English
Then, are the eight consciousnesses produced by their own nature? Or are they produced depending on the power of habituation? According to the first view, since the eight consciousnesses are established as being produced by their own nature, self-arising sharpness is also equally established. According to the second view, then "The nature abides in the sickness of the cause." This statement is harmful. Furthermore, if it is said that the eight causal consciousnesses are produced by the preceding one, then wouldn't that lead to an infinite regress? If you accept that, then it would mean that there is habituation but no sharpness, so one should investigate from where the preceding internal one arises. The second point is that if two individuals have the same initial habituation, then sharpness and dullness of intellect should not occur, because by nature there is no sharpness or dullness. If you assert that, then it is refuted by the statement, "Even from this one, there is a preceding one," and "One mouth, all at once." These statements explain that even with the same habituation, there is sharpness and dullness. According to the general Dharma teachings, below the accumulation path, habituation is equal without difference, but on the path of joining, they are made to meditate on ugliness, the antidote to their respective desires. One, through the method of reversing dependent origination, understands ignorance as the cause of samsara and becomes a Pratyekabuddha, while the other, because it is difficult to rely on bones, remains a Shravaka. Therefore, the occurrence of sharpness and dullness is established. Is that because there is a difference in the habituation of previous lives? Or what is the reason? That is not helpful, so what is the reason? Because it is not knowing, is it that there is no difference in habituation? Or what is the reason? This pervasive investigation is uncertain. Thus it is said. The third point is that sharpness and dullness should not appear as two in the mindstream of one person, because self-arising sharpness is not established, so it is established by the reason of assertion. The pervasion exists in objects. If you assert that, then even if one's own mindstream has no difference in habituation, it is clear that one experiences sharpness and dullness alternately due to the influence of the elements. The final point is that samsara should have a beginning, because the imprints of samsara do not exist by their own nature, but are newly produced. It is established by the reason of assertion, and the pervasion exists in objects, because what is suddenly accumulated is pervaded by having a beginning and an end. Third, the debate with other schools is divided into two: debate and refutation. The first is divided into three: becoming a good or bad basis, a Buddha whose mindstream is pure without effort on the path, falling into hell without practicing the five heinous crimes, and the Tirthika's doctrine of self-view becoming true. The first point is that the basis, the nature of phenomena, should become something with good and bad, sharp
Chinese
因为粗钝二者的基础是法性，所以那二者有善恶之分。第二点是：不依赖于缘的清净相续和地狱存在是荒谬的，因为有不依赖于因缘的锐利和粗钝。第三点是：外道所认为的具有知性的常一不变的补特伽罗也应是真实的，因为与具有自性的锐利和粗钝相同。第二，驳斥：第一个过失是没有的，虽然因缘使锐利和粗钝显现为善恶差别，但根本是心性，心性是自主的，在心性中是无分别的。例如，身体和铜器的因缘使善恶显现为差别，但根本是黄金，善恶是平等的。正如《宝藏论》所说：“一切自性皆是心，与黄金之譬喻无二。”如果那样没有，自锐利就无法成立，所以说是相违，但并不相违。或者说，基础显现为具有善恶是荒谬的吗？或者说，成立是荒谬的吗？如果是前者，就承认吧。如果是后者，就没有理由。如果说：有，因为显现为具有善恶。即使显现，如果善恶没有成立，那又有什么用呢？没有周遍。正如《宝藏论》所说：“显现的方式无论如何显现，存在的方式是不确定的。”因此，那样说是把错觉的执着心当作量，从而给本性加上过失。因此，对于比那二者更殊胜的轮回涅槃和无明智慧也无有善恶，是同一味道，应当思维这样宣说的密宗甚深续部的意义。第二点是：显现为清净相续和地狱，是依赖于道和业的因缘，还是不依赖？如果依赖，那么承认那二者存在，因为一切续部都说由证悟与未证悟而产生轮回涅槃。如果不依赖，那么理由不相同，因为虽然成立了自性的锐利和粗钝，但显现为锐利和粗钝是依赖于因缘的。例如紫色的葡萄。驳斥是：没有修道的清净相续是相违的，因为已经成立了自性的锐利是不相违的，并且铁石等也本来就成立了锐利和粗钝，所以遮破。如果这没有，那么如是本然的佛陀也不应理，这样说。第三点是：与认为常恒不变，以及这里认为只是由四大组成
English
Because the basis of sharpness and dullness is dharmata, therefore those two have good and bad aspects. The second point is: it is absurd that there is a pure continuum and hell that do not depend on conditions, because there is sharpness and dullness that do not depend on cause and conditions. The third point is: the eternal, unchanging self of the heretics should also be true, because it is the same as having sharpness and dullness by nature. Second, refutation: There is no fault in the first point, although conditions cause sharpness and dullness to appear as different good and bad, the root is mind itself, mind itself is autonomous, and there is no distinction in mind itself. For example, the conditions of the body and copper vessel cause good and bad to appear as different, but the root is gold, and good and bad are equal. As the Treasury of Logic says: "All essence is mind, and is no different from the example of gold." If that is not the case, self-sharpness cannot be established, so it is said to be contradictory, but it is not contradictory. Or is it absurd that the basis appears to have good and bad? Or is it absurd to establish it? If it is the former, then admit it. If it is the latter, there is no reason. If you say: There is, because it appears to have good and bad. Even if it appears, if good and bad are not established, then what is the use? There is no pervasion. As it is said in the Treasury: "No matter how things appear, the way they exist is uncertain." Therefore, saying that is taking the clinging mind of illusion as a measure, thereby adding faults to the nature. Therefore, for samsara and nirvana and ignorance and wisdom, which are more superior than those two, there is also no good or bad, they are of the same taste, and one should contemplate the meaning of the profound tantras of the secret mantra that say this. The second point is: does the appearance of a pure continuum and hell depend on the conditions of the path and karma, or does it not depend on them? If it depends, then admit that those two exist, because all the tantras say that samsara and nirvana arise from realization and non-realization. If it does not depend, then the reason is not the same, because although the sharpness and dullness of nature are established, the appearance of sharpness and dullness depends on conditions. For example, purple grapes. The refutation is: the pure continuum without the path is contradictory, because it has already been established that the sharpness of nature is not contradictory, and iron and stone, etc., also originally established sharpness and dullness, so it is refuted. If this is not the case, then the Buddha as he is should not be reasonable, so he said. The third point is: with the idea of permanence and immutability, and here it is considered to be composed only of the four elements.
