English
It also cannot express it. Why? Because even the perfectly enlightened Buddha finds it difficult to indicate this Dharma nature with words and letters; it is un-indicatable. The sons of the four-bodied Buddhas teach the four assemblies of disciples, and even without speaking any words, or even without words, they can be understood through the broad meaning. However, both the teacher explaining in words and the disciples hearing are non-existent. Second, it is shown that it cannot be determined by speculation. If one engages in discernment of right and wrong, that is the basis for thinking from oneself to others. If one thinks in that way, it is dependent on focusing on an object. If one focuses on an object, then the habit of clinging to self will change. Therefore, because one is bound by the knot of the grasped and the grasper, one cannot be liberated from samsara; there is the fault of not being liberated. So, if one speculates when thinking earlier, these two are the cause of knowledge. Is it contradictory to say that speculation is the cause of view, and here to say that it is a fault? No, it is not. Here it means that when understanding the nature of knowable things, even some people with very excellent wisdom understand it from the perspective of the fullness of meaning. And before, it meant that for people with less wisdom, initially, it is established as a way to seek views from the perspective of hearing and thinking. Or, speculation has coarse and fine, or long and short distinctions, so there is no fault. Third, the example and meaning of understanding without speculation. Since neither speculation can liberate, it is like needing gold to show itself when looking at gold. All dharmas are self-nature great wisdom, so one should not seek the object to be observed and the wisdom to observe, because both are unobtainable. Do not seek to view through clinging to "it is like this" through verbal thinking (coarse) and analytical discrimination (fine). One must understand that the intention of the seven Buddhas is that the words themselves are the Buddhas, that is, seeing the meaning of the seven Buddhas themselves. Fourth, it is shown that the nature of the meaning of understanding is free from bondage and liberation. No one is bound by a binder like an enemy, and there is no object of bondage like a rope, and there is no state of being bound like an enemy prisoner. Therefore, when it appears to be bound, there is self-grasping and sentient beings.
English
Since the objects of suffering are not established in the nature of reality, which is the nature of mind, there is no binding. Since there is also no liberator, one does not desire to abandon samsara and liberate the continuum in the realm of transcendence, and is therefore naturally free from bondage. As it is said in the Magical Vajra: 'The bound, the binder, and the one who binds, the self-grasping sentient beings, the objects of suffering, all are of the nature of mind, even the name of self-grasping does not exist. Therefore, since both are absent, one does not desire liberation and is free from bondage.' Thus it is said. Fifth, it is with the definitive word that understanding through discriminating wisdom is supreme. Straightforward. Because discriminating wisdom does not take any object of samsara and nirvana as an object to be measured and contemplated, it realizes the suchness of all phenomena that appear separately, such as samsara and nirvana, without any distortion. Therefore, it is supreme or excellent among discriminating wisdoms, because it contemplates all separate appearances without naming them for the sake of discriminating wisdom. The ornament representing discriminating wisdom is 'Gams,' which is stated as a reason for understanding without examination. Here, there are two refutations of the argument against the reason of non-examination: the view of Lhaje Chenpo and the view of Gyal. The first has two parts: argument and refutation. There are two arguments: the refutation of the argument that all beings are liberated without effort, and the refutation of the argument that the definition of discriminating wisdom is impaired. The first is: if one understands without examination, then ordinary people will understand the Dharma nature, because one understands even without examination. Thus it is said. The latter is that the definition of discriminating wisdom is not established, because it is said to be understanding after examining and analyzing, but here it is understanding without examination, if one says so. The refutation is: the first fault does not occur, because no one has bound, there is no binding. The four lines explain that the meaning of abiding is free from bondage and liberation, but ordinary beings do not understand its meaning and are accompanied by the habit of delusion. Therefore, ordinary beings do not see the Dharma nature. Here, understanding the meaning of the absence of both bondage and liberation, and being free from the habit of delusion, understanding without examination, although it is a fortunate self-benefit, is liberated because it encounters the cause of reason.
