Chinese
从空性方面来说，它远离所有概念的繁琐，因此是胜义谛。就像有为法和无常一样，本体相同但反体不同。玛雅巴大师说，基于对两种智慧（名言和实证）的依赖，安立了二谛。如果从世俗的智慧来看，显现的一切都圆满地包含在世俗谛中。然而，如果不离开这个显现，从最终分析的智慧或圣者的等持来看，它又圆满地包含在胜义谛中。因此，基于对不同观察点的依赖，安立了二谛。正如经中所说：‘所见真实即胜义，所见虚假即世俗。’ 莲花生大师也认为这是合理的。此外，本体相同但反体不同。例如，从显现是法性光明、无有边际的角度来看，它是胜义谛；从执着于相的某个方面的角度来看，它是世俗谛。第四，破除邪见并确立正见的理路有四种或五种：一是分析事物本体的离一异性；二是分析因的清净金刚屑；三是分析果的有无生灭；四是分析因果二者的四句生灭。也可以用缘起的因来分析五种理路。第一种是：如同显现，有法，实际上没有自性，因为远离一和多。就像影像一样。正如《中观论》中所说：‘自和他所说的这些事物，实际上远离一和多，因此没有自性，就像影像一样。’ 确立其含义：有法1，所立2，理由3等。第一，一般而言，仅仅是显现就可以作为有法，特别而言，比如瓶子，一个事物可以作为有法。这样确立了一个，是否就能确立其他呢？是的，就像知道一个火是热的，就能知道所有的火都是热的一样。在某些情况下，也会将对方的观点等作为有法，并消除其增益。第二，是不承认无自性，还是将无自性的遮诠作为所立呢？前者是中观应成派的观点，后者则认为，以远离一和多的理由，可以成立真实的实
English
From the aspect of emptiness, it is devoid of all conceptual elaborations, therefore it is the ultimate truth. Just like conditioned phenomena and impermanence, the essence is the same but the aspects are different. Master Mayapa said that based on the dependence on two kinds of wisdom (conventional and experiential), the two truths are established. If viewed from the perspective of conventional wisdom, all appearances are completely included in the conventional truth. However, without departing from this appearance, from the perspective of ultimate analytical wisdom or the samadhi of the noble ones, it is completely included in the ultimate truth. Therefore, based on the dependence on different points of view, the two truths are established. As it is said in the scriptures: 'What is seen as true is the ultimate truth, what is seen as false is the conventional truth.' Guru Rinpoche also agrees that this is reasonable. Furthermore, the essence is the same but the aspects are different. For example, from the perspective that appearance is the luminosity of the Dharma nature, without limits, it is the ultimate truth; from the perspective of clinging to a certain aspect of characteristics, it is the conventional truth. Fourth, the reasoning for dispelling wrong views and establishing correct views is four or five: first, analyzing the essence of things as being separate from one and many; second, analyzing the pure vajra slivers of the cause; third, analyzing the existence or non-existence of arising and ceasing of the result; fourth, analyzing the four possibilities of arising and ceasing of both cause and result. The five reasonings can also be analyzed with dependent origination. The first is: like appearance, the subject of debate, in reality, it has no self-nature, because it is separate from one and many. Like an image. As it is said in the Madhyamaka: 'These things spoken of by self and others, in reality, are separate from one and many, therefore they have no self-nature, like an image.' Establishing its meaning: subject of debate 1, proposition 2, reason 3, etc. First, in general, just appearance can be taken as the subject of debate, in particular, for example, a pot, one thing can be taken as the subject of debate. If one is established in this way, can the others be established? Yes, just as knowing that one fire is hot, one can know that all fires are hot. In some cases, the opponent's views, etc., are also taken as the subject of debate, and their imputations are eliminated. Second, is it denying the non-existence of self-nature, or is it taking the negation of self-nature as the proposition? The former is the view of the Madhyamaka Prasangika, while the latter believes that with the reason of being separate from one and many, the true reality can be established.
