English
Furthermore, it distinguishes not from the perspective of the object, but from the manner of clinging. That is, clinging to the person (pudgala), considering it to be an independently existing entity, is the clinging to the self of the person; clinging to the person, etc., considering it to be truly established, is considered the clinging to the self of phenomena. These are the general views of the Svatantrika Madhyamaka school. The specific distinctions of the Svatantrika are divided into two: the lower and the upper. The first, in the lower, there is also what is called 'established by illusion' (sgyu mar rigs grub pa), such as the teacher Ocean of Clouds (rgya mtsho'i sprin), etc., who believe that all phenomena are without inherent existence, like the nature of illusion. Both truths exist: the appearance of conventional truth is unreal, like an illusion; the ultimate truth is emptiness, but the appearance of dependent origination is not ceased. Therefore, accumulating the two accumulations like an illusion, attaining the result of enlightenment like an illusion, and constantly abiding in the nature of illusion, they benefit sentient beings like illusions through illusory activities. Therefore, due to the power of causes, conditions, and dependent origination, all appearances are like illusions. Confused appearances are illusions, and in the realm of appearance of wisdom free from confusion, the appearance where conceptual elaborations are pacified but clarity is not ceased is also like an illusion. In short, they consider the basis, path, and result all to be like illusions. Also, there is what is called 'appearance and emptiness are different' (snang stong tha dad pa), such as the teacher Glorious Hidden One (dpal sbas), etc., who believe that nothing is established in the ultimate sense, so there is no need to specifically point out that it is an illusion. But in conventional designation, pots, etc., are not emptiness, because they appear to be functional and are real. In the ultimate sense, nothing can be found upon analysis, so it is emptiness. Therefore, the ultimate, which can withstand analysis, and the conventional, which cannot withstand analysis, as the subject and the nature, do not belong to one entity. If the conventional were like impermanence, the ultimate would also be so; if the ultimate were like non-arising and non-ceasing, the conventional would also be so. Therefore, the appearance, the conventional subject, and emptiness, the ultimate nature, are merely established in dependence on each other. The conventional is also divided into true and false, which is the same as above. The second, the upper Svatantrika, such as the teachers Jñanagarbha, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla, etc., believe that the ultimate is only illusion and emptiness, because it cannot withstand analysis by reasoning. Therefore, in the meaning of the ultimate reality, the ultimate, which is not a mere name, is beyond all conceptual elaborations.
Chinese
然而，在这种情况下，在名言世俗的层面，事物各自保持其特征且不虚妄。如果用理智分析，就会发现它们毫无成立之处，因此，通过同时确立空性或胜义的两种不同方面，我们既予以肯定，又通过自续理性的方式进行自宗的论证和对其他观点的驳斥。例如，如果有人认为事物是常恒的，那么我们会反驳说：事物，作为所立宗，应是不常恒的，因为它是被造作的，就像瓶子一样。在驳斥之后，我们提出自续的誓言：事物，作为所立宗，是不常恒的，因为它已被造作，即因为它是由因缘所生的。类似这样的论证。从这以下，也承认他生。关于在世俗层面如何返回，已经在之前普遍阐述二谛时讲过了。此外，这些错误的世俗现象在未获得清净地之前不会逆转，因此，圣者们后得的显现被称为清净的世间。因此，通过无矛盾地了解二谛，积累二资粮，并认为可以获得二身。此外，如果根据是否接受外境来命名，那么列丹炯（ལེགས་ལྡན་འབྱེད）著有《中观根本慧论释·般若灯论》，其追随者益西宁波（ཡེ་ཤེས་སྙིང་པོ）著有包括自释的《中观二谛论》。这两位父子在名言上接受外境，但不接受自识，因此被称为随经部的自续中观派。寂护（ཞི་བ་འཚོ）著有《中观庄严论》，其弟子噶玛拉希拉（ཀ་ཤཱི）著有《中观光明论》，这两位父子在名言上不接受外境，而接受自识，因此被称为瑜伽行自续中观派。据说，在寂护之前出现的圣者解脱军（གྲོལ་སྡེ་）是瑜伽行自续中观派，但不被认为是开创者，据说还有其他类似的情况。因此，如果通过依赖这些自续派确立二谛的方式，在胜义中未成立的同时，能够毫无阻碍地显现缘起的现象，并对此获得定解，那么就有机会进入无住大中观。如果不是这样，而是不对从无始以来就习惯的实执阿塔的分别念进行纠正，从一开始就
