English
So, does that object exist or not? If that object exists, then it follows that what is to be refuted is not mistaken, because the object is real, like a valid cognition. If it does not exist, then the refuter will not become a valid cognition, like a fabrication without a measurable object. Furthermore, some say: If the object is one, then is that object true or false? If it is true, then the fabrication is true; if it is false, then the valid cognition is false. If that is said, since there is no distinction between real and unreal, merely grasping at a pot posited by exclusion of others as the object to be measured, since the object of clinging is the same, there is no fault of the refuter and what is to be refuted being unreasonable. Since the manner of clinging is different, existing separately, it is reasonable to establish them as valid and invalid cognition. Therefore, the truth and falsity of ascertainment and fabrication are also established by whether the manner of clinging is in accordance with the meaning or not, and the object is not grasped as independently the same. For example, when two people's hearing consciousness perceives the same sound of a conch shell, and one thinks it is permanent and the other thinks it is impermanent, then both are clinging to the manner of clinging that they themselves have grasped, and the object, the appearance of the conch shell sound, is mixed and grasped as one imputation. Therefore, there is no fault of examining the object of valid and invalid cognition as the same or different. If this is well understood, then many key points of valid cognition will also be resolved. Furthermore, are ascertainment and fabrication one or not one in the nature of the mind? If they are one, then like a sword not cutting itself, the refuter and what is to be refuted are unreasonable. If they are different, then like the wisdom of the Buddha not refuting the ignorance in the minds of other sentient beings, the refuter and what is to be refuted are also unreasonable. If that is said, merely in the continuum of the mind, they are one, so they will not become like different continuums. Since the aspects are different, they will also not become like doing something to oneself. Furthermore, are these two simultaneous or not simultaneous? If simultaneous, that is impossible, because it would follow that the two conceptual thoughts of abandonment and cultivation exist simultaneously, which is harmful. If not simultaneous, then the harmer and what is to be harmed are unreasonable, like sunlight and the darkness of night. If that is said, these two are not simultaneous, so they cannot meet. However, in the same continuum of the mind, first fabrication arises, and later ascertainment arises, so the continuum of fabrication is unable to arise, and the term "refutation of fabrication" is applied. All abandonment and cultivation that become the nature of the mind are the same as this. Because the past has ceased, and the present has been established, it is not possible to harm it. It is also not possible to harm what has not yet arisen in the future, so in reality it is a moment.
Chinese
即使所断和能断没有成立，但对所断的相续未来持续生起造成障碍，就安立为所断和能断。对此，有些人说，所断和对治一起在无数劫中交往，因为菩萨圣者的相续中的智慧和障碍的习气二者长期交往。但如果仅仅从名称上考虑，实际上如果住在一起，那它怎么能断除它呢？因此，圣者菩萨相续中的障碍，各自的对治和所断是没有交往的。执著二取分别的微细习气，怎么会是圣者学道的智慧所断的呢？是金刚喻定的所断。这样，对决定的智慧和增益二者，对境和自性三时进行观察，这也是很好的疑问，之后能让推测者们了解。这是在辩论的结尾处所写的。对第三个辩论的回答是，真实的回答，以及如果不是这样，就显示不合理。第一，经论所生的差别之，法性舍弃之后智者和，妇女儿童之间的一切，成为著名之事物彼等，所立与能立之事物此，无余如实能入于其中。如是说，那么你已经承认一切法无自性，并说没有，如果这样，那么所立的法性和，成立它的理由结合也会变得没有意义，因为法性基础没有成立等等。如果认为不陈述成立的理由，仅仅是承诺也不能成就意义。如果陈述理由，因为有理由，所以一切不会变成无自性，如果这样，那么会变成相违，如果这样认为，这种辩论是愚蠢的，这样安立的所立的法性，是舍弃了宗派的经论所安立或产生的差别的法性，即不执著于想要了解它，对于智者和不智者，普通的妇女和儿童之间，相似显现并且普遍著名的事物，作为法性而执著，所立和成立它的理由的名称的事物，全部无余地无害而如实地进入其中。
English
Even if what is to be abandoned and what abandons are not established, it is designated as what is to be abandoned and what abandons when it obstructs the continuous arising of what is to be abandoned in the future. Some say that what is to be abandoned and its antidote have been associated together for countless eons, because the wisdom in the continuum of noble Bodhisattvas and the imprints of obscurations have been associated for a long time. But if one only considers the name, how can it eliminate it if it actually dwells together? Therefore, the obscurations in the continuum of noble beings, their respective antidotes and what is to be abandoned are not associated. How can the subtle imprints of dualistic perception be what is to be abandoned by the wisdom of noble learners? It is what is to be abandoned by the Vajra-like Samadhi. Thus, examining certainty and superimposition, object and nature, in the three times, is a good question, so that those who infer later will understand. This is written at the end of the debate. The answer to the third debate is the actual answer, and showing that it is unreasonable if it is not so. First: "Having abandoned the particulars generated by the scriptures, among the wise, women, and children, all things that have become famous, this object of proof and proof, will all truly enter." It is said, "If you have admitted that all phenomena are without inherent existence and say that they do not exist, then the subject of proof and the reasoning that proves it will become meaningless, because the basis of the subject is not established, etc. If you think that you will not state the reason for proof, then the meaning will not be accomplished by mere commitment. If you state the reason, then because there is a reason, everything will not become without inherent existence, and if so, it will become contradictory." If you think so, this kind of debate is foolish. Like this, whatever is established as the subject of proof is abandoning the particulars of the Dharma established or generated by the tenets of the school, that is, not grasping it as wanting to know it, for the wise and the unwise, ordinary women and children, things that appear similar and have become universally famous, grasping them as the subject of Dharma, this object of the terms of the subject of proof and the reason for proving it, will all enter without harm and truly.
