after Buddhaghosa, see Expositor. 3 Y.Bh. = 53 ; Ab. San. = 55; A.V.P.— P.Sk.— S.dh. = 51 ; and V.M.S. 90 MANUAL OF BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY the term shows that it denoted for the Buddhists merely " awareness " in the broadest sense of the term. Hence it is associated with much which we should call sensation, save that it lacks the hedonistic element which is given to Vedana. Again, it is associated with the perceptual aspect of Samjna, save that it is ampler in its scope, implying not merely the " seeing "of a thing but the full awareness of it, or the absorption of the image into the conscious mind. The distinction between Vijnana and Samskara, particularly in the later use of the latter term, is that Vijnana is " con sciousness " or the " various aspects of consciousness ", and Samskara is the contents or functional phases of con sciousness. Thus the awareness of a visual object implies attention (manaskara), sensation or contact (sparsa), etc. And further, as Vedana and Samjna are considered as Samskaras, we find that even these are phases or functions of consciousness rather than independent realities. That Vijnana involves both the sensatory and ideation aspects of consciousness can be seen from the minimum six-fold classification of Vijnana common to all forms of Buddhism, however many additional aspects may be added. The six divisions consist of five kinds of consciousness dependent respectively upon the five sense organs, and one type of consciousness dependent upon the operation of the mind (manas). This last possesses several functions peculiar to itself, such as intellection, reasoning, and memory. The most important addition to this six-fold category was made by the Yogacarin, who added two more, making eight in all. To this, certain other authorities, chiefly Chinese, have added a ninth.1 Among the Sthaviravadins, in addition to the six-fold group, Vijnana was also classified in a different way under eighty-nine different heads. This arrangement is peculiar to this school, and had no effect upon later philosophic speculation. 1 Cf. sect, on Vij. in 0 ^ g| and jj, fc ^. COSMIC ANALYSIS 91 Concluding Remarks. Turning now from the skandhas taken separately, let us consider them for a moment as a whole. To us there seems little logical basis for this five-fold division of the personality, and it would seem as if the Buddhists themselves were struck by its pragmatic nature, and that the non-material part of the personality was arbitrarily broken up into four co-ordinate parts chiefly in order to emphasize the complex, compound nature of the mind. Nevertheless, the five-fold division is not altogether lacking in psychological insight, and, more particularly if the volitional aspect of Samskara had been retained, we should have had a certain correspondence between the east and those western psychologists who divide the mind into (1) feeling, (2) reason, and (3) volition, corresponding respectively to Vedana, Samjna, and Samskara, which, with Vijnana, consciousness considered as a whole, and Kupa, the body, would give us the following classification :— 1. The body, including sense organs. 2. Consciousness, or awareness, reception of the sense impressions transmitted by the sense organs. 3. Resultant feeling of like or dislike of these impressions. 4. Ideation or the formation of mental images concerning the nature of the external world from which sense impressions are derived, including the classification (naming) of those objects which are pleasant and those which are unpleasant. 5. Volition or will with respect to choosing as far as possible those objects which are pleasant and those which are unpleasant. Later, as we have seen, mental activities other than volition were added, but were placed in the same category. It was only the early mistranslation of the names of the five skandhas which prevented it being seen that some such 92 MAOTAL OF BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY scheme was in the mind of the early Buddhist philosophers. In this connexion, and more or less in defence of this position, one or two points deserve attention. Vijnana follows immediately upon the interaction of the sense organs and sense object, and without the intermediary action of a separate faculty such as Vedana or Samjna. This is obvious from the frequently repeated texts to the effect that " as a result of visible object and organs of sight visual con sciousness comes into being ", and also from the correlation of the sixth sense objects, six sense organs, and six aspects of consciousness to form the eighteen dhatus or factors of existence. From this fact, the sensatory aspect of Vijnana becomes obvious, a fact that is sometimes overlooked, owing to Vijnana's place among the skandhas, Vedana and Samjna intervening between it and Rupa, the body. We find, however, that while retaining the traditional order in the bare enumeration of the skandhas, both Buddhaghosa and Nagarjuna give their exposition of Vijnana immediately after their explanation of Rupa. Vedana, Samjna, and Samskara do not first arise as a result of bodily functioning and then produce Vijnana, for it is expressly said that these cannot exist independent of consciousness.1 Rather are they accessories, even though necessary accessories of consciousness which arise simultaneously with it. Since they are thus but concomitant phases dependent upon Vijnana, which arises directly from the operations of the sense objects and sense organs, the later Buddhists grouped them together as Caitasikas or " mentals ", and the Sthaviravadins and Sarvastivadins gave them, in their external classification of the universe, the following invariable order : — 1. Rupa. 2. Citta or Vijnana. 3. Caitasikas. 1 A.K. 4-3a ; M.Sh., p. 173. COSMIC ANALYSIS 93 (a) Vedana. (6) Samjna. (c) The remaining Samskaras. While, however, the Caitasikas are mental properties owing to their existence to Citta or Vijnana, and hence cannot arise before the latter, yet, on the other hand, pure Citta devoid of all of these Caitasikas cannot arise. So that it is said that the origination of Citta and the Caitasikas is simultaneous. A word must be said concerning the traditional order of the skandhas. In the sutras they are invariably enumerated in the order given above. The philosophers might see fit, as did Buddhaghosa and Nagarjuna, to depart from this order when dealing with them philosophically, but as regards mere enumeration they held fast to the traditional order. Never theless, in the sutras themselves no reasons are ever given for this order, but in the Abhidharma Kosa we find an attempt made to defend the time-honoured enumeration (A.K. 1-176).