English
However, in this context, on the level of conventional terminology, things each maintain their characteristics and are not deceptive. If analyzed with reason, they are found to have no establishment whatsoever. Therefore, by simultaneously establishing emptiness or the two different aspects of ultimate truth, we both affirm and, through the means of autonomous reasoning, carry out the establishment of our own system and the refutation of other views. For example, if someone believes that things are permanent, then we would refute by saying: Things, as the subject of debate, should be impermanent, because they are created, like a pot. After the refutation, we present our own autonomous pledge: Things, as the subject of debate, are impermanent, because they are created, that is, because they arise from causes and conditions. Such is the nature of this argument. From this point onward, they also accept other-origination. Regarding how to revert on the conventional level, it has already been explained earlier when generally discussing the two truths. Furthermore, these mistaken conventional phenomena do not reverse until one attains the pure ground. Therefore, the subsequent attainment appearances of the noble ones are called pure mundane. Thus, by understanding the two truths without contradiction, one accumulates the two accumulations and believes that one can attain the two bodies. Furthermore, if naming is done according to whether or not external objects are accepted, then Legdenjé (ལེགས་ལྡན་འབྱེད) composed the commentary on the Root Wisdom, the "Lamp of Wisdom," and his follower Yeshé Nyingpo (ཡེ་ཤེས་སྙིང་པོ) composed the "Madhyamaka Two Truths" including its auto-commentary. These two, father and son, accept external objects conventionally but do not accept self-awareness, and so are called the Sūtra-following Svātantrika Madhyamaka. Śāntarakṣita composed the "Ornament of Madhyamaka," and his student Kamalaśīla composed the "Illumination of Madhyamaka," and these two, father and son, do not accept external objects conventionally but do accept self-awareness, and so are known as the Yoga-following Svātantrika Madhyamaka. It is said that the noble Vimuktisena (གྲོལ་སྡེ་), who came before Śāntarakṣita, was a Yoga-following Svātantrika Madhyamaka, but he is not considered a founder, and it is said that there are others like him. Therefore, if by relying on the way these Svātantrikas establish the two truths, the appearance of dependent origination can arise unhindered while not being established ultimately, and if one gains certainty about this, then there will be an opportunity to enter the great non-abiding Madhyamaka. If it is not like that, but instead, without correcting the clinging to reality, the conceptualization of Ata that has been habitual from beginningless time, from the very beginning
Chinese
