English
That which cannot function as it appears is like an illusion. The characteristic of true conventional truth is: it can function as it appears, just as fire appears as fire. Or it possesses four qualities: born from causes and conditions, an object of the senses, appearing consistently, true upon examination, and capable of functioning. The general characteristic of ultimate truth is: freedom from elaboration. The categorized ultimate truth is: freedom from some elaborations. The non-categorized ultimate truth is: freedom from all elaborations. Eighth, the meaning of the terms: Conventional is called Samvrita (藏文：སམ་བྲི་ཏ་，梵文天城体：samvṛta，梵文罗马拟音：samvrita，汉语字面意思：Covering), which is the obscuration of truth or the non-deceptive bad obscuration. Ultimate is called Paramartha (藏文：པ་ར་མརྠ་，梵文天城体：paramārtha，梵文罗马拟音：paramartha，汉语字面意思：Highest meaning), which is neither meaning nor supreme, therefore it is non-deceptive. There are two examinations of one and different: one has four faults, and different also has four faults. The four faults of one are: if the two truths are considered one, then just as the conventional appears to each ordinary being, the ultimate should also appear to each ordinary being. If that is accepted, then liberation should follow. Second, just as afflictions increase when the conventional is made an object of mind, afflictions should also increase when the ultimate is made an object of mind, because they are one. Third, just as liberation comes from practicing the ultimate, liberation should also come from practicing the conventional, because they are one. Fourth, just as the conventional is accompanied by many elaborations, the ultimate should also be accompanied by many elaborations, because they are one. If they are different, there are also four faults: First, even if the ultimate is realized, the mistaken appearance of the conventional should not be removed, because they are different. Second, the ultimate should not be the nature of the conventional, because they are different. Third, both defilement and purification should exist simultaneously in the continuum of one person, because they are different. Fourth, just as the conventional appears as real, the ultimate should also appear as real, because it is the opposite of real. Therefore, here it is considered that the essence is one, but the aspects are different, or that it is inexpressible as either the same or different. Third, identifying the five meanings that establish it:
Chinese
《寂护庄严论》中说：不承认可以被说成是我和他。第三，确定它的五个方面是：在《寂护庄严论》中说：我和他所说的这些事物，彻底地远离了一或多的自性，没有自性，就像影像一样。如是说。论题的法，是破除和遣除的对象，是遍除和要证成的，是正理和理由，是确定周遍的例子。第一，论题法有六个方面：成为论题的标准，论题的定义，分类，安立的时间，决定的量，以及避免对它的辩论的过失。第一，成为论题的标准是：没有区分开其他排除的显现和考察的声音和意义。论题的定义是：无论做什么破除或证成，都不会对它本身造成损害，并且具有想要了解的意愿。或者说是成为辩论的基础。分类有四种：显现论题是：将显现的体验安立为论题，然后证成没有自性。考察论题是：将分别念执着于对境为真实，安立为论题，然后证成没有自性。没有区分显现和考察的法是：将显现的体验和考察两者都安立为论题，然后证成没有自性。名声论题是：将法性空性等等，安立为名声的程度的论题，然后证成没有自性。安立为论题的时间是：辩论者和反驳者辩论的时间。决定的量是：显现论题是由根识的力量决定的。考察论题是由自证的力量决定的。避免对它的辩论是：那么，这是论题和其他宗派所考察的邪分别念。当安立它为论题时，是只安立显现本身为论题，还是安立显现的一些差别为论题？如果像第一种情况那样，那么仅仅是那样无法在心中显现，如果像第二种情况那样，那么就不会变成断除一切戏论的智慧。如果这样说，那么没有那个过失，因为安立显现的一些差别为论题，就能断除一切戏论，就像一根芦苇内部是空的，那么所有的芦苇也都是空的一样。经中说：色的如是
English
