English
Just like it's not like that. Therefore, if it is thought that the subject, the pillar, is not empty by the pillar itself, but is empty by the other, the truly established object to be refuted, and that the nature of reality is not empty by the nature of reality itself, but is empty by other pillars, thus establishing the basis of emptiness as pillars and the nature of reality, and then thinking that it is empty by truly established and pillars, etc., these, whether for the other-emptiness of name or for the other-emptiness of reality, the appearance and emptiness cannot become the subject and the nature of reality, and similarly, the faults of reasoning that appearance and emptiness are inseparable, or union, equality, and freedom from elaboration cannot be established will descend together and inevitably. The second part is divided into two points: contradicting the scriptures and reasoning, and refuting; showing that union, etc., cannot be established. The first point is shown by "Alas, by that" etc., ten verses and half a verse. In this regard, there are three contradictions: scripture, reasoning, and self-contradiction, in order, alas, pillars and the nature of reality, etc., are not empty by themselves, pillars and the nature of reality, etc., are not empty or not empty by their own nature, but are only empty by the truly established object to be refuted, etc., then the basis of emptiness, pillars and the nature of reality, etc., will remain unempty, and thus will be established by their own nature. If so, then "Form is empty by form" etc., all phenomena from form to omniscience are empty by their own nature, thus contradicting the meaning of the definitive scriptures of the Extensive, Medium, etc. Mother Sutras, and also contradicting what has reasoning. How does it contradict? Are the subject, pillars, etc., and the object to be refuted, the true establishment of pillars, etc., one entity or different entities? If, like the first case, it is thought to be one entity, then, since one of the objects to be refuted, the true establishment, etc., is refuted, one of the subjects, pillars, etc., will also be refuted, because the two are one, for example, just as fire itself does not exist, heat also does not exist. Therefore, saying "Preventing true establishment without preventing pillars" is meaningless. If, like the second case, it is thought to be a different entity, then, even if the other, the true establishment, etc., which is not the object of the subject, pillars, etc., is prevented, the nature of the subject, pillars, etc., will not be emptied by the reasoning of ultimate truth, because it can withstand observation, so it will become truly established, etc., and the fault of being too pervasive, the conventional truth can withstand the observation of reasoning, etc., just as stated above.
Chinese
是的。如果说，由于真实成立甚至在名言中也从未存在过，因此不需要像这样辨析这两者是一还是异。这不合理，因为实际上虽然没有真实成立的事物，但在愚夫的视角中，对瓶子等执着为真实存在是有的，因此必须那样辨析。中观应成派的观点中，所破的立足点也是，以胜义谛的理智来观察，无法堪忍观察的不空之瓶，或者无法阻挡的瓶子的彼岸，即在其他的另一边，所破真实成立，有谁是无法堪忍观察的呢？因为在任何地方都不存在，因此所破的显现方式，其他的人也没有认识到。你们独自认识到就确定了吗？这是不满。然而，将真实成立等的差别安立于所破，或者在所破上安立胜义谛的差别来显示，是分开二谛，所有各自的证悟意义各自解说，在中观自续派的论典中非常著名和成立的，但在这里，如果以胜义谛理智的角度来说，那么柱子和瓶子等，用“它不空”来安立，有什么必要和合理的理由呢？没有的。如果瓶子以瓶子，或者柱子以柱子而变为空性，那么你认为在世俗名言中，柱子和瓶子等那些也如同不存在一样，会变成断灭见，因为害怕对名言进行诽谤等的言语上的过失，而安立“柱子不以柱子空”等，但言语上的矛盾无法避免，这方面尤其严重。如何呢？仅仅是世俗，即在未经观察辨析的名言中，说柱子是存在的，这样不被允许，为什么要说“柱子不以柱子空”呢？如将要解释的那样，是不合理的。如果说这两者意义相同，因此没有不合理之处，那么这两者意义不相同。这样，说“柱子存在”和说“在柱子上，即柱子有柱子”这二者不相同，因为后者“在柱子上”是所依，“柱子存在”是能依，意义上已经承诺，例如所依柱子依赖于其他的柱子，已经承诺依赖于其他的柱子一样。另外，用“它不空”这句话，在二谛中都不合理。如何呢？在胜义谛中，