Chinese
虽然遮破了，但仅仅显现却无法遮破，因此，显现而无自性的如幻之法，是通过理证成立的。所以，他们认为在胜义中，只有空性的显现存在。如《集经》中说：“何处五蕴知如幻，不将幻异作蕴异，离诸杂念近寂行，是行 श्रेष्ठ 般若度。”又如《广大母经》中说：“涅槃也如梦如幻。”又说：“即使有比涅槃更殊胜的，也如梦如幻。” 第二，极不住者，是将胜义谛仅仅作为无自性也不存在的无遮来作为所要成立的。例如，远离一切边，并且连远离本身也不成立等等。 总的来说，经论的意趣是不安住于这两种边，即显现和空性二者无别，并且远离八戏论之边。如《中观根本慧论》中说：“有者趣善道，无者堕恶趣。”等等。拉贤中也说：“四二离戏法界。”等等。 第三，推理方面，在宗法和周遍二者中，首先是确定所要遮破的一个或多个，以及如何遮破的方法。 前者是，名言谛中具有部分的“一”和“多”不是所要遮破的，而是认为无分之“一”和“多”是所要遮破的。其中，“一”是指自在天和数论派等所认为的粗大有支分等，这在之前外道的章节中已经遮破过。“微细”是指小乘部派认为的无分微尘，这也被遮破了。如果有人说后者不成，那么，它存在于真实的“一”中，还是存在于“多”中？如果存在于“一”中，那么就会产生显现是真实存在，并且在三时中不会改变等等的过失。如果存在于“多”中，那么就必须存在于无分的“多”中，这就像遮破小乘部派的微尘一样。因此，就像这样，因为这个显现执着于多个部分，所以遮破了真实的一。仅仅遮破了无分的事物，所以遮破了无分的“一”。这样，因为“一”不成立，所以由它积累的“多”也被遮破了，这就被称为远离真实的一和多。周遍是，自。
English
Although it is refuted, mere appearance cannot be refuted. Therefore, the illusion-like phenomena that appear without inherent existence are established through reasoning. Thus, they assert that in ultimate truth, only the appearance that is empty of truth exists. As stated in the *Compendium Sutra*: "Wherever the five aggregates are known to be like illusions, and one does not make a distinction between illusion and aggregates, being free from various concepts and engaging in near quiescence, this is the practice of the supreme perfection of wisdom." Also, as stated in the *Extensive Mother Sutra*: "Even nirvana is like a dream, like an illusion." And it says, "Even if there were something more excellent than nirvana, it would be like a dream, like an illusion." Secondly, the utterly non-abiding is that which takes the ultimate truth as a mere absence of inherent existence, which is also non-existent, as the object to be established through negation. For example, being free from all extremes, and even the freedom itself is not established, and so on. Generally, the intention of the scriptures is not to abide in either of these two extremes, but to be non-dual in appearance and emptiness, and to be free from the eight extremes of elaboration. As stated in the *Root Wisdom of the Middle Way*: "One who is existent goes to the happy realms, one who is non-existent falls to the lower realms." And so on. Also, in the *La Shan* it is said: "The sphere of reality is free from the four and two elaborations." And so on. Thirdly, regarding reasoning, in terms of the subject-property and pervasion, the first is to identify the one or many to be refuted, and the method of how to refute them. The former is that the "one" and "many" with parts in conventional truth are not to be refuted, but the "one" and "many" without parts are considered to be what is to be refuted. Among them, "one" refers to what is considered by Ishvara and the Samkhyas, such as the gross with limbs, etc., which was refuted in the previous section on non-Buddhists. "Subtle" refers to the indivisible atoms considered by the Hearers, which are also refuted. If someone says that the latter is not established, then does it exist in a truly existent "one" or in "many"? If it exists in "one," then there will be faults such as appearance being truly existent and unchanging in the three times. If it exists in "many," then it must exist in indivisible "many," just like refuting the atoms of the Hearers. Therefore, in this way, because this appearance clings to many parts, the truly existent one is refuted. By merely refuting the indivisible entity, the indivisible "one" is refuted. Thus, because "one" is not established, the "many" accumulated by it is also refuted, which is called being free from the truly existent one and many. The pervasion is self.