From the Ornament of Śāntarakṣita: It is asserted that it cannot be expressed as self and other. Third, identifying the five aspects that establish it: From the Ornament of Śāntarakṣita: These things spoken of as self and other, are completely devoid of the nature of one or many. They are without nature, like reflections. Thus it is said. The subject of debate, the object to be refuted and eliminated, the object to be completely eliminated and proven, the valid reason and logic, and the example that establishes pervasion. First, there are six aspects to the subject of debate: the measure of becoming a subject, the definition of a subject, the divisions, the time of establishment, the valid cognition that determines it, and avoiding the faults of debating it. First, the measure of becoming a subject is: not distinguishing the sound and meaning of the appearance and examination that eliminates others. The definition of a subject is: whatever refutation or proof is done, it does not harm itself, and it possesses the desire to know. Or it is the basis for debate. There are four divisions: The appearance subject is: establishing the experience of appearance as the subject, and then proving that it is without nature. The examination subject is: establishing the conceptual thought that clings to objects as true as the subject, and then proving that it is without nature. The dharma that does not distinguish appearance and examination is: establishing both the experience of appearance and examination as the subject, and then proving that it is without nature. The fame subject is: establishing the suchness, emptiness, etc., as the subject of the extent of fame, and then proving that it is without nature. The time of establishing as a subject is: the time of debate between the proponent and the opponent. The valid cognition that determines it is: the appearance subject is determined by the power of the senses. The examination subject is determined by the power of self-awareness. Avoiding debate about it is: then, this is the wrong conceptual thought examined by the subject and other schools. When establishing it as a subject, is only the appearance itself established as a subject, or are some differences of appearance established as a subject? If it is like the first case, then it cannot appear in the mind, and if it is like the second case, then it will not become the wisdom that cuts off all elaboration. If you say so, then there is no fault, because establishing some differences of appearance as the subject cuts off all elaboration, just as if one reed is hollow inside, then all the reeds are hollow. The sutra says: The suchness of form
Chinese
如果了解这些，就能详尽地了解所有佛法的要义。这是（经文中的）说法。第二，关于区分所破，分为总和别两种。第一，所破总的定义是：无论是事物还是非事物，通过理智分析，凡是发现被认为是具有某种自性差别的，那就是所破。如果将所破进行区分，则分为两种：破除有和破除非有。破除有，是遮止凡夫、声闻乘以及外道所认为的实有事物。破除非有，是遮止有情众生认为自证是胜义谛。普遍使用的所证分两种：如幻象和彻底不住。如幻象是：遮止显现的事物，而在其后只成立如幻象一般。彻底不住是：遮止认为是显现的事物，甚至不认为是如幻象一般，这就是彻底不住。第四，合理的正理有五种：遮止因的金刚屑正理，遮止果的有无生灭正理，遮止因果二者的四句生灭正理，遮止自性的离一异正理，以及通过成立相违来遮止相关联的缘起正理。第一，遮止因的金刚屑正理是：显现，作为所立宗，实际上没有因果，因为远离四句生灭。如同有色之物一样。《根本慧论》中说：非自生，非他生，非自他生，亦非无因生。任何事物，在任何时候，都不会产生。这是（经文中的）说法。如果说正理不成立，那么，因果是真实存在的吗？如果存在，是从自身产生，还是从他者产生，还是从二者产生，还是无因而生？如果从自身产生，是从已成立的自身产生，还是从未成立的自身产生？如果从未成立的自身产生，那么，从无因而生是不合理的，因为无因不依赖于条件，要么是常有，要么是常无。这是（经文中的）说法。如果从已成立的自身产生，那么，因为也必须从已成立的事物产生，所以会导致无穷无尽的过失。如果从他者产生，是从常法产生，还是从无常法产生？如果从常法产生，是逐渐产生，还是一次性产生？如果是逐渐产生，那么，常法
English
