Chinese
再次通过分析引导，使其持续下去。当这种定解变得恒常稳固时，据说应舍弃分析，保持在这种状态中。也就是说，在最初的阶段，应以执着于无我的方式进行禅修，并由此引导，当定解达到极致时，则不需要无我执着。最终，据说应禅修远离一切增益的离戏大空性。第二，展示其他的特殊法，在《二谛车》中说：不承认自相、自续、自识的差别；认为实执是烦恼障；不区分粗细二种无我的差别；承认灭谛是胜义谛，声闻、缘觉圣者通达法无我所遍及的差别；认为凡夫的意识是错乱识，分析识是量识的差别；认为意现和分别的所依相同；有凡夫能现量证悟微细无常的差别；认为三时是实有，仅仅证悟粗大无常等十六行相，也不能进入三乘任何一乘的加行道，这是应成派所具有的差别。为了稍微解释这些内容，总的来说，我自己的闻思不广，智慧迟钝，特别是对中观应成派的论典了解甚少，所以不能如实了解。然而，如果仅仅作为研究的依据来写，这些差别似乎是所有实事师和自续派的特殊法。如果是这样，虽然应成派和自续派的大车在究竟义上没有差别，但在暂时确定一切法无自性的方式上分为两种，应成派确定的是远离一切承许的非名言的胜义谛，所有的世俗承许都与未经观察的世间人相同，不像经过分析而说的自续派等的主张。自续派则以具有承许的名言胜义谛为重点，由于讲说方式的缘故，主要使用自续的理证，并认为经过分析的世俗是量成立等等。因此，
English
Again, by guiding through analysis, it should be continued. When that ascertainment becomes constantly stable, it is said that analysis should be abandoned and maintained in that state. That is to say, in the initial stage, one should meditate with the grasping of selflessness, and guided by that, when the ascertainment reaches its peak, there is no need for grasping of selflessness. Finally, it is said that one should meditate on the great emptiness free from all elaborations, the freedom from conceptual proliferation. Secondly, to show other special qualities, in the "Two Truths Chariot": The difference of not accepting one's own characteristics, one's own system, and one's own awareness; the difference of considering the grasping of truth as afflictive obscuration; the difference of not distinguishing between subtle and coarse selflessness; the difference of asserting that the truth of cessation is the ultimate truth, and that it is pervasive that Hearers and Solitary Realizers realize the selflessness of phenomena; the difference of considering the consciousness of ordinary beings as mistaken consciousness, and analytical consciousness as valid cognition; the difference of asserting that the basis of mental direct perception and conceptual thought are the same; the difference of having ordinary beings who directly realize subtle impermanence; the difference of asserting that the three times are real, and that merely realizing the sixteen aspects such as coarse impermanence is not enough to enter even the path of preparation of any of the three vehicles, which is a characteristic of the Consequentialists. To explain these meanings a little, in general, my own learning is limited and my wisdom is dull, and especially because I have little knowledge of the treatises of the Consequentialists, I do not know exactly. However, if I write it only as a basis for research, these differences seem to be special qualities of all substantialists and even of the Autonomists. If so, although the great chariots of the Consequentialists and Autonomists have no difference in their ultimate meaning, they are divided into two in the way of establishing all phenomena as devoid of inherent existence. The Consequentialists establish only the ultimate truth that is devoid of all assertions and is non-conceptual, and all conventional assertions are the same as those of the unexamined world, unlike the assertions of the Autonomists and others who speak after analysis. The Autonomists, on the other hand, emphasize the nominal ultimate truth with assertions, and mainly use the autonomous reasoning because of the way of teaching, and believe that the conventional is validly established after analysis, and so on. Therefore,
Chinese
关于不承认自性和他体的意义。自续派认为，名言中所谓的“生”，是指由自己的体性或自己的自性所成立的事物，这种事物即使经过胜义谛的观察也不会被否定，因此他们认为这样的事物在名言中也具有自己的刹那相续。然而，应成派则认为，二谛都不生。如《入中论》中说：“彼时以何理，不许自他生，即此理于世，亦不许彼生，故汝依何生。”自释中说：“因此，自性生在二谛中都不存在。”所谓不承认自明，是指不要说胜义谛中不承认自明，即使在名言中，如果也认为事物由自相成立，并且也承认自明，那么就必须有能知和所知，因此也不承认这样的观点。然而，中观的论典如《理聚论》等中，仅仅因为没有明确承认自明，就认为在名言中也一定不存在，这是不一定的。例如，应成派的观点中，原生心和俱生大乐智慧等名言，因为没有必要附加意义所以没有说，但这并不意味着这些在名言中不存在。如果认为这与自明不同，因为自明是被特意遮止的，所以在名言中也不存在，那么如果所有被特意遮止的事物在名言中都根本不存在，那么其他种类等所有名言都将中断。如果说名言的安立是遵循世间人的，所以外在的相续不会中断，那么仅仅如此也可以说自明，因为世间人认为自己的心识不会对自己隐藏。因此，如果说在名言中一定不存在，那么就必须像名言的识知直接损害常声、作者自在和主宰等一样，而自明并没有受到名言量直接的损害。关于世间名言的范畴中，不可能存在以自明为因的忆念等说法，如颂云：“自明虽立亦粗显，如是忆念非能知，由他未识于相续，生起如是念知识。”如是说，前后之识
English
The meaning of not accepting self-nature and other-entity. The Svatantrika school believes that the so-called "arising" in conventional truth refers to things that are established by their own nature or their own self-nature. These things are not negated even when examined by the ultimate truth. Therefore, they believe that such things also have their own momentary continuum in conventional truth. However, the Prasangika school believes that neither of the two truths arises. As it is said in the *Entering the Middle Way* (Madhyamakāvatāra): "By whatever reasoning it is not accepted that things arise from self or other, by that same reasoning it is not accepted that they arise in conventional truth. Therefore, by what does your arising occur?" The auto-commentary says: "Therefore, arising from self-nature does not exist in either of the two truths." The so-called not accepting self-awareness means that, not to mention not accepting self-awareness in the ultimate truth, even in conventional truth, if one also believes that things are established by their own characteristics and also accepts self-awareness, then there must be a knower and a known. Therefore, such a view is also not accepted. However, in Madhyamaka