English
If determined by the characteristic reason, that which needs to be determined is inconsistent with both similar examples and dissimilar examples, i.e., it does not exist in either aspect. This is inconsistent with any subject of dharma in the example other than the subject of debate, therefore it is the uncommon uncertain reason. For example: Sound, as the subject of dharma, is impermanent, because it is a product. The reason in this syllogism does not exist in either the similar side or the dissimilar side, therefore it is the unseen uncommon uncertain reason. Therefore, that which is incompatible with any of the similar or dissimilar sides other than the subject of dharma is called the uncommon uncertain reason. In reality, it is inconsistent with any of the pure sides other than the impure such as permanent things. Secondly, from "everything is mind" to "this is dissimilar" is shown. By stating the uncertain reason, reversing what is to be established is: everything is an object of mind. This is stated because the object of mind is consistent with all aspects. Since this reason cannot be established alone in any correct aspect of the proposition, the conclusion to be established cannot be certainly established by the power of pervading all aspects of similarity and dissimilarity of the whole object, so it is a common uncertain reason. For example: Sound, as the subject of dharma, is impermanent, because it is knowable by mind, like a pot. And, sound, as the subject of dharma, is permanent, because it is knowable, like space. Whichever is stated, that reason itself exists in all similar sides, and also exists in all dissimilar sides. Therefore, the conclusion to be established, impermanence, cannot be established, and conversely, permanence cannot be established, so it is a common uncertain reason. Therefore, that which is compatible with both the similar side and the dissimilar side other than the subject of dharma is called the common uncertain reason. In reality, the object of mind pervades all permanent and impermanent things, so it is a common uncertain reason. Its characteristic is that no matter which subject of dharma the topic of debate is placed on, no matter what conclusion is established, it cannot be certainly established. Whatever is vowed with the conclusion to be established itself as the target, and whatever reason is stated that is inconsistent with all aspects, by the power of one of them, it can be determined that the vow and the reason are inconsistent, therefore it appears to be in accordance with the nature of reversal, thus mutually
Chinese
所谓“不符”，是指在一个不符的性质上，由于显现出一个不符的性质，而成为相违的理由。例如：声音，有法。是常，因为是所作。如果这样立宗，那么，这个理由就成了仅仅存在于所立的相违品一方，所以叫做相违。因此，这个理由必定会成立与所立相违的结论。对此进行分类，有观待于意义和观待于心识两种。第一种分为：反驳颠倒和成立颠倒两种。第一种，例如：这个房屋里，有法。没有瓶子，因为是能被显现的量所缘。这就像所有不缘的倒转之相。第二种，例如：某处，有法。有火，因为没有烟。以及，声音，有法。是常，因为是所作。这就像所有与果自身之相和所立相违的事例。第二种是，在承认声音是常的前提下，海螺声，有法。是无常，因为是声音。这就像成立相违。以及，在承认存在的事物不会新产生的前提下，瓶子，有法。不是新产生的，因为是存在的。这就像反驳相违。这样共有四种。实际上，所作之相和常之所立二者相违，所以必定是不符，就像这样。它的定义是：在诤论处有法上，必定成立与所立相违的结论。又如：声音，有法。不是由功用所生，因为是无常。相似的例子如闪电、森林之花和天空。不相似的例子如瓶子等。这个论式中，声音的所立与不符的事物，比如瓶子，其本体与非功用生不符，而无常的理由又存在于此，所以存在于所有不符的一方。虽然存在于相似的一方闪电中，却不存在于天空，因此，相似方内部也存在不符。这被称为与成立正确的所立不符，因此成为不定因的范畴。对此也可以分类，分为观待于意义的共同不定因和观待于心识的增益不定因两种。第一种又分为，周遍于双方，声音
English
