Chinese
从有而执取吗？或者无也有执取？如果从有而执取，则会犯所执取的境不存在的誓言过失。如果无也有执取，则会成为错乱。又，如果认为识的内分是能取和所取，并说境不存在，那么，识的内分是同时执取，还是异时执取？如果同时执取，则识流成为有二分。如果异时执取，因为有能取时，所取尚未产生，所以能取所取不能成立。三摩地是，从十二缘起次第的逆转门径，修习对治无明的智慧之细微光明。行持也是，在没有佛陀住世的刹土，以神变利益有情。果是，以如意妙乐而听闻。大乘有二，即因缘乘和果金刚乘。因缘乘有二，即大乘唯识和中观。唯识有四，本体是，宣说一切法唯是心。定义是，因为认为外境不真实，只是自心的显现，所以是唯识。如《大方广经》云：‘诸佛子，此三界唯是心。’分类是，真实现和虚妄现。归纳是，唯识归纳为一个。它有四，即见、修、行、果。第一，见有四，遮破了声闻部所承许的实有的能取所取，一切法唯是心，心是自明自显、体验二取的智慧，如同灯火不为风所动一般，承许此一为实有。那么，外境的显现是如何产生的呢？认为是轮回无始以来，由无明力增盛所产生的习气所显现。如何得知自明是实有成立的呢？由体验得知仅有自明存在，并且以理证成立它空离能取所取，如同遮破声闻部所承许的实有的能取所取一样。因为理智不损害它，所以它是真实存在的。其中，三种自性的安立方式是：在外境中，由因缘和合而产生的是依他起。其中有能取所取。
English
Does one grasp from existence? Or does one grasp even from non-existence? If one grasps from existence, then one commits the fault of a vow where the object of grasping does not exist. If one grasps even from non-existence, then it becomes confusion. Furthermore, if one considers the inner aspect of consciousness as the grasper and the grasped, and says that there is no object, then does that inner aspect of consciousness grasp simultaneously or at different times? If it grasps simultaneously, then the stream of consciousness becomes twofold. If it grasps at different times, since the grasper exists when the grasped has not yet arisen, the grasper and grasped cannot be established. Samadhi is, from the reverse order of the twelve links of dependent origination, cultivating the subtle light of wisdom as the antidote to ignorance. Conduct is also, in realms where Buddhas do not reside, benefiting sentient beings through miraculous powers. The result is, hearing through the supreme bliss of wish-fulfillment. The Great Vehicle has two aspects: the causal characteristic vehicle and the resultant secret mantra vehicle. The causal characteristic vehicle has two aspects: the Great Vehicle of Mind-Only and the Middle Way. Mind-Only has four aspects: the essence is, asserting that all phenomena are only mind. The definition is, because it is asserted that external objects are not real, but merely appearances of one's own mind, therefore it is Mind-Only. As it is said in the Great Vaipulya Sutra: 'O sons of the Victorious Ones, these three realms are only mind.' The divisions are, true appearance and false appearance. The summary is, Mind-Only is summarized into one. It has four aspects: view, meditation, conduct, and result. First, the view has four aspects: refuting the truly existent grasper and grasped as analyzed by the Hearers, all phenomena are only mind, and mind is self-aware, self-illuminating, and the non-dual wisdom of experience, like a lamp not moved by the wind, asserting this one as truly existent. Then, how do external appearances arise? It is asserted that they appear from the habitual tendencies arising from the power of ignorance, which has been increasing since beginningless samsara. How is it known that self-awareness is established as truly existent? It is known through experience that only self-awareness exists, and it is established through inference that it is empty of grasper and grasped, just as the truly existent grasper and grasped asserted by the Hearers are refuted. Because reason does not harm it, it is truly existent. Among these, the way of establishing the three natures is: in external objects, that which arises from the combination of causes and conditions is other-powered. Among these, there are grasper and grasped.
