English
All of these, the profound depths of their meaning, the hundreds of sacred Dharma's excellent explanations, like gently flowing streams, converge and complete the boundless ocean of nectar. This is the essence of the early translation teachings, with pure view, practice, and conduct. It is truly rare among the rare, wonderful among the wonderful! Thus, the ultimate reality and all phenomena are in harmony. Other impure appearances, and the ways of clinging to these appearances, cannot generate certainty through the path of valid cognition, because they are uncertain. If one sees the harm of reason, they will waver. Therefore, they are changing, merely assertions of appearances without a firm basis. However, the wisdom of spontaneously arising union, which is the indivisible truth of purity and equality, having perfectly and manifestly realized the nature of reality as it is, having abandoned all obscurations, is the unchanging, unconditioned nature. It is the ultimate, primordial Dharma-nature established by infallible valid cognition, free from all elaborations of the object and subject of perception. Reality and all phenomena are in harmony, and it is the valid cognition of the result. Thus, all practices are ultimately established by decisive reason, and therefore it is an unchanging, true promise. Alas! Apart from this, no matter how one examines, the fruit of the vow cannot be manifested. Transcending limits, free from bias, whichever aspect of union it may be, everything is permissible; knowing one is liberation from all. Thus it is said. The seventh question and answer: Regarding whether the Great Madhyamaka free from elaboration has assertions or not, which is appropriate, there are four parts to the answer: 1. How asserting that there are no assertions directly contradicts one's own tenets. 2. Presenting the views of the Omniscient Great One, distinguishing between whether there are assertions or not. 3. Therefore, greatly establishing that there are assertions through the power of valid cognition and reasoning, and how to refute objections. 4. Following the Omniscient Dharma Lord, extensively explaining the Madhyamaka's own system. First, it is shown by two stanzas and three lines, such as "Madhyamaka free from elaboration": When examining whether the Great Madhyamaka free from elaboration, the Prasangika, which does not abide in union, has its own system of assertions or not, most of the early Tibetan scholars unanimously said that the Prasangika Madhyamaka's own system
Chinese
认为在任何情况下都不承认任何事物是不合理的，因为不存在是与否、存在与否等等的戏论。例如，在吉祥月称的自宗中观论著《入中论》及其注释中，清楚地表明了对基础——蕴、界、处之缘起，以及道——各个补特伽罗的三种法，十地菩萨，果——三身和十力等等功德的承认。尽管如此，却公然否认一切承认，并将基础、道和果等等的术语之安立完全推给他人，这是因为吉祥月称的自宗的能诠之词与所诠之义相互矛盾，因此不应如此认为。第二，克隆钦饶绛等四句偈颂表明：第二佛陀，全知法王克隆钦饶绛桑波亲口说道，在吉祥月称的自宗中观，即中观应成派中，对于术语的安立，是否存在承认，对此进行考察。大多数雪域的早期学者都执着于存在或不存在的片面观点。例如，四位善说者之一，精通词义的玛嘉香尊认为存在承认。而大学者藏巴则认为不存在承认。如果对此进行考察，这两种观点各自都存在缺点和优点，因此没有很好地区分。因此，对于远离一切缺点的自宗观点来说，为了与圣者的等持智慧相符，在衡量胜义谛的实相时，当专注于等持时，在自性法界中，是与否、存在与否等等的戏论都无法成立，既然如此，又该如何承认存在与否等等呢？因此，根本不存在任何承认。因此，所谓的自宗，就是指通过自己的理智来衡量最终的实相，并确立为无害的，这必须被认为是自宗的承认。因此，在以等持智慧为对境，以及与他人辩论等等时候，自性或
English
It is unreasonable to assume that nothing is admitted in any way, since there is no elaboration of is and is not, exists and does not exist, and so on. For example, in glorious Chandrakirti's own tenets, the Madhyamakavatara and its commentaries, it is clearly stated that the basis—the dependent arising of the skandhas, dhatus, and ayatanas—and the path—the three dharmas of individual beings, the ten bhumis of the bodhisattvas, and the result—the three kayas and the ten powers, and so on, with their qualities, are all admitted as the unmistaken dependent arising of mere appearances. Nevertheless, it is openly denied that there is any admission at all, and all the terms of the basis, path, and result, and so on, are completely transferred to others, which is not acceptable because the expressing words and the expressed meaning of glorious Chandrakirti's own tenets contradict each other. Second, Klongchen Rabjam and the other four verses show that the second Buddha, the omniscient Dharma King Klongchen Rabjam Zangpo, said that in glorious Chandrakirti's own tenets of Madhyamaka, that is, the Madhyamaka-Prasangika, it is examined whether there is admission of the establishment of terms or not. Most of the early scholars of Tibet