English
Merely the common moisture, the six types of beings will generate many different and dissimilar appearances of water, pus, etc. Between each other, what one sees appears to the other, thereby appearing as invisible, appearing as water and pus, etc. Other than these, what is the moisture that is the basis of appearance? Such a thing does not exist. Furthermore, in the formless, boundless sky, merely the moisture, how could everything that appears become the basis for appearing solely as the sky? It will not change. If examined as one or different, even if the common object of observation is merely moisture, if it is one with water itself, then it should always appear as water, and should not appear in any way as pus, etc., because it appears as water itself, just as water itself appears as water and is cognized. If the moisture is different from water, etc., then merely the moisture cannot be cognized at all, because it is water, etc., that appears and is cognized, just as cognizing water itself is not cognizing something else. Therefore, for water and pus, etc., which are not the same and have different appearances, it is impossible to have a common object of observation, saying, "This is the common object of observation." And in terms of convention, it is also impossible for one thing to appear commonly and uniformly, yet appear as various different things, just as pillars, vases, etc., appear as different things, and it is impossible to have a common object of observation. For people with similar karma and appearances, it is also impossible for the same water, which appears commonly and uniformly, to appear as water and not appear as different things like pus, etc. Therefore, merely by mutually depending on each other, water and pus, etc., are established as having different appearances. Other than that, if one analyzes with reason and acknowledges a common basis or object of observation for water and moisture, etc., then it must be established as the ultimate truth. If so, it would become something that can be established by rational analysis, etc. No matter how one examines or acknowledges it, it will be unreasonable. If there is absolutely no common object of observation that appears commonly, then, as asserted by the Mind-Only school, external objects such as forms do not exist, and it is only the inner consciousness that, under the influence of habitual tendencies, appears as objects such as forms.
Chinese
如果必须承认显现为外境和能取二相，那也不是完全合理的，因为外境在实义上无成立，同样，内能取的心在实义上也是无成立的，二者是相同或相等的，并且所取和能取二者在名言世俗中显现也是相同的，因此，如果用胜义谛的理智来观察所显现的事物，那么将所取和能取二者分开，说能取存在而所取不存在，这种区分是不合理的，因为，在名言中，色等外境显现为所取是存在的，但在实义上无成立，所以是虚假的，同样，能取虽然显现，但如果加以观察，则无成立，所以也是虚假的。因此，《般若经》中说：境和心二者同样被遮止，并且在阿毗达磨的法中是同样存在的。如上所述，由于显现和空性没有截然分开，因此，不偏袒任何一方的显现，共同的观察对象，对于人与天等来说，水和甘露等显现相同，并且作为不显现的基础而存在，所以不能认为它不存在。例如，如果未经观察和分析的显现的戏剧演员在名言中存在，那么就能看到天等戏剧的不同姿态，如果不存在，则无法看到等等。而且，除了这显现和空性没有截然分开的存在之外，不可能从其他存在中成立，如果这显现和空性没有截然分开的显现本身不存在，那么所有的名言显现都将完全不显现，一切都将像虚空一样，什么都没有，这是非常不合理的。即使如此，由于内外各种错乱的因缘，也无法如实地看到事物的真实状况，而是颠倒地看到各种不同的事物，例如，通过施展幻术咒语的力量，使树木等不显现为原来的样子，而是显现和看到马和大象等。因此，不应该确定地说，共同显现的共同观察对象就是这个，不应该设立一个确定的观察基础。第二部分有三个方面：共同的一般性阐述；清净、平等、无别的大的分别阐述；
English
Even if it is necessary to accept that appearances manifest as objects and apprehending aspects, that is not entirely reasonable, because external objects are not established in reality. Similarly, the internal apprehending mind is also not established in reality, and the two are the same or equal. Furthermore, both the apprehended and the apprehending are also the same in appearing as mere conventional designations. Therefore, if one examines what appears with the reasoning of ultimate truth, it is unreasonable to separate the apprehended and the apprehending, saying that the apprehending exists but the apprehended does not. For example, in conventional terms, forms and other external objects appear as apprehended objects, but they are not established in reality, so they are false. Similarly, although the apprehending appears, it is not established upon examination, so it is also false. Therefore, the Prajnaparamita Sutra says: "Objects and mind are equally prohibited, and they exist equally in the Abhidharma teachings." As stated above, since appearance and emptiness are not separate, the mere appearance that is free from bias and partiality, the common object of observation, appears the same to humans and gods as water and nectar, and it is established as the basis for non-appearance, so it cannot be considered non-existent. For example, if a theatrical performer of mere appearance, without investigation or analysis, exists in name, then one can see various different postures of the drama of gods, etc., and if it does not exist, one cannot see them, and so on. Moreover, it is impossible to be established from any other existence other than this existence where appearance and emptiness are not separate. If this very appearance where appearance and emptiness are not separate does not exist, then all conventional