English
Just as those with cataracts Mistake hairs for combs, Non-existent things also appear. The clinging of children confuses the mind. Like this: these are merely appearances of consciousness, Because they appear as things, they are not truly existent. For example, for those with cataracts, It's like seeing non-existent hairs, etc. Specifically, there are two types: with defilements and without defilements. The former believes that mind and appearance are neither one nor different, like gold and impurities. The latter believes that appearance and mind are unrelated, appearance is false, and self-awareness is clear like crystal and difficult to examine. Furthermore, those who believe that the appearance of emptiness exists even in the state of Buddhahood are called 'with defilements'; those who believe it does not exist are called 'without defilements.' The *Yu Thang Sutra* says: 'Self-awareness, non-dual, clear like crystal, is said to exist in a pure way.' Moreover, appearances of objects that look outward are all conceptual constructs (parikalpita), and because they are produced by causes and conditions arising from the inner mind, they are dependent phenomena (paratantra). The experience of things, the non-dual self-awareness, is perfectly established (parinispanna) because it is very difficult to examine. The *La Xian Sutra* says: 'Unique and devoid of parts and aspects, like sun crystals, water moons, beryl, etc., the wisdom itself that is difficult to examine, such a stream of consciousness also exists constantly.' Regarding the tenets of the Mind-Only school, from the perspective of mind, there is no need to refute it. Because it is the Mind-Only school, refuting it includes: generally refuting the belief that the ultimate experience of non-duality, self-awareness, is subject to arising and ceasing; refuting the belief that appearances are conceptual illusions; refuting the belief that dependent phenomena are truly existent and subject to arising and ceasing; and refuting the specific tenets of each school. Firstly, for a moment of consciousness, does it have prior and subsequent parts or not? If it does, then the moment would be divided into three parts of time. If it does not, then will a coarse stream of consciousness arise? It will not arise. If it does not arise, then the coarse stream of consciousness will be interrupted. If it arises, then are the prior and subsequent connected or not connected? If they are not connected, then the subsequent will not arise from the prior. If they are connected, then are the prior and subsequent simultaneous or not simultaneous? If they are simultaneous, then because there is no past, present, or future, an eon would become just a moment. If they are not simultaneous, then the moment would be divided into three parts of time, and the vow of the moment would be broken. Furthermore, this is also the same as the refutation of the moment in the context of the Hearers (Śrāvakayana). Because it has become a moment of arising and ceasing, the three times are equal.
Chinese
您和，没有领悟到心离边大空的意义，并且偏离了。 在《啦香》中说： 其他的殊胜意义， 并非真实地安住于一个方面， 因为缘起显现是迷惑的部分， 所以与宣说二取的理智相违背。 并且在《广大母经》中说： 在三时平等性中，不可得过去际，不可得未来际，不可得现在际。 并且在《摄类》中说： 菩提萨埵不可得过去际和未来际， 现在生起也不可得，三时清净， 那些不是积聚所为，没有戏论， 这是殊胜般若波罗蜜多的行境。 这是因为这些。 第二个是， 如果显现的对境都是无有显现的错乱， 那么在错乱显现清净的时候，显现是有还是没有？ 如果有，就变成不是错乱显现，因为错乱也存在。 如果没有，就会产生一切智智的智慧中断等等的过失。 即使显现存在，但没有真实执着，所以存在一切智智，如果这样说。 即使所执境没有错乱，但佛陀也会有对显现境错乱的邪见之过失。 第三个是， 他空不能成为胜义谛， 因为它具有刹那前后之分， 并且是由因缘所生而显现的缘故。 在《中观根本慧论》中说： 自性从因和缘中， 不可能产生， 从因和缘中产生的， 自性就成了造作。 这样说的。 因此，胜义谛不是由因缘所生，是不变的，是无分。 在《集论》中说： 为什么称为如是性？ 因为它不会变成其他的缘故。 这样说的。 分别有两种， 认为实有显现是心的那个， 执持境的意识是错乱还是不错乱？ 如果不错乱，那么境就成了颠倒的真实。 如果错乱，那么境就是非实有虚假的， 与成为知识的自性真实相违背， 例如，梦中的众多马牛不能成立真实的马牛一样。 还有，如果显现是心，那么是心的自性还是从心中产生的？ 如果是产生的，那么是从有产生的还是从无产生的？ 如果是后者，那么就会出现从虚空中也产生花朵，以及外道的断灭见成为真实等等的过失。
English
You and, not realizing the meaning of the great emptiness free from extremes of mind, and deviating. As it says in Lashen: The sublime meaning of others, It is not truly situated in one aspect, Because the appearance of dependent origination is a part of delusion, Therefore, it contradicts the intellect that speaks of duality. And as it says in the Extensive Mother Sutra: In the equality of the three times, the past limit is not observed, the future limit is not observed, and the middle is not observed. And as it says in the Compendium: Bodhisattvas do not observe the past limit and the future limit, The present arising is not observed, the three times are pure, Those are unconditioned, without elaboration, This is the supreme conduct of the Perfection of Wisdom. This is because of these. Secondly, If all appearing objects are illusory appearances of non-existence, then when the illusory appearances are purified, is there appearance or not? If there is, then it becomes not an illusory appearance, because the illusion also exists. If there is not, then faults such as the cessation of the omniscient wisdom will occur. Even if there is appearance, but there is no clinging to truth, so there is omniscience, if you say so. Even if there is no delusion in the object of clinging, the Buddha will also have the fault of wrong knowledge of delusion in the object of appearance. Thirdly, Other-powered nature cannot be the ultimate truth, because it has parts of before and after moments, and because it appears after being produced by causes and conditions. As it says in the Root Verses on the Middle Way: It is not reasonable for self-nature To arise from causes and conditions; That which arises from causes and conditions Will become something artificial. It is said. Therefore, the ultimate truth is not produced by causes and conditions, is unchanging, and is without parts. As it says in the Compendium of Abhidharma: Why is it called Suchness? Because it does not change into anything else. It is said. Specifically, in two divisions, That which asserts true appearance as mind, Is the mind that grasps objects deluded or not deluded? If it is not deluded, then the object is necessarily true in a reversed way. If it is deluded, then the object is unreal and false, Which contradicts the truth of the nature of knowledge, For example, just as many horses and cows in a dream cannot establish a single true horse and cow. Also, if appearance is mind, then is it the nature of mind or does it arise from mind? If it arises, then does it arise from existence or from non-existence? If it is the latter, then it would follow that flowers also arise from space, and that the annihilationist view of the heretics would be true, and so on.