This so-called "discordance" refers to a situation where, due to the appearance of one discordant characteristic on another discordant characteristic, it becomes a contradictory reason. For example: Sound, the subject. It is permanent, because it is produced. If such a sign is posited, then that reason itself resides only in the contradictory side of what is to be proven, hence it is called contradictory. Therefore, that sign will definitely establish the opposite of what is to be proven. This can be divided into two types: those that depend on meaning and those that depend on cognition. The first has two types: reversed negation and reversed affirmation. The first is like: In this house, the subject. There is no pot, because it is perceived by a valid cognition that can perceive it. This is like all reversed aspects of non-apprehension. The second is like: In some place, the subject. There is fire, because there is no smoke. And: Sound, the subject. It is permanent, because it is produced. This is like all instances where the sign and what is to be proven are reversed. The second is: Given the premise that sound is permanent, conch sound, the subject. It is impermanent, because it is sound. This is like contradictory affirmation. And, given the premise that existing things do not newly arise, a pot, the subject. It is not newly arising, because it exists. This is like contradictory negation. Thus, there are four types. In essence, the sign of being produced and the proposition of permanence are contradictory, so it is definitely discordant, like that. Its definition is: On the subject of the debate, it is certain to establish a conclusion that is the opposite of what is to be proven. Furthermore: Sound, the subject. It is not produced by effort, because it is impermanent. Similar examples are lightning, forest flowers, and the sky. Dissimilar examples are pots, etc. In that formulation, the proposition of sound is discordant with something like a pot, whose essence is discordant with being non-effort-produced, and the reason of impermanence is present in it, so it exists in all discordant sides. Although it exists in the similar side of lightning, it does not exist in the sky, so there is discordance even within the similar side. This is called being discordant with establishing the correct proposition, therefore it becomes a category of uncertain reasons. This can also be divided into two types: the common uncertain reason that depends on meaning and the excessive uncertain reason that depends on cognition. The first is further divided into: being pervasive in both sides, sound
Chinese
例如，无常，因为是可以衡量的。在顺品方面普遍可见，在违品方面则分为两部分。声音，作为所立宗，应是勤作所生，因为是无常的。在违品方面普遍，在顺品方面分为两部分。声音，作为所立宗，应不是勤作所生，因为是无常的。在两个方面都分为两部分。海螺声，作为所立宗，是可以听闻的，因为是勤作所生的，这是四种情况。这里，通过展示第一种和第三种情况，可以理解其他情况。第二种情况分为：具有正确剩余和具有相违剩余两种。第一种情况：声音是无常的，因为是所作的。如果对所作和常住的相违不知晓，则在顺品方面可见，即使在违品方面不可见，也不能确定在违品方面不存在，从而产生怀疑。第二种情况：声音，作为所立宗，是常住的，因为是所作的。如果对常住和所作的相违不知晓，则在违品方面可见，即使在顺品方面不可见，也会认为可能存在于顺品方面，从而具有怀疑的剩余。或者，如果将与所立宗不同的两个方面中的任何一个不相似的方面，执为一方并结合为相似，由于不明显的力量而显现不相似，因此不能正确看到。因此，这种被称为相互不相似的事物，由于不能正确成立所要证明的事物，因此是不相似或不正确的，所以是不共不定因。对此也可以分为两种：取决于意义和取决于心识。第一种：在两个方面都不存在而不可见，例如：声音，作为所立宗，是无常的，因为是可以听闻的。第二种：在两个方面都存在但不可见，例如：这个人，作为所立宗，是从天界转生而来的，因为具有眼睛。因为无法确定是从天界转生而来还是没有转生而来，所以在两个方面都不可见，从而产生怀疑。在顺品方面存在但不可见，在违品方面不存在而可见，在心识方面成为不共的。对于认为吠陀之声是常住的人来说，声音，作为所立宗，是无常的，就像吠陀之声一样。在违品方面存在但不可见。在吠陀论者看来，凡不是所作的，都是常住的，例如吠陀。
English