treatises such as the *Collection of Reasoning*, it is not necessarily the case that just because self-awareness is not explicitly acknowledged, it must be non-existent in conventional truth. For example, in the Prasangika view, the terms such as innate mind and coemergent great bliss wisdom are not mentioned because there is no need to add meaning, but this does not mean that they do not exist in conventional truth. If one thinks that this is different from self-awareness because self-awareness is specifically prohibited, so it does not exist in conventional truth, then if all specifically prohibited things do not exist at all in conventional truth, then all conventional truths such as other kinds will be interrupted. If it is said that the establishment of conventional truths follows worldly people, so the external continuum will not be interrupted, then self-awareness can also be spoken of in this way, because worldly people believe that their own minds are not hidden from themselves. Therefore, if it is said that it must not exist in conventional truth, then it must be like the knowledge of conventional truth directly harming permanent sound, the agent Ishvara, and the chief, etc., but self-awareness is not directly harmed by the measure of conventional truth. Regarding the statement that in the category of worldly conventional truth, there cannot be memory caused by self-awareness, etc., as the verse says: "Although self-awareness is established, it is also coarse and obvious, but in this way, memory does not know memory, because it arises in the continuum without being known by others, like such memory knowledge." As it is said, the previous and subsequent consciousnesses
Chinese
以自相成立的各个事物，虽然过去自己可以亲自体验，但现在不可能回忆起来，这显示了这种道理。如果有人认为，如果自证在名言中存在，那么能作、所作、作用三者就会成立，例如，能知是蓝色，所知是蓝色，通过执蓝的能知以及能知的行为等等都需要像能知一样。但这也是仅仅是名言安立，实际上并不成立。蓝色和执蓝二者，无论观察是否相合，先后等等，无论如何也不成立。然而，就像名言中可以安立能知、所知等名言一样，对于感受苦乐等，即使观察能作等不成立，也仅仅是在名言中，感受境是苦乐等，感受者是了知，清楚地体验到等等，仅仅是安立这样的名言，没有任何损害，而且非常合理。如《入行论》云：何者以何而领受，由此生起之忆念，此异于我非有故，因此我见如是念，此亦世间名言法。意思是说，不是以忆念的了知来领受所体验的乐受，因此忆念会与境相合而生起。自己解释说，凡是以体验的了知来完全断除的，忆念不会完全断除。法称论师也说：意识无有他所缘，亦无由彼而领受，无有能取所取故，是故彼性自明了。以及《中观庄严论》中说：识从物质自性转，极度生起即是识，何为非物质自性，此即自性即是识。一体无分自性中，三种自性不应理，故以自性而了知，非是能作所作事。这样说的是能取所取无有差别，能作所作的实体没有差别，仅仅是自明自显，所以不要认为有矛盾。还有，如果《入行论·智慧品》中说：无有自证然以识，忆念譬如中毒鼠，由与他受有关联，生起忆念如鼠毒。这样说，虽然以前没有中毒，但后来却安立了忆念，难道不是说在名言中没有意义吗？对于安立比喻的方式，是这样认为的
English
That individual things established by their own characteristics, although one could have personally experienced them in the past, it is impossible to recall them now, which demonstrates this reasoning. If someone thinks that if self-awareness exists in name, then the three aspects of agent, object, and action would be established from their own side. For example, the knowable is blue, the knower is the one who grasps blue, and the act of knowing, along with the act of knowing, needs to be like the knower. But this is merely a designation in name, and it is not established in reality. Whether blue and the one who grasps blue are in contact or not, whether they are before or after, in any case, they are not established. However, just as in name, one can appropriately designate the terms knowable, knower, and so on, similarly, when examining the experience of pleasure and pain, even if the agent and so on are not established, merely in name, the object of experience is pleasure and pain, and the experiencer is awareness, clearly experiencing it, and so on. There is no harm in applying such a name, and it is very reasonable. As it says in the *Entering the Middle Way*: "Because whatever is experienced by whatever, from that arises the memory, this is different from me, therefore I remember 'I saw,' this is also the way of worldly convention." The meaning is that it is not that the pleasure experienced is not experienced by the awareness of memory, therefore memory arises in conjunction with the object. The self-commentary says that whatever is completely cut off by the awareness of experience is not completely cut off by memory. Dharmakirti also said: "Consciousness has no other object, nor is it experienced by that, because there is no grasper and grasped, therefore that nature is self-luminous." And in the *Ornament of the Middle Way* it says: "Consciousness turns from the nature of matter, the extreme arising is consciousness, what is the non-material nature, this self is consciousness. In the nature of one indivisible, the three natures are not reasonable, therefore knowing by oneself, it is not the object of agent and action." This speaks of the non-difference of grasper and grasped, and the non-difference of the entity of agent and action, merely self-luminous, so do not think there is a contradiction. Furthermore, if in the *Entering the Bodhisattva's Way of Life, Wisdom Chapter* it says: "Without self-awareness, yet with consciousness, the example of memory is like a poisoned mouse, arising from association with the experience of others, memory arises like mouse poison." This says that although one has not been poisoned before, later memory is established, is it not saying that there is no meaning in name? Regarding the way of establishing the example, it is thought to be like this.