held one-sided views of existence or non-existence. For example, Macha Phyangtson, one of the four good speakers, who is skilled in both words and meaning, believes that there is admission. The great scholar Tsangba, on the other hand, believes that there is no admission. If we examine this, each of these two views has both advantages and disadvantages, so they have not been well distinguished. Therefore, for one's own tenet that is free from all faults, in order to be in accordance with the wisdom of the samadhi of the noble ones, when measuring the ultimate reality as it is, when focusing on samadhi, in the nature of the dharmadhatu, the elaboration of is and is not, exists and does not exist, and so on, cannot be established at all. Since this is the case, how can one admit existence and non-existence, and so on? Therefore, there is no admission at all. Therefore, what is called one's own tenet is the ultimate reality that has been measured by one's own reasoning and established as harmless, and this must be regarded as the admission of one's own system. Therefore, when the wisdom of samadhi is the object, and when debating with others, and so on, the nature or
Chinese
对于实相存在与否等极其细微的戏论也一概不成立，法界如其本然，既非存在也非不存在，也无所谓空与非空等任何执着。当以道后得位名言为对境时，对于包括基、道、果在内的宗派，所有如是如是的安立，都必须如实不混淆地分别承认，我是这样认为的。今后，如果我能如此立誓，并且能够说话，那么我所说的善妙之语，都应归功于《大疏·白莲花》的力量。第三，因此以“雪域”等十二颂来阐述。像这样，后得位分别的安立方式，以及其他宣说存在承认的方面，以及依此而立的雪域的一些和另一些智者，如果以应成中观的自宗来观察，因为没有真实成立，所以没有真实成立的承认，但是对于未经观察、未经考察的世间共称的名言，仅仅是存在承认的方面，以教证和理证反复强调并极力论证，这也是没有很好区分的。因为如果那样，对于俱生和后得的中观细微和粗大等情况没有很好区分，如果普遍地论证存在承认，那么对于自性、实义、实相、法界，存在与否等戏论都不能成立。因此，对于应成中观的自宗，未经考察的世间共称的一切名言，一概都存在承认，这也是极难成立的。像这样，所谓应成中观的自宗，必须是以理性能够衡量，并且没有损害的中观宗派的究竟实相之义。除此之外，其他的名言承认，因为有理证的损害，所以不是自宗。为什么呢？因为应成中观自宗以胜义谛的观察理智来衡量时，那些名言的承认并不成立。因此，如果应成派的自宗承认是自宗的宗义，那么它本身就必须在胜义谛中成立，因此，唯有以自主的胜义谛观察理智来观察也认为没有损害的承认，才能被正确的理智所推动。
English
Regarding the nature of reality, even the subtlest elaborations such as existence or non-existence are not established. The Dharmadhatu, as it is, is neither existent nor non-existent, and there are no assertions of emptiness or non-emptiness, etc. When the path of post-meditation is taken as the object, all the tenets of the schools, including the basis, path, and result, must be acknowledged separately without confusion, as they are taught in the authentic scriptures. This is what I believe. In the future, if I can make such a vow and am able to speak, then my good explanations should be attributed to the power of the Great Commentary, the White Lotus. Thirdly, it is explained by twelve verses such as "Snow Land." Thus, the way of establishing post-meditation differentiation, and also the aspect of saying that there is acceptance, and some and other scholars of the Snow Land who rely on that, if one examines the self-nature of the Madhyamaka-Prasangika, because there is no true establishment, there is no acceptance of true establishment, but for the worldly conventions that have not been examined or investigated, only the aspect of accepting the terms of worldly fame is repeatedly emphasized and greatly proven by scripture and reason, which is also not well distinguished. Because if that is the case, if the subtle and coarse aspects of Madhyamaka in coemergence and post-attainment are not well distinguished, if one proves that there is acceptance in all aspects, then for the nature, meaning, reality, and Dharmadhatu, the elaborations such as existence or non-existence cannot be established at all. Therefore, for the self-nature of Madhyamaka-Prasangika, it is very difficult to establish that all the terms of worldly fame that have not been examined are accepted in all aspects. Like this, the so-called self-nature of Madhyamaka-Prasangika must be the ultimate meaning of the Madhyamaka school, which can be measured by reason and is without harm. Other than that, the acceptance of other terms is not the self-nature because there is harm from reason. Why? Because when the Madhyamaka-Prasangika itself measures with the wisdom that examines ultimate truth, those acceptances of terms are not established as such. Therefore, if the Prasangika's own acceptance is the tenet of its own school, then it must be established in the ultimate truth, so only the acceptance that is seen as harmless even when examined by the independent wisdom that examines ultimate truth can be propelled by correct reason.