English
Yes. If it is said that since true establishment has never existed even in name, there is no need to analyze whether these two are one or different. That is not reasonable, because although there is no truly established thing in reality, from the perspective of fools, there is attachment to things like vases as truly existent, so it is necessary to analyze in that way. In the view of the Madhyamaka-Prasaṅgika school, the basis of refutation is also that, when examined with the wisdom of ultimate truth, who can tolerate the examination of the non-empty vase that cannot be resisted, or the other side of the vase, that is, on the other side, the refutation is truly established? Because it does not exist anywhere, the way the refutation appears is not recognized by others. Is it certain that you alone recognize it? This is dissatisfaction. However, to apply the distinction of true establishment, etc., to the object of refutation, or to apply the distinction of ultimate truth to the object of refutation to show it, is to separate the two truths, and to explain all the respective meanings of realization separately, which is very famous and established in the treatises of the Madhyamaka-Svātantrika school, but here, if we consider the perspective of ultimate truth reasoning, then what is the necessity and reasonable reason for applying "it is not empty" to pillars and vases, etc.? There is none. If the vase becomes empty by the vase, or the pillar by the pillar, then you think that in conventional terms, those such as pillars and vases will become like non-existent, and will become nihilistic views. Because of the fear of verbal faults such as slandering conventional terms, you establish "the pillar is not empty by the pillar," etc., but the verbal contradiction cannot be avoided, and this aspect is particularly serious. How is it? Merely conventionally, that is, in terms that have not been examined and analyzed, it is not permissible to say that the pillar exists, so why say "the pillar is not empty by the pillar"? As will be explained, it is unreasonable. If you say that these two have the same meaning, so there is nothing unreasonable, then these two do not have the same meaning. In this way, saying "the pillar exists" and saying "on the pillar, that is, the pillar has a pillar" are not the same, because in the latter, "on the pillar" is the support, and "the pillar exists" is the supported, and the meaning has already been promised, for example, the supporting pillar depends on other pillars, and it has been promised to depend on other pillars. Furthermore, the phrase "it is not empty" is unreasonable in both truths. How is it? In ultimate truth,
Chinese
如果用正理观察，柱子由于不可见或不存在而变为空性，那么说“柱子不以柱子自空”有何必要和作用，这会变得毫无意义。即使在世俗谛中，两次说“柱子以柱子”也是对词语和术语的无知，并且与意义相悖。这也与承诺相矛盾，因为如果柱子等事物不以自身，即自身的自性而空，那么在自性存在的情况下，不承认以真实现立等其他所破之空为他空，反而承认自空是矛盾的。由于柱子等显现中没有其他不同的所破，如果以各自的自性而空，那么承认柱子不以柱子自空也是矛盾的。第二，一般而言，以“他者”等四句偈和两句偈来表示。一般来说，无论前后期的论敌等任何宗派的论者，如果所立宗的柱子和法性涅槃等不以自身而空，反而以所破的真实现立和轮回等其他事物而空，那么不能确定地理解柱子等所立宗是空性的，因为它们不是所立宗和它的法性，显现和它的空性，而是各自不同的。例如，马不是牛，牛也不是马，因此，对于通过无错乱的现量所见的马，由于没有看到除了马之外的牛在马的上面，因此在名言中也不成立，即使通过牛知道马是空性的，也不能确定马是空性，因为无法确定。马的存在和牛的不存在，不是所立宗和法性，缘起和空性，方便和方便生，而是无关联的差异，因此，对于这两者来说，空缘起或显空无别或双运没有任何意义。因此，仅仅见到马，对于见到牛是空性的又有什么用处呢？没有见到牛又有什么损害呢？没有任何作用。因此，不以自身自性而空的涅槃等，以及以轮回等空掉它，也不能成为所立宗和法性，就像马被牛空掉，或者像瓶子和兔角一样。因此，这两者，显现和空性是分离的