If you understand these, you will thoroughly understand the essence and details of all the Dharma. This is the statement (in the scriptures). Secondly, regarding distinguishing what is to be refuted, there are two types: general and specific. First, the general definition of what is to be refuted is: whether it is a thing or a non-thing, through rational analysis, whatever is found to be considered as having some kind of distinct characteristic is what is to be refuted. If we divide what is to be refuted into specific categories, there are two types: refuting existence and refuting non-existence. Refuting existence is to negate what ordinary beings, the Hearers (Śrāvakas), and outsiders consider to be truly existent things. Refuting non-existence is to negate sentient beings who consider self-awareness to be the ultimate truth. The objects to be proven for common use are of two types: like an illusion and utterly non-abiding. Like an illusion is: having negated the appearing thing, only establishing something like an illusion in its place. Utterly non-abiding is: having negated the belief that it is an appearing thing, not even considering it to be like an illusion, this is utterly non-abiding. Fourth, there are five valid reasons: the Vajra Splinter reasoning that refutes the cause, the reasoning that refutes the arising of existence or non-existence that refutes the result, the reasoning that refutes the arising of the four possibilities that refutes both cause and result, the reasoning of being separate from one and many that refutes self-nature, and the reasoning of dependent origination that refutes related entities by establishing the contradictory. First, the Vajra Splinter reasoning that refutes the cause is: appearance, as the subject to be proven, actually has no cause and effect, because it is free from the arising of the four possibilities. Like a colored object. In the Root Wisdom Treatise, it says: Not from itself, not from another, not from both, nor from no cause. For any things whatsoever, there is never any arising. This is the statement (in the scriptures). If you say the reasoning is not established, then, do cause and effect truly exist? If they exist, do they arise from themselves, from others, from both, or from no cause? If they arise from themselves, do they arise from an already established self or from an unestablished self? If they arise from an unestablished self, then arising from no cause is unreasonable, because no cause does not depend on conditions, it would necessarily be either permanent or non-existent. This is the statement (in the scriptures). If it arises from an already established self, then, because it must also arise from what is already established, it would lead to an infinite regress. If it arises from another, does it arise from a permanent entity or from an impermanent entity? If it arises from a permanent entity, does it arise gradually or all at once? If it arises gradually, then, the permanent entity
Chinese
是不变的。因为是逐渐变化的，所以与常恒相违背。如果同时产生，那么会导致在因的时节果实就成熟。因为同时需要因果是一体的。如果承认，那么显而易见。另外，如果从无常中产生，那么是从过去产生呢？还是从未来产生呢？还是从现在产生？从过去产生是不合理的，因为因果已经用完了。从未来产生是不合理的，因为在处所不存在。如果从现在产生，那么是从同时产生呢？还是从异时产生？同时没有利益，所以不能产生。如果从异时产生，那么因果有相遇吗？没有相遇吗？如果相遇，是同时相遇吗？还是异时相遇？如果同时相遇，那么因果的誓言就破灭了。如果异时相遇，那么因果不能成立，因为没有利益施加者和施加对象。如果从两者产生，既然没有从自他产生，那么从两者怎么产生？又说从无因而生，因为无因不依赖于缘，所以会导致常有也不存在，因为时间突然出现，所以因果不能成立。第二，阻碍果实产生的有无生灭的理证是：唯识宗认为自证是胜义谛，这是有法，不是真实自性，因为不是从果实的有无中产生的，就像虚空一样。也就是说：存在产生是不合理的，不存在也像虚空中的花朵一样。因此，智者不应安住于有和无之中。这样说。如果说理证不成立，那么，一个果实的产生是从有中产生呢？还是从无中产生？如果从有中产生，那么已经存在了，还需要产生什么？对方说：有使不好的变好，小的变大等等的必要。那么，就不是从有中产生，因为没有好和大的缘故。如果从无中产生，那么，无不应是果实的法性，所以产生是不合理的。如果从无中产生，那么会导致兔子生角。又如果从无中产生，那么，后来产生的时候，之前的无是消失了还是没有消失？如果没有消失，那么后来也应是无。如果消失了，那么之前也应是有的，因为是从之前的无中消失的。因此，认为自证是胜义谛是不合理的。第三，因