Chinese
将不存在的事物执着为存在，这是遍计所执。如果如实了知其为空性，远离能取所取，那就是圆成实性。唯识宗可以分为：真实现和虚妄现。真实现是指，外境并非真实存在，仅仅是识的显现。也就是说，认为仅仅是识的显现才是真实的。虚妄现是指，外境并非真实存在，仅仅是识的显现，而且识的显现也不是真实的，认为是虚假的、不存在的。真实现又分为三种：法称论师认为，识是一个，显现也是一个。也就是说，一切显现都是明晰的自性，是一个。一切识都是自证的自性，是一个。对此的反驳是，一切显现是一个是不合理的，因为显现为多种，并且有六方等差别。对方说：虽然显现为多种，但自性是一个。如果是这样，那么外道说，具有肢体的实物，有一种事物遍布一切，这该如何反驳？如果无法反驳，那就不是唯识宗，因为已经承认了外境的存在。对方说：比如瓶子这样的事物，具有多种部分，因此具有肢体的实物是不成立的。那么，这里也是一样，显现为多种，并且具有多种部分的事物是不成立的。如果说，虽然显现为多种，但真实是一个。那么，瓶子虽然显现为多种部分，但真实是一个具有肢体的实物，没有区别。识是自证的一个是不合理的，因为有过去、未来等时间的差别。即使有时间的差别，识的自性也是一个，如果是这样，那么如何反驳外道所说的常恒不变的“我”？因为缺少次第和同时产生作用的能力，所以常恒的“我”不成立。这里也是一样，因为有过去、未来等时间的差别，所以自证的一个是不成立的。对方说：过去、未来等只是识的暂时状态，是常恒的，它们也是识的自性，是一个。这也是通过次第和同时产生作用来判断常恒的状态是否变化。常恒的自性没有变化，非常相似。还有，释迦友论师认为
English
Attributing existence to what does not exist is parikalpita (imputed nature). If one truly understands that it is empty of the grasper and the grasped, then that is pariniṣpanna (accomplished nature). Mind-only can be divided into: true aspectarian and false aspectarian. True aspectarian means that external objects are not truly established, but are merely appearances of consciousness. That is, they believe that only the appearances of consciousness are true. False aspectarian means that external objects are not truly established, but are merely appearances of consciousness, and even the appearances of consciousness are not true, but are considered false and non-existent. True aspectarian is further divided into three: Acharya Dharmakirti believes that consciousness is one and appearances are also one. That is, all appearances are one in the nature of clarity. All consciousnesses are said to be one in the nature of self-awareness. The refutation of this is that it is not reasonable for all appearances to be one, because they appear as many and have distinctions such as the six directions. The opponent says: Although they appear as many, their nature is one. If that is the case, then how do you refute the Tirthikas who say that there is one substance with limbs that pervades everything? If you cannot refute it, then it is not Mind-only, because you have admitted the existence of external objects. The opponent says: For example, a thing like a pot has many parts, so a substance with limbs is not established. Here too, what appears as many and has many parts is not established as one. If you say that although it appears as many, it is truly one, then although a pot appears as many parts, it is truly one substance with limbs, there is no difference. It is not reasonable for consciousness to be one self-awareness, because there are distinctions of time such as past and future. Even if there are distinctions of time, the nature of consciousness is one. If that is the case, then how do you refute the Tirthikas' permanent and unchanging self? Because it lacks the ability to function sequentially and simultaneously, the permanent self is not established. Here too, because there are distinctions of time such as past and future, one self-awareness is not established. The opponent says: Past and future are only temporary states of consciousness, but they are permanent, and they are also one in the nature of consciousness. This is also judged by whether the permanent state changes by functioning sequentially and simultaneously. The permanent nature does not change, it is very similar. Furthermore, Acharya Shakya Friend believes
Chinese