English
If, by examining with valid reasoning, the pillar becomes empty due to being unobservable or non-existent, then what necessity or purpose is there in saying "the pillar is not empty by the pillar itself," as this becomes meaningless. Even in conventional truth, saying "pillar by pillar" twice is ignorance of words and terms, and is contrary to meaning. This also contradicts the commitment, because if the pillar and so forth are not empty by themselves, that is, by their own nature, then while their own nature exists, not accepting emptiness of other things to be refuted, such as true establishment, as other-emptiness, but instead accepting self-emptiness is contradictory. Since there are no other different things to be refuted from the appearance of the pillar and so forth, if it becomes empty by its own nature, then accepting that the pillar is not empty by the pillar itself is also contradictory. Secondly, in general, it is shown by four verses and two lines beginning with "by others." In general, no matter which proponent of tenets, whether earlier or later opponents, if the subject, the pillar, and the dharma-nature, nirvana, etc., are not empty by themselves, but are empty by other things to be refuted, such as true establishment and samsara, then it cannot be definitively understood that the subject, the pillar and so forth, is empty, because they are not the subject and its dharma-nature, appearance and its emptiness, but are distinct. For example, a horse is not a cow, and a cow is not a horse, therefore, for a horse seen by unmistaken direct perception, since no cow other than the horse is seen on top of the horse, it is not even established in terminology, even if one knows that the horse is empty by the cow, one cannot be certain that the horse is emptiness, because one cannot be certain. The existence of the horse and the non-existence of the cow are not the subject and dharma-nature, dependent arising and emptiness, means and what is produced by means, but are unrelated differences, therefore, for these two, empty dependent arising or the inseparability of appearance and emptiness or union have no meaning whatsoever. Therefore, what benefit is there in seeing the horse itself to seeing that the cow is empty? What harm is there in not seeing the cow? There is no benefit or harm whatsoever. Therefore, nirvana and so forth, which are not empty by their own nature, and emptying it by samsara and so forth, cannot be the subject and dharma-nature, just like a horse being emptied by a cow, or like a vase and a rabbit's horn. Therefore, these two, appearance and emptiness, are separate.
Chinese
无或双运，轮回世间与寂灭涅槃二者平等性，此理不应有，譬如有的马和牛没有，或者瓶子和山，龟毛二者没有双运和平等性的意义一样。对此，水月本身不是真正的月亮，如是说，天空的月亮是空性的，水月自现，这二者若是双运，那又如何呢？如此显空双运，无论贤愚谁都容易，愚笨的牧牛人也能够证悟，牛不是马或者以马空，贤愚都知道，牛显现，显而易见地贤愚都能见到，如此证悟空性和缘起，赞叹说太稀奇了，不应如此赞颂赞叹，是伟大的世尊佛陀。第二，安立具理的自宗。因此，以自己的等五颂和三句来阐述。如是阐述，因此，对不谬误的宁玛巴自宗来说，水月的显现本身，以理智观察，水月本身内外其他等任何处，都找不到丝毫自己的体性，因此在无或空性的同时，水月本身显现，在显现时，水月本身远离有无等一切戏论，是无遮，但缘起不灭，因此能够显现，如此空性和显现或有二者，如火和热一样无有分别，凡夫的智慧无法容纳，虽然看似相违，但在此处，显而易见地空和缘起或显空二者不相违，不仅如此，如火和热一样无有分别或见到双运，对此，唉玛吙，太稀奇了，也因此这个太稀奇了，以非常稀奇的语言，伟大的智者世尊佛陀和包括心子在内的圣众们，异口同声地赞叹应赞叹的殊胜，也大大地赞颂了。如此，诸法自始至终安住于显空无别或双运自性的实相，因此从体性空性的角度来确定或衡量时，总摄轮回涅槃的一切法，没有丝毫以自性不空的成立，因此一切法