如果通过贬低后来者来抬高自己，那只是犯了诽谤宗派和舍弃佛法的过失，而且难以理解前辈的意图，如果将所有诀窍的锋芒都施加在这颗心上，那么所有的论典都会显现为教言。自续派也认为，仅凭中观论典中所说的强大理证来破除常断二边，与应成派并无不同，因此将在下文展示这些理证。第二，讲述应成中观派的宗义，分为三点：基础是中观二谛双运，道路是中观二资粮双运，果实是中观二身双运。第一点分为四部分：真实宣说如何确立基础，阐述其超越其他宗派的理由，确定如此确立的修习要点，详细阐述承认与不承认的区别。第一部分分为三点：确立所知二谛的自性，确定所破二我的体性，阐述如何通过能破理证进行分析。第一点是确立所知二谛的自性：如此，所有显现和存在的法，都是依缘而生，如幻如梦般显现，不考察其是否成立等，就作为进入胜义谛的方便而称为世俗谛。如《入行论自释》中说：因此，任何世俗谛，都是进入胜义谛的方便，因此不考察自生和他生，而是按照世间的习惯来承认。又如经部中说：世尊与世间一同争论，而我不与世间一同争论。世间认为存在的，我也认为存在；世间认为不存在的，我也认为不存在。就像这样。所谓的世间习惯，不仅仅是表面上顺应他人，而是指任何依缘而生的显现，对所有自他都无欺地显现，就如其显现的那样，不考察其存在与否而承认。法，以及
English
If one elevates oneself by disparaging those who came later, it only incurs the fault of slandering sects and abandoning the Dharma, and it is difficult to understand the intentions of the predecessors. If all the sharpness of the essential instructions is applied to this mind, then all the scriptures will appear as instructions. The Svatantrikas also believe that merely refuting the extremes of permanence and annihilation with the great reasonings spoken of in the Madhyamaka scriptures is no different from the Prasangikas, so these reasonings will be shown below. Second, explaining the tenets of the Prasangika Madhyamaka, there are three points: the basis is the union of the two truths of Madhyamaka, the path is the union of the two accumulations of Madhyamaka, and the result is the union of the two bodies of Madhyamaka. The first point has four parts: actually explaining how to establish the basis, explaining the reasons why it is superior to others, identifying the meditation points of such establishment, and specifically explaining the distinctions of what to accept and not accept. The first part has three points: establishing the nature of the two truths of knowable objects, identifying the nature of the two selves to be refuted, and explaining how to analyze with the refuting reasonings. The first point is to establish the nature of the two truths of knowable objects: Thus, all phenomena that appear and exist are dependently originated, appearing like illusions and dreams. Without examining whether they are established or not, they are called conventional truth as a means of entering the ultimate truth. As it says in the auto-commentary of the "Entering [the Middle Way]": Therefore, whatever is conventional truth is the means of entering the ultimate truth, so without examining self-origination and other-origination, it is accepted according to worldly customs. And as it says in the sutras: The Blessed One argues with the world, but I do not argue with the world. Whatever the world considers to exist, I also consider to exist; whatever the world considers not to exist, I also consider not to exist. Like that. The so-called worldly custom is not merely showing face to others, but refers to any appearance that arises dependently, appearing unerringly to all self and others, and accepting it as it appears, without examining its existence or non-existence. The subject, and
Chinese
不共的法性，是指显现的自性，无论是有或无等，在任何方面都未成立的空性中，从原始以来就存在，这被称为胜义谛，只是从名言的角度安立而已。对于这个意义，两者不落于显现和空性的任何一方，诸法自性无基无根，因此远离一切戏论的边。否则，如果名言中存在的事物没有被遮止，仅仅是空掉了其上的真实成立，那么通过显空二者来遮止有无戏论的戏论寂灭，只是与此名称相似，意义并不相同。如果知道通过无实和无实来区分的两种显现，在有和无之间变得不同，即使知道这样的无实，也无法稍微阻止贪执等，无论如何习惯这样的空性，对于名言的法，执著于此的观念也不会消失。如果这个观念不消失，那么对于它的贪嗔等又如何能摧毁呢？《如意宝藏论》中，在驳斥自续以下显空异体的观点时说：非显现的空性，两种真理都不可能存在，不能被证悟，如果变得不同，那么舍取就不合理，就像对敌人产生嗔恨时，知道虚空是空性也无济于事一样。执著于虚假的显现，而另外知道是空性，也无济于事。此外，《三摩地王经》中也说：谁人安住于女人之想，彼等贪欲增长。如果摧毁这些想，贪欲不会沾染。如果无有想，那么慈爱等又如何修习呢？必须将这些与真实成立的想结合，而不是必须没有那个对境的想。如果有人说，对于女人和敌人等对境，执著于此，是能生起烦恼的所取能取分别，如果不舍弃它，那么除此之外，在那个对境上就没有所谓的真实成立的遮止之物了。姜嘉若贝多吉的道歌中说：现在我们的一些聪明人，将明晃晃的显现放在一边，却在寻找有角的遮止之物，就像担心老妈妈逃跑一样。如是说。因此，对于初学者来说，容易理解的