For example, impermanent, because it is measurable. It is seen to be universally present in the similar side, but divides into two parts on the dissimilar side. Sound, as the subject of the proposition, should be produced from effort, because it is impermanent. It is universally present on the dissimilar side, and divides into two parts on the similar side. Sound, as the subject of the proposition, should not be produced from effort, because it is impermanent. It divides into two parts on both sides. Conch sound, as the subject of the proposition, is audible, because it is produced from effort, these are the four cases. Here, by illustrating the first and third cases, one should understand the others as well. The second is divided into: having correct residue and having contradictory residue. The first: sound is impermanent, because it is produced. If one does not know the contradiction between produced and permanent, it is seen on the similar side, and even if it is not seen on the dissimilar side, it is not certain that it does not exist on the dissimilar side, thus creating doubt. The second: sound, as the subject of the proposition, is permanent, because it is produced. If one does not know the contradiction between permanent and produced, it is seen on the dissimilar side, and even if it is not seen on the similar side, one might think it exists on the similar side, thus having the residue of doubt. Alternatively, if one takes any dissimilar aspect from the two aspects other than the subject of the proposition, and combines it as similar, because the dissimilar appears due to the power of being unknown, it is not seen correctly. Therefore, this thing called mutual dissimilarity, because it does not correctly establish the thing to be proven, is dissimilar or incorrect, so it is the uncommon uncertain reason. This can also be divided into two: depending on meaning and depending on mind. The first: not existing on both sides and therefore not seen, for example: sound, as the subject of the proposition, is impermanent, because it is audible. The second: existing on both sides but not seen, for example: this person, as the subject of the proposition, is reborn from the realm of the gods, because he has eyes. Because it is impossible to determine whether he is reborn from the realm of the gods or not, he is not seen on both sides, thus creating doubt. Existing on the similar side but not seen, and not existing on the dissimilar side and therefore seen, becoming uncommon in the mind. For those who believe that the sound of the Vedas is permanent, sound, as the subject of the proposition, is impermanent, like the sound of the Vedas. Existing on the dissimilar side but not seen. In the view of the Vedic scholars, whatever is not produced is pervaded by permanence, for example, the Vedas.
Chinese
例如，像记录“虚空也未造作”一样。第三，从“楞伽”到“那也未闻”之间所显示的是：楞伽的主人，此外，也变成了相似的例子。将那个征相安置在争论的主题上，并且与相似的例子主题结合时，因为它显现出与相似的一方不一致，所以会变成非共同的相违，因此不能确定是正确的相似例子。所谓“不成立所要成立的法，所以在世间上不闻名作为相似的例子”。例如，声音，主题，是常，因为不是有身之物。例如虚空一样。如果这样安立就不正确了。声音，主题，是无常，因为不是有身之物。例如心和心所一样。如果这样说，在任何一方面都有相似之处，所以不是与唯一正确者一致。法性，主题，是不生的，因为不离真实的单一和众多。例如虚空中的花朵一样。如果这样安立，也只是相似的例子，因为虚空中的花朵的特征完全断绝，是遍计所执，所以不能确定是相似的例子。同样，在与不相似的例子结合时，也有显现为相似例子的部分，所以不能成立为唯一的不相似，那是由于非共同的相违，因此不能确定是不相似的例子。像这样说的，那在世间上也不闻名作为不相似例子的主题。例如，反驳前者，或者虚空，主题，是常，因为不是有身之物。例如瓶子一样。如果作为不相似的例子来安立，那就是相似的。灭，主题，不是有为法，因为不是有身之物。例如虚空一样。如果这样说，也会变成那个征相的相似例子。还有，法性，主题，不是有为法，因为不是由因缘所生。例如瓶子一样。如果这样做，法性也不是常恒的，瓶子也不是常恒的，因为有相似之处，所以那不能确定是不相似的例子。第四，从“凡未闻名”到“不正确”之间所显示的是：凡未闻名作为相似的显现，无论攻方还是辩方，谁将各自的臆测作为主题