Chinese
如果像前面所说的那样，由于自生成立，则会成为顺世外道真实的过失。由于是从有产生的缘故，会成为错乱不是自性的过失。如果是本体，则错乱不是自性。即使是本体也错乱，那么刹那自明也会成为错乱的过失。如果说外境的显现是虚假的，外境不真实，那么在心中也不真实，因为认为境是虚假的，就像外境不真实，那么内在的识也不真实一样。就像没有彼，就没有此一样不真实。如果说识是体验的自证，所以是真实的，而外境是不真实的。那么外境也能从水火中起作用，所以是真实的。如果说即使能起作用，也是他识的错乱，所以是不真实的。那么同样体验也是自证的错乱，所以是一样的。玉汤中说：互相舍弃而成为相违。不是那样的话，境是虚假的，识也是虚假的。如此等等。差别是，如果认为显现的赤白等各种显现，虽然显现为多种多样，但真实是作为一个真实的识的本体而真实，那么多种多样的显现是错乱还是不错乱？如果不错乱，那么由于境不真实，所以不合理成为一个识。如果错乱，那么虚假是无实有的，所以不能成立为一个真实。例如，就像幻化的多种马牛不能成立一个真实一样。如果认为显现和识的数量那么多是真实的，也是相违的。如果每个无分微尘都显现为一个无分识，那么一个识流中就会成为有多个无分识的过失，并且会成为粗显完全不存在的过失。如果认为显现和识像剥开的鸡蛋一样是不同的，也是相违的。显现会成为不是心的显现。如果承认，那么也会和显现真实相违，并且会成为能取所取成为真实实有的过失。为什么呢？因为是不同的缘故。如果认为显现虚假像金和铜锈一样，就像铜锈干净的时候不会出现一样。成佛的时候，显现会出现还是不会出现？如果出现，那么比喻不相似。如果不出现，那么会有全知中断的过失。还有，如果认为显现和心没有关联，并且觉性像水晶一样清净，那么显现的周遍分别错乱不会遮蔽觉性。如果没有关联也遮蔽，那么众生的错乱也会遮蔽佛陀的过失。还有
English
If, as previously stated, it is established by self-origination, then it would be the fault of asserting the truth of the Tirthikas. Since it arises from what exists, it would be the fault of confusion not being its own nature. If it is the essence, then confusion is not its own nature. Even if it is the essence, if it is confused, then the instantaneous self-illumination would also be confused. If one says that the appearance of external phenomena is false, and the external objects are not true, then they are also not true in the mind, because considering the objects to be false is like saying that if the external objects are not true, then the internal consciousness is also not true. It is like saying that if there is no "that," then there is no "this." If one says that consciousness is the self-awareness that is experienced, so it is true, but the external is not true, then the external can also perform functions from fire and water, so it is true. If one says that even if it can perform functions, it is the confusion of other consciousness, so it is not true, then the experience is also the confusion of self-awareness, so it is the same. In the Yu Thang it says: "They mutually abandon each other and become contradictory. Otherwise, if the object is false, the consciousness is also false." And so on. The distinction is that if one considers the appearances of red, white, and various other appearances, although they appear in various ways, to be true as the essence of one true consciousness, then are the various appearances confused or not confused? If they are not confused, then since the object is not true, it is not reasonable to be one consciousness. If they are confused, then falsity is unreal, so it cannot be established as one truth. For example, just as various illusory horses and cows cannot establish one truth. It is also contradictory to assert that the number of appearances and consciousness is that many and true. If each indivisible atom appears as one indivisible consciousness, then it would be a fault that there would be many indivisible consciousnesses in one stream of consciousness, and it would be a fault that the coarse appearance would be completely non-existent. It is also contradictory to assert that appearances and consciousness are different like a peeled egg. Appearance would become not the appearance of the mind. If one admits this, then it would also contradict the truth of appearance, and it would be a fault that the grasper and the grasped would become truly existent. Why? Because they are different. If one considers appearance to be false like gold and copper rust, just as copper rust does not appear when it is clean, will appearance appear or not appear at the time of Buddhahood? If it appears, then the analogy is not similar. If it does not appear, then there would be the fault of the omniscient being interrupted. Furthermore, if one considers that appearance and mind are unrelated, and that awareness is pure like crystal, then the pervasive conceptual confusion of appearance would not obscure awareness. If it obscures even without being related, then the confusion of sentient beings would also obscure the Buddha's faults. Also,