Chinese
因为不希望有“有”的特征，所以不相似。例如，火的灼热是自性成立的，但却是无常的。铁的锋利和迟钝是自性成立的，但也是无常的。第三，考察它存在于何处，有四种情况。第一，锋利和迟钝存在于基础事物自性的实相中吗？还是存在于考察对象中？如果存在于实相中，就会产生与经文相违背的过失。什么是唯一的法？即是菩提心要。以及与口诀相违背：有情众生的心相续中，从根本上说，有锋利和迟钝吗？没有吗？有情众生的心之相续，因为是如来藏唯一，所以从调伏的锋利程度大小的差别来看，从根本上说，自相续没有锋利和迟钝。如果自相续有锋利和迟钝，那么就不可能是如来藏唯一。如此等等。理智是：基础会变成具有能取所取。为什么呢？如果说因为基础中存在锋利和迟钝两种，那么拉杰藏巴说：在四种颠倒的考察中，会出现锋利和迟钝两种，但在实相中，没有锋利和迟钝两种。拉杰涅吾说：如果不在实相中，而出现在考察对象中，就会变成无因之果，因此，在实相自性的基础中，也应该存在一种因。拉杰努布说：在胜义谛中是空性的，在世俗谛中是显现的，在无分别中，锋利和迟钝两种是无分别存在的。第二，一个人的智慧相续中，锋利和迟钝能否同时存在？如果不能同时存在，那么一切法就不是二无自成，因为不能同时存在。如果承认，那么存在与不存在、常与断、作为与勤奋等等，一切都自性成就，本来就存在。这样就排除了。如果能够同时存在，那么锋利的时候就不是迟钝，迟钝的时候就不是锋利，这就有矛盾。如果说，锋利和迟钝这两种是相对于本体来说不能同时存在，因为锋利的时候就不是迟钝，迟钝的时候就不是锋利。相对于因缘来说，是可以同时存在的，因为锋利本身也会因为身体不适的因缘而变得迟钝。第三，自性的敏锐和修习的敏锐，能否在一个人的智慧相续中同时存在？不能同时存在
English
Because it is not desired to have the characteristic of "existence," it is dissimilar. For example, the heat of fire is established by its own nature, but it is impermanent. The sharpness and dullness of iron are established by their own nature, but they are also impermanent. Third, examining where it exists, there are four situations. First, do sharpness and dullness exist in the reality of the nature of the base object? Or do they exist in the object of examination? If they exist in reality, there will be a fault of contradicting the scriptures. What is the one Dharma? It is the essence of Bodhi. And it contradicts the oral instructions: In the mindstream of sentient beings, from the root, are there sharpness and dullness? Or are there not? Because the mindstream of sentient beings is the one Tathagatagarbha, from the difference in the degree of sharpness of taming, from the root, the self-mindstream has no sharpness or dullness. If the self-mindstream has sharpness and dullness, then it cannot be the one Tathagatagarbha. And so on. The intellect is: the base will become something with a grasper and a grasped. Why? If it is said that because there are two, sharpness and dullness, in the base, then Laje Tsangpa says: In the four inverted examinations, two, sharpness and dullness, will appear, but in reality, there are not two, sharpness and dullness. Laje Nyewo says: If it is not in reality, but appears in the object of examination, it will become a cause without an effect, therefore, in the base of the reality of reality, there should also be one cause. Laje Nub says: In the ultimate truth, it is emptiness, in the conventional truth, it is appearance, in non-duality, the two, sharpness and dullness, exist non-dually. Second, can sharpness and dullness exist simultaneously in the mindstream of one person? If they cannot exist simultaneously, then all dharmas are not spontaneously accomplished in non-duality, because they cannot exist simultaneously. If it is admitted, then existence and non-existence, permanence and annihilation, action and diligence, etc., are all spontaneously accomplished, and exist from the beginning. This is how it is excluded. If they can exist simultaneously, then when it is sharp, it is not dull, and when it is dull, it is not sharp, which is contradictory. If it is said that these two, sharpness and dullness, cannot exist simultaneously in relation to the essence, because when it is sharp, it is not dull, and when it is dull, it is not sharp. In relation to conditions, they can exist simultaneously, because sharpness itself will become dull due to the condition of physical discomfort. Third, can innate sharpness and cultivated sharpness exist simultaneously in the mindstream of one person? Cannot exist simultaneously