因此，他们认为识是多样的，显现也是多样的。当一个境靠近时，在那里执着的识也生起一个。当两个境靠近时，在那里执着的识生起两个。这是他们的观点。对此进行驳斥：如果境和识两者都真实地存在于多样之中，那么作为多样的遍因，一个真实存在是否成立？如果一个真实存在成立，那么与真实存在于多样之中相矛盾。如果一个真实存在不成立，那么由于遍因是一个，遍果多样也无法成立。此外，如果境和识两者都真实地存在于多样的自性之中，那么自显现将会完全消失。如果你们认为自显现消失是可以接受的，那么微尘就不需要区分方向部分了。此外，根据导师智生（Śes rab ’byung gnas sbas pa）的观点，多种相存在于一个识的体性之中。他们说，相虽然显现为白色、红色等各种各样，但真实地存在于一个识的自性之中。对此进行驳斥：如果说苦乐两种感受也是一个实体，那么如何阻止这种说法呢？如果你们认为是一个实体，那么感受就没有差别了。如果你们说，苦乐不能成为一个实体，因为这与体验相矛盾，那么如果你们的多种相真实地存在于一个识的体性之中，这与识显现为多种相矛盾。如果你们说，只是显现为多种，体性上没有多种，那么感受也只是显现为苦乐，体性上没有苦乐。如果你们认为没有苦乐是可以接受的，那么天界和恶趣就没有区别了，因为没有苦乐的缘故。此外，对于相真实存在来说，还有这个普遍的过失：按照你们的真实存在，由于你们认为所有的识的相都是真实的，那么错乱的延续将会中断。如果你们说，粗大的显现是真实的，但粗大的成立是不真实的，那么除了显现之外，还有一个独立的成立存在。如果你们接受这一点，那么识就有了真实和虚假的境。此外，相虚假存在是指：识是与能取所取分离的自证，是真实的。而外境由于受到一和多等因素的损害，是不真实的，是虚假的、不存在的。如果你们说，如果没有外境，那么现在显现的粗大之相是怎么回事呢？这是由无明错乱的因所产生的，在识存在的相清晰显现的道路上，不存在的相也清晰显现。
English
Therefore, they consider consciousness to be multiple and appearances to be multiple. When a single object comes near, a single consciousness that apprehends it arises. When two objects come near, two consciousnesses that apprehend them arise. This is their view. To refute this: If both objects and consciousnesses truly exist in multiplicity, then does the one that is the pervading cause of multiplicity truly exist or not? If the one truly exists, then it contradicts truly existing in multiplicity. If the one does not truly exist, then since the pervading cause is one, the pervaded effect, multiplicity, will also not be established. Furthermore, if both objects and consciousnesses truly exist as the nature of multiplicity, then self-appearance will completely cease. If you say that the cessation of self-appearance is acceptable, then it follows that minute particles do not need to be divided into directional parts. Moreover, according to the view of the teacher Śes rab ’byung gnas sbas pa, multiple aspects exist as the essence of a single consciousness. They say that although aspects appear as various colors such as white and red, they truly exist as the nature of a single consciousness. To refute this: If one were to say that the two feelings of pleasure and pain are also a single substance, how would you prevent that? If you accept that they are a single substance, then it follows that there is no distinction between feelings. If you say that pleasure and pain cannot be a single substance because it contradicts experience, then if your multiple aspects truly exist as the essence of a single consciousness, it contradicts the appearance of consciousness as multiple. If you say that they only appear as multiple, but there is no multiplicity in essence, then feelings are also only appearing as pleasure and pain, but there is no pleasure and pain in essence. If you accept that there is no pleasure and pain, then it follows that there is no difference between higher realms and lower realms, because there is no pleasure and pain. Furthermore, there is also this general fault for the existence of true aspects: According to your true existence, since you believe that all aspects of consciousness are true, it follows that the continuity of delusion will be cut off. If you say that the appearance of the coarse is true, but the establishment of the coarse is not true, then it follows that there is a separate establishment that exists apart from appearance. If you accept this, then it follows that consciousness has both true and false objects. Furthermore, the existence of false aspects means that consciousness, which is self-awareness separate from grasper and grasped, is true. However, external objects are not true because they are harmed by factors such as one and many, and are false and non-existent. If you say that if there are no external objects, then what is the coarse appearance that is appearing now? It is produced from the cause of ignorance and delusion, and on the path where the appearance of existing consciousness is clearly manifest, the appearance of non-existence is also clearly manifest.