Chinese
诺。如果把由于论典的观点不一致而产生的有法作为争论的基础，那么共同认可的有法就不能成立，因此所有的论证都会变成有法的基础不成立。这样一来，具有能立和所立两种性质的例子也不可能存在，所以一切的论式都会消失。如果对于论典所产生的差别取得一致的认可，那又有什么可争论的呢，争论也就没有意义了。即使一致还要争论，那就是不顾自己的立场，一味地进行驳斥了。第二，与此相反则不合理。如果不是这样，基础不成立。等等，应该如何回答呢？如前所说，抛弃了不一致之处，没有对有和无等事物进行区分，只是把显现的认知对象作为有法来执取，如果不是这样，你的论证的基础就不成立，例子也不能成立等等，应该如何回答呢？无法回答。例如，佛教徒在对方的面前说：声，有法。是无常的。因为是实有之物。或者，山，有法。有火。因为有烟。像这样陈述。如果对方外道的论典执取所产生的有法差别，就必须执取具有支分的山，以及虚空的性质的声音，这是不可能的，所以有法的基础不能成立。由于它不成立，依赖于它的论证也不可能存在，就像兔角的毛发一样。因此，与有法一致的方面的例子也不可能存在，最终需要推测的有法，以及推测的所依或能立的论证，一切都不能成立。因此，仅仅是共同认可的事物，并且对它进行详细的执取，在建立名言的时候，如果像前面那样对认识和增益的对境进行分析，那就是通达了理性的究竟之处。第二，在世俗中破除争论，分为：能立和所立的安立总体上是合理的，前后世的因果缘起安立的道理分别进行阐述，像这样赞叹远离常断的观点作为结尾这三部分。第一，我不是对具有显现自性的事物进行否认，因此能立和所立的安立没有错乱。
English
No. If the subject of debate is based on disagreements arising from differing philosophical tenets, then a commonly agreed-upon subject cannot be established, and therefore all arguments will become based on an unestablished subject. In that case, an example possessing both the proponent and the property to be proven would also be impossible, so all signs would disappear. If there is agreement on the distinctions created by the tenets, then what is there to argue about? There would be no debate. If one argues even when there is agreement, then one would be refuting without regard for one's own position. Second, it is unreasonable to argue the opposite of that. If it is not like that, the basis is not established. How should one respond to such replies? As previously stated, discarding disagreements and not differentiating between things like existence and non-existence, but merely taking the object of apparent cognition as the subject, if it is not like that, then your argument's basis is not established, and the example cannot be established, etc. How should one respond? One cannot respond. For example, a Buddhist might say to an opponent: Sound, the subject. Is impermanent. Because it exists as a real thing. Or: Mountain, the subject. Has fire. Because there is smoke. Like such statements. If the opponent, a non-Buddhist, takes a specific subject created by their tenets, then one must take a mountain with parts and sound as a quality of space. This is impossible, so the basis of the subject cannot be established. Since it is not established, the sign that depends on it is also impossible, like the hair of a rabbit's horn. Therefore, an example that connects to the side consistent with the subject is also impossible, so ultimately the subject to be inferred and the basis of inference, or the establishing argument, all cannot be established. Therefore, merely a commonly agreed-upon object, and even then, when establishing terminology by carefully examining the way it is apprehended, if one analyzes the object of ascertainment and imputation as described above, then one has reached the ultimate understanding of reasoning. Second, refuting debate in conventional truth, divided into three parts: the establishment of the proponent and the proposition to be proven is generally reasonable; the way in which the cause and effect of past and future lives, the dependent origination, is established is explained in detail; and concluding with praise for being free from permanence and annihilation. First: I do not deny things that have the nature of appearance, therefore the establishment of the proponent and the proposition to be proven is not confused.
Chinese
如是说，我对于从贤者到孩童之间的众生，共同显现于眼、耳等处的有情事物，仅仅是缘起，这并不遮止。如果用智慧和胜观来观察它，就像水边树木的树干一样，连一点点精华的痕迹也看不到，因此不认为是胜义谛成立的。因为没有遮止显现的意义，所以遣除对事物颠倒的增益，并且不颠倒地成立，随之推断的因，以及因所要成立或随之推断的自体之安立，由于在安立上没有丝毫错乱和混淆的过失，因此成立无自性。此处的反面观点已经通过暗示而显现，无需赘述。所谓无自性，是指理解为遮止显现，如果那样，则会认为一切能立和所立的安立都不合理。因此，在这种情况下，以及通常所有中观宗派都一样，在说不遮止显现的时候，不应理解为似乎存在着一种不被自性空性所遍及的显现。例如，水中的月亮本身是显现的，但它是空的。就像保留显现而没有单独的空性存在一样。空性也不需要因此而没有任何显现。如果连显现都没有，那么它的空性也没有。空性和显现两者，如果一个不存在，另一个也不可能存在，如果一个存在，另一个也必然存在。存在的状态也并非像黑白丝线交织那样各自独立存在，或者像去除一个之后另一个才出现那样的轮流交替，而是空性遍及显现，显现遍及空性。如果对这两者永远不可分离的实相深信不疑，即使被一千个佛陀阻止也不会改变，那么就说明对中观宗派的闻思修已经达到了极致。从那以后，无论是显宗还是密宗的道路，只要努力修行，就能扎下稳固的根基。因此，在此处说不遮止显现，虽然只是为了表明承认共同显现的法，但如果深究其原因，问为什么不遮止显现，那并不是为了争论而承认的，而是因为与自己的宗