Chinese
如果存在自性，就必须存在于真实的物体中。由于真实的一个和多个存在被排除，因此成立了无自性。第二点是：这个显现如何，作为有法，在真实中是没有自性的，因为不是从自性、他性、二者和无因而生，就像影像一样。如是说：非从自性生，非从他性生，非从二者生，非从无因生。任何事物，无论是什么，都从未有过产生。如是说。有法和所立与之前一样。理由是：周遍和法相两方面。第一点是：缘起的产生不是所破，而物体自性的产生是所破。因此，需要认识到这一点，以及如何破斥的方式或目标。如果说第一点理由不成立，那么从自性、他性、二者和无因等产生的原因是什么？第一，从自性产生，是数论派等，如先前所考察和破斥的那样。也就是说，如果从自性产生，是从已成立的自性产生，还是从未成立的自性产生？对于已成立的自性，不需要产生。如果已经成立还要产生，那将导致无穷无尽。对于未成立的自性，没有产生的依据，也无法产生。如果未成立也能产生，那么兔子角也能产生和死亡，会有这样的过失。认为从他性产生，是自宗的声闻乘和唯识宗，认为前一刹那的自明心识产生后一刹那，并通过四种缘的促成而产生，如先前所说和遮止的那样。也就是说，如果从他性产生，是从他因产生他果，还是从彼产生彼？如果是前者，那么从甘蔗也能产生麦芽。如果是后者，那么他生就不成立。如果不是那样，而是作为因的他产生作为果的他，那么从豆子也能产生青稞等过失。如果又是转变的彼产生彼果，那么就不是从他产生，而是自生，如先前所遮止的那样。从二者产生，是自在天和数论派，认为从自性和他性二者产生，如先前所说的那样。也就是说，如果从二者产生，是从因果同时产生，还是从不同时产生？如果是前者，那么因成立的同时，果
English
If there is essence, it must exist in a real object. Since the existence of a real one and many is excluded, it is established that there is no essence. Secondly: How this appears, as a subject, is without essence in reality, because it does not arise from self, other, both, or without cause, like a reflection. As it is said: Not from self, not from other, not from both, not from no cause. For any object whatsoever, there is never any arising. So it is said. The subject and what is to be proven are the same as before. The reason is: Of the two, pervasion and property of the subject. The first is: Dependent arising is not what is to be refuted, but the arising of an object's own nature is what is to be refuted. Therefore, one must recognize this and know the way or object of how to refute it. If it is said that the first reason is not established, then what is the sign of arising from self, other, both, and without cause? First, arising from self is the Samkhya school and so on, as previously examined and refuted. That is, if it arises from self, does it arise from an established self or an unestablished self? There is no need for an established self to arise. If it is established and still arises, it will become endless. For an unestablished self, there is no basis for arising, and it cannot arise. If it arises even if it is unestablished, then even a rabbit's horn will arise and die, and there will be such a fault. Those who believe in arising from other are the Hearers and Solitaries of our own school, and the Mind-Only school, who believe that the later moment arises from the earlier moment of self-illuminating consciousness, and that it arises through the four conditions. This has been previously explained and refuted. That is, if it arises from other, does a different result arise from a different cause, or does the same arise from the same? If it is the former, then even sprouts will arise from sugarcane. If it is the latter, then arising from other is not established. If it is not so, but the other that has become the cause produces the other that has become the result, then even barley will arise from beans, and so on, there will be faults. Again, if the transformed same produces the same result, then it is not arising from other, but it is self-arising, as previously refuted. Arising from both is the Ishvara and Samkhya schools, who believe that it arises from both self and other, as previously stated. That is, if it arises from both, does it arise from cause and effect occurring simultaneously or not simultaneously? If it is the former, then as soon as the cause is established, the result