Chinese
是所希望的。最终的过失也不会产生，因为对于任何事物都没有分别的认识。这五句是指对于轮回涅槃或者自共相之类的任何事物，都没有通过分别的智慧去作为对境进行思考和辨析，而是未经思考就能够证悟并理解轮回涅槃和自共相等一切显现之法的真如。这比需要辨析的分别识更为殊胜，因为这是不经对事物进行思考和辨析就能证悟的卓越智慧。第二，关于汝耶的观点，有三点：一是消除先前是否辨析的争论，二是是否依赖因缘，三是消除是否具备所量之事的争论。第一点是：这个不可辨析的事物是先前经过辨析后才不可辨析的吗？还是先前未经辨析就不可辨析？如果是前者，那就成了不是自性的锐利之理，因为先前已经辨析过了。如果是未经辨析就不可辨析，那就成了不合理的理由，因为没有确定所量之事的任务和作用。如果这样说，那么，虽然先前未经辨析，但通过今生的辨析，这个理由是合理的。如果今生进行辨析，那就和可以辨析的意义没有差别了，如果这样说，虽然仅仅是辨析没有差别，但已经说明了所量之事和理由没有差别，而且先前生世不可能进行辨析，而且对于今生来说，也不会辨析小乘的意义，因此不会有差别。总之，所谓的不可辨析，是指依赖于辨析的辛苦较少，而不是完全没有，就像无腰的女神和无腹的女孩一样。如果反驳说，自性的锐利是先前通过学习教法而变得锐利的吗？还是未经学习就变得锐利？如果是前者，那就成了学习的锐利。如果是后者，那就成了不合理的锐利，因为这两个根和这个理由就像是天授和斧头一样，砍伐实相之树，虽然不是共同的，但自性的根锐利是从自性基础上锐利的，而不可辨析不是完全没有，而是指辨析时间短或者落入二元对立，所以反驳并不相同。第二个争论消除是：这个没有辨析的理由是依赖于词句和文字的因缘，还是不依赖？
English
That is what is desired. The ultimate fault will not arise either, because there is no separate understanding of anything. These five lines refer to the fact that for any phenomenon such as samsara and nirvana or self and generality, there is no thinking and analyzing by taking the discriminating wisdom as an object, but without thinking, one can realize and understand the suchness of all phenomena that appear separately in samsara and nirvana and self and generality. This is more excellent than the discriminating consciousness that needs to be analyzed, because it is the excellent wisdom that can realize without thinking and analyzing things. Second, regarding Ru Yael's view, there are three points: one is to eliminate the controversy of whether or not to analyze previously, two is whether or not to rely on conditions, and three is to eliminate the controversy of whether or not to have measurable things. The first point is: is this indistinguishable thing indistinguishable after being analyzed before? Or is it indistinguishable even if it has not been analyzed before? If it is the former, then it becomes not the reason for the sharpness of self-nature, because it has been analyzed before. If it is indistinguishable even if it has not been analyzed, then it becomes an unreasonable reason, because there is no task and function to determine the measurable thing. If you say so, then even though it has not been analyzed before, this reason is reasonable because it is analyzed in this life. If you analyze in this life, then there is no difference from the meaning of being able to analyze. If you say so, although there is no difference only in analyzing, it has been shown that there is no difference between the measurable thing and the reason, and it is impossible to analyze in previous lives, and for this life, the meaning of the Hinayana will not be analyzed, so there will be no difference. In short, the so-called indistinguishable means that it depends on less effort in analysis, but it is not completely absent, like a goddess without a waist and a girl without a belly. If you refute, is the sharpness of self-nature sharp after learning the teachings before? Or is it sharp without learning? If it is the former, then it becomes the sharpness of learning. If it is the latter, then it becomes an unreasonable sharpness, because these two roots and this reason are like the gift of the gods and the axe, cutting down the tree of reality, although it is not common, the sharp root of self-nature is sharp from the basis of self-nature, and the indistinguishable is not completely absent, but refers to the short time of analysis or falling into duality, so the refutation is not the same. The second dispute elimination is: does this reason without analysis rely on the conditions of words and letters, or does it not rely on it?
Chinese
如果依赖，就和“词语和文字不能表达”这两句话相矛盾；如果不依赖，就和“仅凭言说就能见到实相”相矛盾。此外，还会导致意义无法确定，而且那个意义也必须依赖名言才能说明，这样就产生了矛盾。如果这样问，回答是：仅仅是言说或者仅仅是表达，需要依赖因缘。如果问：那么之前的过失就会出现吗？回答是：那个意义，心的本性如何，谁也不能用词语和文字等来表达，所以只能这样说。仅仅指示这个名字，金刚萨埵也不能表达。本来言词的实际和言词的道路都断绝了，心性本身就是一切的自性，那些有什么可说可表达的呢？佛陀说难以稳定和衡量。虽然如此，为了调伏的对象，必须用无法言说的词语来表达，因为“词语和文字不能表达”这句话本身就变成了词语和文字。例如，虽然执着于无名之名，但它本身却能表达名字。正如《普作续》中所说：“无生无表示无灭绝。”以及“远离增损的无言说是智慧。”《十经》中说：“无法表示的意义，不表示就无法理解，用词语表示无法表示的意义，从而理解无法表示的意义。”《分别论》中说：“对此如实地安立，用如实表达的词语，就像用白色表示白色一样，用超越思虑言说的来表示它。”这样就消除了疑问。第三个辩论的驳斥是：这个不可分析的理由，是具有可衡量性还是不具有可衡量性？如果像第一种情况那样，就和可分析的没有区别了。如果像第二种情况那样，就会陷入遍计所执，因为没有衡量不存在的事物。如果这样问，回答是：这是上师的教言和如雅的观点。第一种观点是，虽然具有可衡量性，但在衡量的方式上，理解有快慢的差别。例如，在观看桑耶寺时，跛子和快行者，在词语上没有差别，但在行走方式的快慢上有差别。这样说的。第二种如雅的观点是：虽然具有可衡量性，但这两个理由的可衡量性是不同的。不可分析的可衡量性是实相本身。可分析的可衡量性是轮回和涅槃二者。