appearances will not appear at all, and everything will be like mere space, with nothing at all, which is very unreasonable. Even so, due to various causes of internal and external confusion, one cannot see the actual state of affairs as they really are, but sees various different things in a reversed manner. For example, through the power of casting illusory spells, trees and other things do not appear as they are, but appear and are seen as horses and elephants, and so on. Therefore, one should not definitively say that the common object of observation that appears in common is this alone, and one should not establish a definite basis for examination. The second part has three aspects: a general explanation of the common; a specific explanation of the great purity, equality, and non-duality; and
Chinese
以无遗的方式总结要义。第一部分分为两点：阐述显空双运的平等性；以及驳斥关于其不符合量与非量的争论。第一点，因此，以两颂及一句偈颂阐述自宗观点。如前所述，因此，在具备合理性的自宗观点中，无有边际、不偏不倚的显空，作为不可分割的基础，显空无别之平等性，其自性空性与非空性等戏论皆不成立，然而，显现的一切都平等，因此，一物显现为多种事物也极其合理。对于显空不相违背、不可分割者而言，显空无别是可行或合理的，那么，对于他来说，显现与不显现、量与非量、共同的观察对象等一切名相都可行，极其合理。对于认为显空无别相违背而不可行者而言，显现与不显现等一切名相皆不可行，因为一切名相都断绝了，所以极其不合理。第二部分分为三点：阐述自宗现量和比量成立且并非无意义；阐述他宗的量之安立不合理；因此，要证实为量。第一点，那么，量等以五颂及两句偈颂阐述。那么，对于一切显现皆为平等性而言，量与非量的区分也不合理，是这样吗？在未被错觉染污的如实所见之识面前，水等显现与脓等其他事物不显现，因此，未被错觉染污的如实所见之识，并非不能成立所量之自相，而是极其成立。因为，在水等事物中，一切显现之法，自性上皆安住于各自不共的坚硬、湿润等自性之中，因此，可以从反面的角度对一与异等进行区分，所以，所量之自相以及正确衡量它的无欺之量是成立的。因此，所量和能量相互观待，所量被衡量之量才能成立，没有观待
English
Summarizing the meaning in an all-encompassing way. The first part has two points: explaining the equality of the union of appearance and emptiness; and refuting the arguments that it is not in accordance with valid cognition and non-cognition. First, therefore, the self-view is explained with two verses and one line. As stated before, therefore, in the self-view that possesses reason, the appearance and emptiness that are without limit and impartial, as an indivisible basis, the equality of the inseparability of appearance and emptiness, its self-nature of emptiness and non-emptiness, etc., all fabrications are not established, however, all that appears is equal to all, therefore, it is extremely reasonable and appropriate that one thing appears as many things. For those for whom appearance and emptiness are not contradictory and indivisible, the inseparability of appearance and emptiness is feasible or reasonable, then, for him, all terms such as appearance and non-appearance, valid cognition and non-cognition, common objects of observation, etc., are feasible and extremely reasonable. For those who think that the inseparability of appearance and emptiness is contradictory and infeasible, all terms such as appearance and non-appearance are not feasible, because all terms are cut off, so it is extremely unreasonable. The second part has three points: explaining that the self-view's direct perception and inference are established and not meaningless; explaining that the establishment of valid cognition in other views is unreasonable; therefore, to prove it as valid cognition. First, then, valid cognition, etc., is explained with five verses and two lines. Then, for all appearances that are equality, the distinction between valid cognition and non-cognition is also unreasonable, is it? In the face of the knowledge of seeing things as they are, which is not immediately defiled by the cause of illusion, the appearance of water, etc., and the non-appearance of other things such as pus, etc., therefore, the knowledge of seeing things as they are, which is not defiled by the cause of illusion, does not fail to establish the self-character of the object to be measured, but is extremely established. Because, in things such as water, etc., all phenomena that appear, by their very nature, all abide in their own unique characteristics such as hardness and wetness, which are different from all others, therefore, it is possible to distinguish between one and different, etc., from the opposite point of view, so the self-character of the object to be measured and the infallible valid cognition that correctly measures it are established. Therefore, the object to be measured and the measuring subject are mutually dependent, and the valid cognition that measures the object to be measured is established, without dependence
Chinese
仅仅凭借自主性来确定诸法是通过能量（gZhal bya）和能量的持有者（’jal byed）——量（Tshad ma）而成立的，这并非事实。如果仅仅凭借自主性而成立，那么就会导致实相可以被分析。因此，当说“唯一的水”时，虽然由于没有被错觉所迷惑，水自身通过量而无欺地成立，但并非不依赖于此而仅仅凭借自主性而成立。像这样，由于胜义谛的分析无法被分析，所以水无法通过量而成立，并且对于饿鬼的意识来说，水也不会通过量而成立。因此，相对于水等，对于未被错觉所迷惑的自识之境——能量，通过现量和通过正确的理据而由比量所引导的定解，当能量如何确定其境时，无论取舍、进入或离开，在意义上都不会欺骗或不欺骗，因此量是完美成立的，并且由于它如其所确定般不会欺骗，所以指出它并非没有意义。通过它的力量，也指出了相反的非量即错觉。第二，因此，通过“唯一的水”等三个诗节和三个部分来指出。因此，当说“唯一的水”时，也是相对于未被错觉所迷惑的自识之人的见识的量，将通过量而成立的水作为观察的基础，如果相对于天神本身，则必须将通过量而成立的唯一甘露作为观察的基础，而不是将水和脓作为观察的基础。如果不是这样，如果没有任何东西通过量而成立，例如一满杯水，当饿鬼看到脓、人看到水、天神看到甘露时，这三者不会在同一个基础上聚集，并且如果这三者中没有一个是通过量而成立的观察基础，那么就无法通过量来证明看到这三者之外的其他事物，因此观察的基础会变得不稳定，因此所见之物——脓等三者都会消失。这样一来，如果人所见的水也不是水本身，那么就无法证明看到其他东西是水，因此这完全是不合理的，因此会导致“水”这个词完全消失。对于那种观点来说，世俗量的所有安立也根本无法成立。