Chinese
因此，由于他所承诺的未经考察的世俗名言也是自宗的承诺，所以在胜义上成立为真实，并且会变成能够被胜义理智所考察。因此，对于自续派来说，说世俗谛能够被理智考察太过分了，胜义生不被遮破太过分了，圣者的等持成为事物坏灭之因太过分了这三个过失，在你们自己身上也同样会发生。如果说未经考察的承诺不是应成派自宗的承诺，那么说自宗有如世间老人的安立一样的承诺，这与自己的话相违背，因此不合理。另外，如果你们有以胜义理智考察后没有成立为真实，以及未经考察世间名言的一切事物无害存在的这两个承诺，并且这两个承诺都必定是真实的或正确的，那么所谓的自宗是这两个中的每一个，还是两个都是？如果说是其中任何一个，那么另一个就不合理，因为是相违的。如果说“有”不是自宗的承诺，而承诺“无”才是自宗，那么这样一来，“有”的承诺在自己的宗派里，连未经考察的世间名言的世俗也算不上，因为只有“无”才被承诺为自宗。如果说不是每一个，而是“有”和“无”两个都是自己的宗派的承诺，那么任何法都不能被理智考察，因为不承诺或排除不能被理智考察的，而是承诺能够被理智考察而没有过失的，因此“有”和“无”两个都会变成能够被理智考察太过分了。即使那样，以理智考察的空性和未经考察的显现这两个同时在一个事物上聚集也是世间不可能的，如果聚集，那么在以胜义考察的理智考察而证悟到没有或空性的时候，也像未经考察的世间老人一样，事物本身也是存在的，因此对它的执着的有实执着也无法遮止地必须存在，因此胜义考察的理智考察有什么用呢？
English
Therefore, since the unexamined conventional designation that he has promised is also a self-professed commitment, it is established as true in the ultimate sense, and it will become something that can be examined by ultimate reasoning. Therefore, for the Svātantrika, it is too much to say that conventional truth can be examined by reason, it is too much that ultimate arising is not refuted, and it is too much that the samādhi of the noble ones becomes the cause of the destruction of things. These three faults also fall equally on yourselves. If you say that the commitment of unexamined convention is not the self-professed commitment of the Prāsaṅgika, then it is unreasonable because it contradicts your own words that the self-system has commitments like the way the old people of the world establish things. Furthermore, if you have two commitments: that there is no truth established by examining with ultimate reasoning, and that all unexamined worldly conventions exist without harm, and if both of these commitments are necessarily true or correct, then is the so-called self-system of the Middle Way either one of these two, or both? If you say that either one is the self-system, then the other is not reasonable as the self-system, because they are contradictory. If you say that 'exists' is not a self-professed commitment, but that the commitment to 'does not exist' is the self-system, then in that case, the commitment to 'exists' is not even a mere conventional truth of unexamined worldly convention in your own system, because only 'does not exist' is committed to as the self-system. If you say that it is not each one, but that both 'exists' and 'does not exist' are commitments of your own system, then any dharma cannot be examined by reason, because you do not commit to or eliminate what cannot be examined by reason, but commit to something that can be examined by reason without fault, therefore both 'exists' and 'does not exist' will become too much to be examined by reason. Even so, it is impossible in the world for emptiness examined by reason and appearance unexamined to gather together in one thing. If they gather, then even when one realizes that there is no existence or emptiness by examining with the reasoning that examines the ultimate, the thing itself is also existent as in the time of the unexamined old people of the world, so the grasping at it, the grasping at existence, must also exist without being able to be reversed, so what is the use of the examination of reasoning that examines the ultimate?